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1 Introduction
One of the least understood aspects of human migration is the com 
position of the migration flows. Numerous studies have described 
migrant composition in terms of measures such as age, education, 
occupation, income, employment status, gender, and more, but few 
studies have actually attempted to explain or model such aspects. Why 
do certain migration flows consist of relatively more men than women, 
relatively more young than old, or relatively more skilled than 
unskilled? We do not have good answers to such questions. The pri 
mary objective of this study is to model the gender, age, and skill com 
position of legal immigration to the United States.
For many years, immigration issues were not widely studied, pre 
sumably because immigration was not an important source of U.S. 
population growth, either absolutely or relatively. For example, the 
foreign-born population increased by about 283,000 during the 1920s 
and contributed only 1.7 percent of the incremental national population 
between 1920 and 1930. The Depression discouraged immigration 
during the 1930s, and World War II prevented immigration during the 
1940s. During the 1950s and 1960s, the "baby boom," as it came to be 
called, attracted far more attention as a demographic phenomenon than 
immigration. What attention was directed at international migration 
issues by economists during this period was mainly by economic histo 
rians, who focused on the period of unrestricted flows, and by those 
interested in the "brain drain," who were concerned with the flow of 
high-level personnel from poor to rich countries (Greenwood 1983).
Immigration to the United States began to change dramatically with 
the U.S. immigration law enacted in 1965 that opened the door to 
immigration from Asia (which had virtually been banned since the 
1880s). Because European countries were experiencing rapid eco 
nomic growth in the 1960s, demand for entry from these countries was 
low, and immigration from the Americas (especially from Mexico) was 
becoming important.
These changes produced an immigration policy debate that became 
more heated during the 1970s and (especially) the 1980s, and immigra 
tion issues began to find their place in the mainstream literature of eco-
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nomics. The work of Barry Chiswick, who used census microdata to 
study the earnings assimilation of the foreign-born, was particularly 
noteworthy. George Borjas, who formed "synthetic" immigrant 
cohorts using 1970 and 1980 census microdata to also study earnings 
assimilation, further emphasized the importance of immigration in the 
economics profession. Today, immigration issues are widely studied 
and discussed in various social science disciplines.
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF IMMIGRANTS
Do immigrant workers cause a reduction of domestic wage rates and 
displace domestic workers from jobs? This question has long been 
asked in the United States. The United States Immigration Commis 
sion, after meeting from 1907 to 1911, concluded that immigration was 
responsible for many of the poor working conditions then evident in 
the country. Bernard (1953, p. 57) felt that the Commission misrepre 
sented the impacts of immigrant workers on domestic job opportuni 
ties:
One of the most persistent and recurrent fallacies in popular 
thought is the notion that immigrants take away the jobs of native 
Americans. This rests on the misconception that only a fixed 
number of jobs exist in any economy and that any newcomer 
threatens the job of any old resident.
Bernard argued that immigrants as consumers cause an expansion of 
the market and encourage increased investment expenditures, thereby 
further contributing to increased aggregate demand. Moreover, immi 
grants contribute importantly to technological progress and entrepre 
neurial activity. Bernard is suggesting that immigration causes an 
outward shift of not only the labor supply schedule, but also the labor 
demand schedule, but he presents no reason why the demand shift 
should dominate the supply shift. If the supply shift dominated the 
demand shift, the consequence would be that wages would fall and 
indigenous workers would be displaced, though not to the extent that 
would have happened had no offsetting demand shift occurred.
Substantial quantitative evidence suggests that the position advo 
cated by Bernard may have prevailed in the United States up to 1900
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and perhaps even to 1920, during which time aggregate economies of 
scale probably existed. However, opposing evidence also exists; for 
example, Jerome (1926) showed that during the nineteenth century, 
immigration rose during expansionary periods and fell during contrac 
tionary periods, with the effect that immigration did not contribute to 
unemployment as much as would be the case if immigration were not 
so responsive to the domestic business cycle.
Spengler (1958), in a conceptual (rather than empirical) work, 
argued that the main economic consequences of immigration are 
derived from two demographic effects of immigration. 1) In the short 
run, immigration increases the rates of population and labor force 
growth, which in turns boost the rate of growth of output. 2) Immigra 
tion also changes a nation's age composition, favoring working ages 
and augmenting the nation's labor force, while reducing the depen 
dency ratio (i.e., the ratio of the nonworking population to the total 
population). Spengler recognizes that this second effect is also short 
run, with the long-run effect dependent upon such factors as the size, 
sex composition, continuity, and precise temporal dimension of the 
flows.
Spengler (1956) also argued that the skill composition of immigra 
tion changed as the sources of U.S. immigrants shifted from western 
and northern Europe to southern and eastern Europe. The "first wave" 
of immigrants (see p. 37) had served as a catalyst in U.S. economic 
growth, since it included many innovators and entrepreneurs. He con 
tends that the "second wave" of immigrants, on the other hand, origi 
nated primarily in relatively underdeveloped, agriculturally oriented 
economies, and those immigrants tended to be illiterate and lacking in 
occupational and industrial skills. However, with American industry 
becoming more mechanized at about the same time as their arrival, this 
wave of immigrants satisfied the growing demand for unskilled labor 
in the nation's cities. Thus, the "second wave" performed a more or 
less passive role in U.S. economic development.
In general, historical evidence suggests that the direct consequence 
of immigration was to affect adversely the wages and working condi 
tions of less-skilled domestic workers. As Williamson (1982, p. 254) 
wrote, "surely, in the absence of mass migrations, the real wage would 
have risen faster and inequality trends would have been less pro 
nounced." Indirectly, however, the effects of immigration may have
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been strongly positive. Economies of scale may have been increasing 
in the aggregate until the early years of the twentieth century, and 
immigration may have contributed to the faster achievement of these 
economies. Moreover, immigration's impacts on land and mineral 
development, as well as on capital accumulation and the general 
growth of markets, may well have been positive. Hill (1975), studying 
the period 1840-1880, concludes that the existence of a 10 percent 
economy of scale would cause observed immigration over the period to 
increase per capita income by 3.1 percent.
Finally, Williamson (1982) stressed the idea of the "absorptive 
capacity" of permanent immigrant settlement in the United States, 
referring to the effects of immigrants on the wages of domestic work 
ers. If absorptive capacity is high, immigration will have little if any 
depressing effect on wages. Absorptive capacity is high if the native 
labor force has high supply elasticities (i.e., native secondary workers 
are crowded out of the labor force), if demand elasticities are high, and, 
in a dynamic model, if a high elasticity of response of land and capital 
with respect to immigration prevails. Quantitatively, the forces that 
presently underlie absorptive capacity may be considerably different 
than they were historically.
The debate today frequently focuses on illegal alien immigrants 
(although it could as well focus on less-skilled immigrants in general), 
and widespread disagreement exists about the effects of immigrants on 
native-born workers. Briggs (1975a, 1975b) has expressed what might 
be called the "replacement hypothesis," asserting that illegal aliens 
depress local wage levels and take jobs that would otherwise be held 
by native workers. Hartley (1972, p. 66) supports this view, arguing 
that illegal aliens "displace low income American workers, hampering 
unionizing efforts, encourage employers to disregard wage, hours, and 
working conditions statutes and generally depress the labor market."
Other writers have put forth what might be called the "segmentation 
hypothesis." Abrams and Abrams (1975), for example, have taken a 
position that the jobs filled by illegal aliens are not at the expense of 
native workers. They argue that the labor market is sufficiently seg 
mented that American workers are insulated from direct employment 
effects caused by immigrants. 1 Piore (1979) has pressed this argument 
even further by arguing that one component of labor demand in 
advanced industrial societies is for jobs that are simply undesirable to
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the native labor force. As a consequence of this demand and the failure 
of the native labor force to meet the demand, a migrant labor market 
develops and thrives. Marshall (1986) has taken an intermediate posi 
tion, arguing that while it would be unrealistic to argue that illegal 
immigrants do not displace any domestic workers, it would equally 
unrealistic to argue that the displacement is one for one. The "contro 
versy therefore is over the extent of displacement not whether or not it 
occurs" (p. 26).
The most common approach to studying the economic conse 
quences of immigration is the production-theory approach, which 
essentially asks whether immigrants and natives are complements or 
substitutes in production. The magnitudes of the wage and employ 
ment changes due to immigration depend upon the elasticities of labor 
demand and domestic labor supply, the magnitude of any immigration 
quota, and other assumptions. In general, the more inelastic the 
demand and supply relationships are, the greater will be the reduction 
of domestic wages due to a given number of immigrants. Moreover, 
the displacement effect will be greater the more elastic the domestic 
labor supply is and the less elastic the labor demand is.
One of the most troubling assumptions of the production-theory 
approach is that labor is homogeneous. Such an assumption rules out 
issues of the differing impact of immigration on various members of 
the native-born labor force. Borjas (1985 and 1987b) provided evi 
dence that earlier immigrant cohorts generally do relatively better (in 
terms of earnings) than both natives and immigrants in more recent 
cohorts, thus suggesting that immigrant "quality" has been declining 
over time. While this evidence is inferential, Borjas (1992) and others 
(Smith 1991; LaLonde and Topel 1991b) also have noted a decline in 
observable skills, such as educational attainment, in more recent immi 
grant cohorts. If U.S. immigration is becoming more oriented toward 
less-skilled individuals, the most directly relevant demand and supply 
elasticities are those in the low-wage labor market. Furthermore, if the 
labor market is indeed nonhomogeneous, issues concerning the ease or 
difficulty of transferring skills internationally (as well as those associ 
ated with the economic adaptability of immigrants and their offspring 
in the receiving country) take on added importance.
Studies that take the production-theory approach often recognize 
that the short-term impacts of immigrants on native-born workers may
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differ from the long-term impacts. In the short run, physical capital is 
fixed and time is insufficient to accumulate additional human capital. 
In the long run, however, general capital accumulation and intersec- 
toral shifts of capital may be induced by immigration, and the immi 
grants themselves may invest in human capital. The domestic groups 
with which the immigrants initially competed in the domestic labor 
market may therefore differ from those with which they later compete.
The short-term effects of immigration should be to increase the rela 
tive rates of return on factors of production that are complementary to 
the migrants' skills and resources and to decrease the rates of return of 
factors that are substitutable for those of the migrants. Thus, for exam 
ple, if migrant labor can be substituted for native labor, the relative 
earnings of native owners of capital will rise, whereas native labor 
earnings will fall. A number of models assume three factors: capital 
and two classes of labor, skilled and unskilled. Considering the case of 
three factors of production and assuming a constant elasticity of substi 
tution (CES) production function, Chiswick (1982) suggested that 
immigration of either type of labor will increase aggregate per capita 
income. 2 However, migration results in a decrease in the marginal 
product of native workers who possess the same type of labor skill as 
immigrants and results in an increase in the marginal product of both 
capital and the other type of labor. Thus, if immigrants are assumed to 
be less skilled than the average native worker, immigration will 
increase the average earnings of skilled workers and owners of capital 
and decrease the average earnings of low-skilled native-born workers.
The increase in the wage differential between skilled and unskilled 
workers that results from the inflow of unskilled migrants will set in 
motion another set of adjustments. Members of the indigenous popu 
lation who were at the margin between whether to invest in more 
human capital are now more likely to make such investments. As this 
skill adjustment occurs, the wages of unskilled workers will rise rela 
tive to those of skilled workers. Over time immigrants will also adjust 
the level of their skills. Consequently, the initial impacts of the immi 
grants may differ considerably from the ultimate impacts.
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EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF THE EFFECTS 
OF IMMIGRATION
Aggregate Effects
A few studies have attempted to simulate the effects of immigration 
on native-born workers by using relevant demand and supply esti 
mates. For instance, Johnson (1979) argued that because estimates of 
the elasticity of supply of low-skilled labor are close to zero, employ 
ment among low-skilled native workers will fall only slightly due to 
immigration, but these estimates imply a strong negative impact on 
their earnings. In a later paper, Johnson (1980) postulates that in many 
industries domestic wages are inflexible downward in the short run. 
Consequently, immigrants who find jobs do so at the expense of the 
employment of native-born workers. The rate of labor market dis 
placement depends on the magnitude of various parameters. Using a 
plausible range of these parameters, Johnson (1980, p. 335) suggested 
"a labor market displacement effect that is only around 10 percent."
Using cross-sectional data for 1970, Grossman (1982) estimated a 
translog production function to determine the substitutability between 
capital, employed native workers, employed second-generation native 
workers, and employed foreign-born workers. Based on measures 
derived from factor-share equations estimated for 19 standard metro 
politan statistical areas (SMSAs) for 1969, she concluded that "both 
second generation workers and foreign workers are substitutes for 
native workers, but second generation workers are much more highly 
substitutable for natives than are foreign-born workers. In-migrants 
substitute for second generation workers more easily than for native 
workers" (p. 599).
Considering the effect of a 10 percent increase in the number of 
legal U.S. immigrants and assuming that the wage rates of native 
workers are downwardly rigid (as they might be in the short run), she 
concludes that native employment would fall by only 0.8 percent and 
wages of the foreign-born would fall by 2.2 percent. In the long run, 
however, if all wages were flexible, native workers would suffer about 
a 1.0 percent decrease in wages, second-generation workers a 0.8 per 
cent decrease, and foreign-born workers a 2.3 percent decrease, but
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the price of capital would rise by 4.2 percent. Thus, Grossman (1982, 
p. 602) concludes that "large inflows of immigrants ... do not pose 
serious economic threats to natives, although the effects are not negli 
gible."3 These findings are consistent with Borjas's (1986a) conclu 
sion that during the 1970s, male immigrants failed to affect the 
earnings of black men but had a small negative influence on the earn 
ings of native white men.
Grossman's empirical results are now widely accepted, but her esti 
mates must be interpreted with caution. 4 Using a production-theory 
approach but with a special form of the normalized quadratic func 
tional form, Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli (1996) found that, in the 
short run, an exogenous increase in the number of (recent) immigrants 
causes the employment of native workers to fall, but the effect is quan 
titatively small. This decrease in employment of native workers con 
tributes to a short-run decline in gross domestic product, but this 
decline is also quantitatively small. Because the rental price of capital 
rises, owners of capital are better off. In the long run, the wages of 
native workers fall only slightly. However, the wages of recent immi 
grants fall considerably. The wage of nonrecent immigrants rises, 
which suggests that recent immigrants are more like native workers 
than nonrecent immigrants. 5
Given the differences in underlying methodologies and data sets 
examined and Borjas's inclusion of controls for the skill levels of indi 
viduals, the similarity of the findings of Borjas (1986a), Grossman 
(1982), and Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli (1996)—that immigrants 
have had a very small (negative) impact on the earnings of the native- 
born population—is of considerable interest. Indeed, a recent study by 
the National Research Council (1997, p. 5-23) concluded that "the 
weight of the empirical evidence suggests that the impact of immigra 
tion on the wages of competing native-born workers is small—possibly 
reducing them by only 1 or 2 percent." These findings, however, imply 
nothing about how quickly the economy adjusts to an exogenous 
change in labor supply. Even though the resulting change in wages 
may be small, adjustment costs may be large. 6
Moreover, in each study, different immigrant groups are aggregated 
into a single homogeneous population. Several important issues are 
raised by this approach. First, since existing evidence illustrates that 
immigrants of different racial and ethnic background differ in terms of
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the characteristics they possess upon arrival in the United States, one 
may question whether immigration's impacts on native workers differ 
by race and/or ethnic origin. Furthermore, the various analyses deal 
primarily with the impact of legal immigrants on broadly defined 
classes of native workers. Therefore, their conclusions may be ques 
tioned, because more finely defined subclasses of workers may have 
impacts that are unidentified. 7
Subgroup Effects
The impacts of racial and ethnic groups were studied in the 1980s 
by, among others, Borjas (1986a, 1986b, 1987a), Stewart and Hyclack 
(1986), King et al. (1986), and DeFreitas (1988). The conclusions of 
those who have developed more or less direct evidence regarding the 
aggregate effects of immigration on native workers (as a whole) refute 
the segmentation hypothesis in its extreme form. Immigration appears 
to cause a decrease in employment of low-skilled, native-born persons, 
but only a small decrease. The wages of such workers probably fall 
also, but again only slightly. Subdividing of the domestic labor market 
and further refinements in classifying immigrant groups have led to 
similar conclusions of negligible or, at most, very small immigration 
impacts. Interestingly, these impacts are sometimes positive. DeFrei 
tas' (1988) view of immigration, as a sequential process in which some 
newcomers integrate into ethnic job clusters and, over time, disperse 
from these enclaves to exert competitive pressures on low-skilled 
native workers, seems to be a plausible explanation for some of the 
observed coexistence of complementary and substitution relationships. 
However, it should be noted that analyses based on 1990 data are still 
rare. The large influx of the 1980s and its focus on California could 
have changed the various relationships.
Others have studied the effects of immigrants on young workers. 
Matta and Popp (1988) as well as Kimenyi (1989) argued that recent 
immigrants are substitutes for low-skilled native-born workers. Win- 
garden and Khor (1991) found only small effects of illegal aliens on 
teenagers' unemployment, but Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992) 




Although the aggregate supply of unskilled labor may be quite 
inelastic and the aggregate demand for such labor is elastic, conditions 
may be considerably different in specific industries or occupations. 
Consequently, while the effects of immigrants on the total employment 
of unskilled persons and on their national average wage may be small, 
the effects on workers at a subnational level could be considerable, yet 
obscured in the aggregate.
Differences in age and educational composition, combined with 
less-than-perfect transferability of skills to the U.S. labor market, con 
tribute to an occupational distribution of recent immigrants that is 
somewhat more oriented toward less-skilled occupations. The U.S. 
workforce as a whole is considerably more concentrated in the mana 
gerial and professional and in the technical, sales, and administrative 
support occupations than is the new immigrant population; immigrants 
are more concentrated in service and in operator, fabricator, and 
laborer occupations. Immigrants who have been in the United States 
for a longer period have an occupational distribution that is similar to 
that for all U.S. workers, which suggests either that the older immi 
grants had a different initial bundle of skills or that over time they were 
assimilated into the U.S. economy.
Industry-specific studies have been conducted for agriculture (Duf- 
field 1990; Mines and Martin 1984); manufacturing (DeFreitas and 
Marshall 1984; Waldinger 1985; Maram and King 1983); and the ser 
vice sector (Maram and King 1983). The many industry case studies 
are largely descriptive (as opposed to analytical) contributions, but 
taken as a whole, two conclusions emerge. First, in certain industries 
located in specific regions, such as Los Angeles and New York, 
employment displacement effects of immigrant workers are clearly 
evident. 8 These negative effects are frequently felt by earlier cohorts of 
immigrants, but native-born workers also suffer job displacement. 
Second, employers find immigrant hiring networks to be advantageous. 
No study has specifically analyzed why these networks are advanta 
geous, but we can infer that relatively substantial cost savings must be 
realized through the use of network hiring.
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Region-Specific Effects
The concentration of the foreign-born population of the United 
States differs considerably by census division and state. Whereas ear 
lier immigrants of European origin tended to locate in eastern cities 
and then spread out from there, contemporary immigrants from Asia 
and the Americas tend to locate in western and southern areas. For 
example, in 1980,40.9 percent of Miami's employees and 23.9 percent 
of Los Angeles's employees were foreign-born, but only 6.0 percent of 
Detroit's and 4.7 percent of Denver's. Such differential concentrations 
of the foreign-born suggest that the economic impacts of immigrants 
may differ in various regions of the United States, even though labor 
and capital flows along with interregional trade presumably spread and 
smooth the effects somewhat nationally. Studies of regional effects 
have included those of Smith and Newman (1977), Davila and Mattila 
(1985), Muller and Espenshade (1985), McCarthy and Valdez (1986), 
Card (1990), and LaLonde and Topel (1991a, 1991b).
In general, the empirical evidence appears to indicate that in areas 
where immigrant concentrations are particularly high (such as the 
southwestern border and Los Angeles), some wage-depressing effects 
are evident. 9 Moreover, some job displacement also seems to exist. 
These effects are most concentrated among the less-skilled and lower- 
income native residents of these regions.
More research is clearly required to identify the markets in which 
the immigrants compete, as well as to measure the relevant demand 
and domestic labor supply elasticities in these markets. One observa 
tion seems clear, however. The more narrowly defined the industrial 
sector and/or the region in question, the more likely are investigators to 
find negative consequences of immigration to native workers and ear 
lier immigrant groups.
STUDIES BEYOND PRODUCTION THEORY
One of the major problems with most existing studies is that they 
focus on a single channel of immigrant influence, the production-theory 
channel; that is, they are concerned with whether immigrants and
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natives are substitutes or complements in production. However, immi 
grants may also influence native workers through a number of other 
channels, and these additional influences may offset or reinforce those 
exerted through the production-theory channel (Greenwood 1994; 
Greenwood and Hunt 1995). Another problem in many studies is that 
labor and capital mobility are not incorporated explicitly.
The production-theory effect can lead to either a decrease or an 
increase in aggregate labor income depending on whether immigrants 
and natives are complements or substitutes and the size of the relevant 
elasticities. Consequently, this effect can lead to higher or lower levels 
of local demand in an area. Moreover, the greater the wealth of the 
immigrants, the larger their sources of nonlabor income, and therefore 
the greater will be the stimulation of local final demand in an area due 
to immigrant settlement there.
Agglomeration effects—economies that accrue to an entire area 
due to increased population and scale—are rarely considered in the 
context of immigration, and the internal migrations caused by immi 
grants' effects on local wages are also seldom focused on. These 
channels of influence (and others) could be integrated into a single 
model, and two recent studies introduce channels of immigrant influ 
ence beyond the production-theory channel. The first of these is by 
Altonji and Card (1991), who developed a structural model that in 
addition to production theory includes output demand and exports 
from the metropolitan region. Their local demand effect occurs 
through increased population. Four skill categories of native labor are 
considered, and each is low-skilled. Altonji and Card did not econo- 
metrically estimate many of their model's parameters, did not explic 
itly include capital as an input, and did not explicitly incorporate labor 
mobility. They estimated parts of their model with 1970 and 1980 
census data for 120 SMSAs. Although their econometric results are 
somewhat sensitive to the specification and estimation procedure used, 
their preferred results suggest that "a 1 percentage point increase in 
the fraction of immigrants in an SMSA reduced less-skilled native 
wages by roughly 1.2 percent" (p. 226).
The second recent study that introduces several channels of immi 
grant influence is by Greenwood and Hunt (1995). The main distin 
guishing features of this study are that it includes capital, explicitly 
models area supply-and-demand relationships in a structural manner,
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and incorporates several channels through which immigrants may 
affect natives, including production theory, local demand (including 
immigrant demand separately), net export demand, labor force partici 
pation, and migration. Both capital and labor are mobile.
Greenwood and Hunt used the recently available Gross State Prod 
uct Accounts, which represent a more comprehensive database than 
that available to previous researchers, to estimate capital and output. 
Simulation results indicate that although immigrants and natives are 
substitutes in production, when other channels of influence are taken 
into account, the negative effects stemming from substitutability in 
production are substantially mitigated. Moreover, under certain 
assumptions the effects on native wages and employment are positive, 
which in turn leads to a positive correlation between native migration 
and immigration (similar to the observation made by Butcher and Card 
[1991] with respect to the 1980s). 10 However, increased immigration 
causes somewhat lower wages among the foreign-born, which is con 
sistent with previous studies using alternative models.
IMMIGRANT COMPOSITION AND ITS IMPORTANCE
Immigrant composition is important, because who is permitted to 
enter may differentially affect the U.S. economy, native-born workers, 
and prior immigrants. The economic consequences of immigration to 
the United States are far-reaching, and they depend upon the character 
istics of the immigrants. Given the fact that legal immigration is cur 
rently at or near historical highs, the compositional aspects of the 
immigrant population assume commensurate importance.
Gender is one of these important compositional aspects. Although 
little research has ever been conducted on the economic effects of 
immigrant females versus immigrant males, these effects are likely to 
be considerably different. First, females are less likely than males to 
be "economic migrants," or migrants motivated by economic advan 
tages and costs. Female immigrants tend to have lower labor force par 
ticipation rates and lower earnings than their male counterparts. 
Female immigrants therefore contribute less to taxes (such as income 
and Social Security taxes) than male immigrants. They tend to have a
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higher probability of part-time employment, and they sometimes com 
pete in labor markets that are not common for males (e.g., day care, in- 
home cleaning services). Moreover, females have longer life expect 
ancy than males, so those female immigrants who qualify for social 
services and generally for social benefits (such as Social Security and 
Medicare, as well as Supplemental Security Income) will, on average, 
demand them for a longer period of time. Finally, the child-bearing 
capacity of female immigrants increases the growth potential of the 
second-generation immigrant population and the U.S. population as a 
whole.
The age composition of immigration also is important. For 
instance, the age at which immigrants enter the United States is a 
determinant of the benefits that will be derived from their presence in 
the country. Other things being equal, immigrants who migrate at 
younger ages assimilate more rapidly into the U.S. labor force and 
therefore, since younger immigrants also have more years over which 
they contribute to the U.S. economy, they provide greater benefits to 
the United States. Furthermore, younger immigrants tend to be more 
proficient in English-language skills during their subsequent post-entry 
years than immigrants who enter at older ages. Greater proficiency in 
English-language skills further augments the immigrants' labor force 
productivity and also facilitates their more general social and cultural 
assimilation. In addition, the age composition of immigrants may 
influence the magnitude of the costs that immigrant families impose on 
the U.S. economy, since age composition importantly determines the 
dependency ratio within newly entering immigrant families. Immi 
grant families that arrive in the United States with young children may 
impose costs on social service providers (such as the public school sys 
tem), but the returns to these investments (such as to education) may 
not accrue until many years in the future.
On the other end of the age spectrum, individuals who migrate at 
older ages may constitute a net burden on the U.S. economy, since they 
enter at ages at which their reliance on certain social services (e.g., 
health care) may be particularly high. Yet, age and human capital 
accumulation (in the form of formal education and job experience) go 
hand-in hand. Thus, in addition to implications for entrepreneurship 
and technical change, the immigration of older persons typically 
implies a potential direct impact on older native workers. They also
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have more nonlabor income, which more positively affects local labor 
demand, and their greater assets allow older immigrants to actively 
participate in housing and other (e.g., stock) markets. For these and 
other reasons, the age of immigrants is an important determinant of 
their economic impacts, but this aspect of immigration has not been 
extensively studied.
Finally, the skill composition of immigrants has many potential 
effects on the U.S. economy. The supply of highly skilled immigrant 
workers is often stressed as a matter of critical importance to the main 
tenance of a vibrant and competitive U.S. workforce in an economy 
that is increasingly becoming more globalized. Moreover, in an era of 
rapid technological change, highly skilled workers are necessary to 
keep productivity at the frontiers of technological developments. Yet, 
many of the studies that conclude that less-skilled immigrants have 
small but non-negligible impacts on the least-skilled domestic workers 
use data from 1970 and refer to immigration that occurred during the 
1960s. Not only was immigration somewhat greater during the 1970s 
and 1980s than during the 1960s, but it also appears to have shifted 
toward less-skilled migrants. Several other studies have concluded that 
more highly skilled native workers are positively affected or perhaps 
are unaffected by immigration, again at least in the short run. In gen 
eral, however, the literature is lacking in studies that identify precisely 
why the more highly skilled workers enjoy short-run benefits. Such 
benefits could result from factor complementarity, from the demand 
effects of the immigrants, from capital accumulation directly related to 
immigration, and/or from other causes.
In addition, migrant skill levels may be linked to many of the influ 
ences discussed earlier in the context of the age composition of 
migrants. Highly skilled workers are more economically productive 
than less skilled workers. Therefore, highly skilled workers add more 
to overall U.S. productivity, and their higher incomes contribute more 
to the private sector in the form of consumption expenditures and to the 
public sector in the form of tax payments. In addition to their higher 
incomes, highly skilled workers generally have higher levels of educa 
tion. By virtue of their education and innate abilities, such workers are 
likely to be more proficient in English when they enter the United 
States, and if they are not, to learn English-language skills more 
quickly, and therefore they are able to assimilate more rapidly in the
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U.S. economy. Given the linkage between skill level and income/edu 
cation levels, the skill composition of immigrants also may influence 
the dependency ratio within immigrant families, as well as affect the 
overall U.S. fertility rate in subsequent years. Crime rates too are 
related to income and education levels. Therefore, the skill level of 
migrants should affect the extent to which immigrants impose a net 
cost on U.S. society.
OVERVIEW OF THIS STUDY
The research that is described here is based on a "human capital" 
approach to immigration. Although we attempt to account for factors 
such as political conditions and religion in source countries, much of 
our focus is on the benefits and costs of migrating legally to the United 
States. Such a focus entails explanatory variables such as relative per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) and distance to the United States 
from source countries of immigrants. Because all sorts of institutional 
impediments inhibit free international movement, the force of eco 
nomic incentives is blunted. Consequently, the models developed 
below attempt to control for institutional restrictions in two ways. 
First, we distinguish those immigrants who are numerically restricted 
under U.S. law from those who are exempt. Second, we introduce a 
number of "policy controls" as independent variables in our various 
models. These controls reflect such factors as naturalization to U.S. 
citizenship of persons born in different countries, as well as various 
programs (e.g., lotteries) that may have caused deviations from other 
wise "normal" admission procedures.
Perhaps the most unique type of variable included in the study is a 
vector or set of source-country social program indicators. Four types 
of social programs are examined: 1) old-age pension systems, 2) sick 
ness and maternity programs, 3) unemployment insurance programs, 
and 4) family allowances. We anticipate that because such programs 
involve transfers or redistributions between various groups in source 
countries, they influence the differential economic advantages of resid 
ing in various countries relative to residing in the United States. Thus, 
such programs will play a role in influencing not only the rate of legal
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migration to the United States, but also the gender, age, and skill com 
position of the migrants.
As an illustration of our thinking regarding the importance of social 
programs in source countries, consider unemployment insurance pro 
grams, which involve transfers from older workers with lower unem 
ployment rates to younger workers with higher unemployment rates. 
In a typical country, the unemployment rate of persons in their twenties 
may be three times higher than that of persons in their forties. The 
younger workers also have migration propensities that are often three 
or four times higher than those of workers 20 years older. Thus, the 
benefits of unemployment insurance programs accrue differentially to 
an age class that otherwise has a high propensity to migrate. Conse 
quently, such programs should discourage migration, and especially 
the migration of younger persons, while twisting the age composition 
of U.S. immigration toward older persons. Similar modes of thinking 
underlie many other social programs examined in this study.
The study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 sketches the history of 
U.S. immigration policy, and Chapter 3 provides a brief history of U.S. 
immigration. Chapter 4 provides details on the data that underlie the 
models that are estimated in Chapters 5 through 8. Chapter 5 discusses 
a model of the determinants of overall U.S. immigration. Chapters 6, 
7, and 8 develop models of the gender, age, and occupational composi 
tion of U.S. immigration, respectively; the models also distinguish 
immigrants who are numerically exempt under U.S. law from those 
who are numerically restricted. Chapter 9 provides a summary and 
conclusions.
Notes
1. Also see Gordon (1975).
2. A CES production function requires that each elasticity of substitution between 
input pairs be equal, which in turn implies that no differential pattern of factor 
complementary exists.
3. Grossman's analysis is based on the assumption that characteristics of immigrants 
are similar to those of U.S. legal, employed residents in 1969. Since these charac 
teristics may have changed over time, the conclusions may also have to be modi 
fied somewhat.
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4. Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli (1996) point out that her estimated production func 
tion is not well behaved and that it fails to satisfy the required concavity condi 
tions.
5. Greenwood, Hunt, and Kohli suggest that the result appears to be consistent with 
findings regarding immigrant assimilation that indicate age-earnings profiles of 
immigrants that are initially lower than those of otherwise comparable native 
counterparts, but after a period of years catch up with and later surpass those of 
the natives. They are also consistent with declining immigrant quality over time.
6. Simon, Moore, and Sullivan (1993) report evidence of little or no observed 
increase in aggregate native unemployment, even in the relatively short run during 
which adjustment costs should be most severe.
7. Questions may also be raised concerning the relevance of the conclusions to the 
assessment of the impact of undocumented aliens on domestic workers. For evi 
dence related to impacts of undocumented workers, see Bean, Lowell, and Taylor 
(1988), DeFreitas (1988), the companion U.S. General Accounting Office reports 
(1986, 1988), and Grossman (1984).
8. The fact that case studies reveal the most negative impacts on native and legal 
workers is not particularly surprising. Research employing the case-study meth 
odology focuses on situations where researchers expect to find negative impacts. 
Regions and industries where negative impacts are likely to be found are generally 
known. For researchers knowledgeable about immigration in specific regions, 
occupations and even firms where negative effects might be found are also well 
known. Obviously, such knowledge frequently directs the researchers to cases 
that show adverse consequences for native and legal workers.
9. Topel (1994) concludes that, in the West, immigration of less-skilled Hispanics 
and Asian workers has adversely affected the wages of natives, especially less- 
skilled natives, thus contributing to the wage inequality observed in the West. 
This inference is indirect, however, since the Current Population Survey data that 
are used did not allow nativity status to be identified. Moreover, concerning the 
possible sources of the increase in the wage gap between highly educated and less 
educated individuals during the 1980s, Borjas and Ramey (1994) are unable to 
reject noncointegration between the college-to-high-school dropout wage series 
and the percentages of immigrants.
10. Filer (1992) describes a different pattern for the 1970s in which the location of 
immigrants in various places encourages out-migration of natives.
2 United States 
Immigration Policy
Immigration policy not only helps to determine how many persons 
may enter the United States during any given year; it also helps to 
influence the characteristics of U.S. immigrants: who they are, where 
they were born, when they may come, and with whom they may come. 
U.S. immigration policy has been characterized by three lengthy peri 
ods during which different emphases were placed on admission crite 
ria: 1) the laissez-faire period that ended in 1921; 2) the national origin 
quota period from 1921 to June 30, 1968 (fiscal year 1967); and 3) the 
family reunification period beginning in 1968.
During the laissez-faire period, essentially no quantitative restric 
tions existed on immigration. Almost all persons were welcome to 
enter the United States with the exception of the Chinese (after 1882) 
and individuals such as criminals and prostitutes. Immigrants met at 
least two critical and related economic needs during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. First, they allowed the frontier to be devel 
oped without major labor shortages in eastern industrial centers, which 
could have been one cost of developing the frontier in the absence of 
immigration. Second, they satisfied the rapidly growing demand for 
unskilled and semiskilled labor in the nation's cities.
Between 1820 (when immigration statistics were first compiled) and 
1921, 34.5 million persons were welcomed to the United States, an 
annual average of 337,843 immigrants. 1 The vast majority of these 
immigrants came from Europe, where famine, religious intolerance, 
political institutions, lagging employment opportunities, and relatively 
low wage rates in one way or another encouraged their flight. More 
over, many European nations were experiencing demographic transi 
tions;2 rural areas were especially overpopulated. Vialet (1980, p. 7) 
succinctly characterized the period: "The mass migration of the 19th 
century was the result of a near perfect match between the needs of a 
new country and overcrowded Europe."
During the second period of U.S. immigration policy, from 1922 
through fiscal year 1967, 9.5 million immigrants entered the United
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States, an average of 206,875 per year, or about 61.2 percent of the 
annual average during the laissez-faire period. This second period was 
characterized by the national origin quota system, which allocated 
visas in proportion to the national origins of the U.S. population, as 
defined from various censuses.
Vialet (1980) attributed the adoption of the first comprehensive 
quantitative restrictions on immigration (in the Quota Law of 1921) to 
a variety of immediate causes, including the fear of a flood of refugees 
from Europe following World War I, and the growing nationalism and 
isolationism that followed the war. The report of the Dillingham Com 
mission (Joint Commission on Immigration), which painted a fairly 
negative picture of immigrants, undoubtedly also contributed to the 
Quota Law. Moreover, the adoption of restrictions was reinforced by 
what were at the time popular biological theories alleging the superior 
ity of certain races (Congressional Research Service 1979, p. 8). 
Although the national origin quota system was reaffirmed in 1952, its 
philosophical basis was probably not one of racial superiority, but 
rather of contemporary sociological theories relating to cultural assim 
ilation. The 1952 act introduced a preference system that recognized 
both needed skills and family reunification. In this way it was an ante 
cedent of the Immigration Act Amendments of 1965 that were fully 
implemented in 1968.
The Immigration Act Amendments of 1965 ushered in a new era 
both for U.S. immigration policy and for U.S. immigration in general. 
The national origin quota system was abandoned at a time when 
national awareness of limitations on civil rights and civil liberties was 
acute. The new system, which is described in detail later in this chap 
ter, was characterized by heavy emphasis on family ties as the main 
path to entry, although persons with needed skills and refugees also 
were provided opportunities to enter the United States. Between 1968 
and 1995, 18.2 million persons were admitted to the United States as 
legal resident aliens, an annual average of 651,716. This average is 
193 percent of that for the 1820-1921 period and 315 percent of that 
for the 1922-1967 period.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
The Aliens Act of 1798 was the first federal law related to immigra 
tion, yet it was not until 1864 that Congress attempted to centralize 
control of immigration. This goal was achieved through the appoint 
ment by the President of a Commissioner of Immigration who served 
under the Secretary of State.
In 1875, Congress began for the first time to develop a policy of 
direct federal regulation of immigration in earnest. Direct regulation 
was accomplished by prohibiting the entry of undesirable persons 
(criminals and prostitutes). 3 Moreover, Congress prohibited bringing 
Oriental persons into the country without their free and voluntary con 
sent and made contracting to supply coolie labor a felony. The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 suspended the immigration of Chinese laborers 
for 10 years, provided for the deportation of Chinese who were ille 
gally in the United States, and barred Chinese from naturalization, 
among other provisions. 4 This act was later extended, and in 1904 it 
was reaffirmed and made permanent, with clarification of the territories 
from which Chinese were to be excluded.
The Immigration Act of 1907, among other things, established a 
Joint Commission on Immigration (the Dillingham Commission) that 
was charged with examining the U.S. immigration system. The Com 
mission studied the effect of immigrants on the employment, wages, 
and working conditions of U.S. workers. In large part, the Commis 
sion's findings were responsible for the Immigration Act of 1917, 
which was a precursor of substantially more restrictive legislation 
enacted during the early 1920s.
The first quantitative restrictions on U.S. immigration were pro 
vided in the Quota Law of 1921,5 which limited the number of immi 
grant aliens of any nationality to 3 percent of the foreign-born persons 
of that nationality who were living in the United States in 1910 (based 
on the decennial census of that year). The 1921 law had a clear effect 
on immigration, especially that from southern and eastern Europe. 
Table 2.1 shows the quotas that were in force for fiscal year 1921-22, 
as well as actual admittances during this year. The quotas were restric 
tive for virtually every country in southern and eastern Europe. For 
example, Italy had a quota of 42,057 and admittances from Italy were
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Table 2.1 U.S. Immigration under the Quota Law of 1921 and Quotas 

















































































































































SOURCE: Congressional Research Service (1980), Tables 7 and 15.
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100.2 percent of this number; for Hungary, 5,638 and 107.0 percent. 
On the other hand, the old source countries of the "first wave" of immi 
grants in western and northern Europe had relatively high quotas, and 
their admittances during 1921-22 were relatively few: Germany, 
68,059 (28.0 percent); and Sweden, 20,042 (43.7 percent). In total, 
only 68.3 percent of the overall quota of 356,995 was filled in fiscal 
year 1921-22, the first year in U.S. history that general quotas were in 
force. In 1922, the Quota Law of 1921 was extended for two years.
The Immigration Act of 1924
The Immigration Act of 1924 is one of the most important pieces of 
immigration legislation in U.S. history. It made permanent the national 
origin quota system and, in combination with the Immigration Act of 
1917, it governed U.S. immigration policy until 1952. The 1924 law 
provided that until June 30, 1927, the annual quota of any quota 
nationality be set at 2 percent of the number of foreign-born persons of 
such nationality resident in the continental United States in 1890. The 
total annual quota was 164,667. From July 1, 1927, (but later post 
poned to July 1, 1929) until December 31, 1952, it set the annual quota 
for any country or nationality; the quota number had the same relation 
to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in the continental United 
States in 1920 having that national origin did to the total population of 
the continental United States in 1920.
The 1924 act was far more restrictive than that of 1921, especially 
for countries of southern and eastern Europe. While the overall 1924 
quota was 46.1 percent of that for 1921 (Table 2.1), the percentage for 
countries of southern and eastern Europe was much smaller: Hungary, 
8.4 percent, and Italy, 9.1 percent. For first-wave countries, the per 
centages were much higher: Germany, 75.3 percent, and Sweden, 47.7 
percent.
The change from a 1910 basis in the Quota Law of 1921 to an 1890 
basis for defining country quotas in the 1924 law reflected nationality 
and ethnic tensions in the country during the 1920s. The major wave 
of immigration from southern and eastern Europe occurred after 1890. 
By establishing a basis date from a census before this wave, Congress 
effectively reduced the quotas of the new origin countries while main 
taining relatively high quotas for the old source countries. In this way,
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Congress hoped to preserve what it perceived as the nationality and 
ethnic balance of the United States as it existed prior to the second 
wave of immigration. It was precisely this type of discriminatory treat 
ment that later laws would attempt to correct.
The 1930s and the 1940s were not particularly eventful in terms of 
immigration legislation. During the Depression of the 1930s, immi 
gration was at a low ebb. 6 During the first half of the 1940s, immigra 
tion remained low because of World War II. In 1943, Congress 
repealed the Chinese Exclusion laws that began in 1882. After the war, 
immigration began to climb again, reaching 249,187 in 1950.
In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(McCarran-Walter Act) over a presidential veto. In many respects this 
1952 act was a continuation of the laws of 1917 and 1924. It main 
tained the national origin quota system (though in a modified form); it 
kept in place the Asia-Pacific-triangle restrictions; and it contained no 
provisions to restrict Western Hemisphere immigration. However, the 
McCarran-Walter Act lifted various racial bars to naturalization, which 
removed race as a bar to immigration, and eliminated sex discrimina 
tion in immigrant admittances. Moreover, the act established a system 
of selective immigration that granted quota preference to skilled per 
sons whose labor services met an urgent need in the United States. The 
1952 act also maintained the policy established in the 1920s of exempt 
ing natives of Western Hemisphere countries from numerical restric 
tions.
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965
The national origin system had been designed to preserve the ethnic 
balance of the U.S. population, but by the 1960s Congress began to 
recognize that the system was failing in this respect. First, those coun 
tries with the highest quotas were demanding only a fraction of their 
quota numbers. Second, between 1953 and 1964, approximately one- 
half million immigrants (of about 3.2 million total) were admitted 
under various special programs as exceptions to the national origin for 
mula, which in the eyes of some members of Congress essentially 
resulted in the abandonment of the national origin system (Congres 
sional Research Service 1979, p. 52). Between 1960 and 1965, of 1.7 
million immigrants admitted to the United States, only 34.6 percent
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entered under a quota (Congressional Research Service 1980, p. 64). 
Finally, public perceptions regarding race and national origin were 
changed relative to what they were during the cold-war climate under 
which the McCarran-Walter Act was passed in 1952.
The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 were 
passed in October, and most provisions of the new law took effect on 
December 1, 1965. However, until June 30, 1968, certain vestiges of 
the national origin formula remained operational, and during this tran 
sition period, the unused quota numbers of undersubscribed countries 
could be absorbed by oversubscribed countries.
Because immigrants who legally entered the United States between 
1972 and 1991 entered under the terms and conditions of the Immigra 
tion and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (with certain revisions 
enacted after 1965), the 1965 law is especially important in the context 
of the present study. This law had five major provisions.
1. It abolished the national origin quota system that had been estab 
lished in 1924 and reaffirmed in 1952, thus eliminating national 
origin, race, or ancestry as a basis for exclusion.
2. It established a seven-category preference system for numerically 
restricted immigrants. These preferences (Table 2.2) provided for 
the reunification of families—the first, second, fourth, and fifth 
preferences, called the relative preferences—and for entry of per 
sons with special occupational talents—the third and sixth prefer 
ences, which have come to be called the occupational 
preferences. (The seventh preference [not shown in Table 2.2], 
which related to refugees, was eliminated by the Refugee Act of 
1980 after it became clear that this preference could not accom 
modate the flow of refugees who were being admitted under spe 
cial legislation.) Visas not used in higher preference categories 
could be used under preferences two, four, and five. Nonprefer- 
ence immigrants were to receive any remaining visas, but after a 
short time nonpreference visas were unavailable because prefer 
ence visas accounted for the total allotment of restricted numbers. 
Numerically restricted immigrant visas were allocated on a first- 
come, first-served basis, but Western Hemisphere countries were 
not subjected to the preference categories.
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Table 2.2 Immigrant Visa Allocation System (1968-1991)3
Preference/provision Limit








Unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. 
citizens and their children
Spouses and unmarried sons and daughters 
of permanent resident aliens
Members of the professions of exceptional 
ability and their spouses and children
Married sons and daughters of U.S. 
citizens, their spouses and children
Brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens (at least 
21 years of age) and their spouses and 
children
Workers in skilled or unskilled occupations 
in which laborers are in short supply in the 








Any numbers not 
used abovec
Numerically exempt immigrants
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens
Spouses, children, parents of U.S. citizens 
at least 21 years of age
Special immigrants
Certain ministers of religion
Certain former employees of the U.S. 
government abroad
Certain persons who lost U.S. citizenship 
Certain foreign medical graduates 
Adjustments for refugees and those seeking asylum
a As presented, this table refers to the law in 1991.
b Except for immediate relatives of adult U.S. citizens, an annual limit of 20,000 is
imposed on each independent country. 
0 Numbers not used in higher preference may be used in these categories.
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3. It established a group of immigrants exempt from quota limita 
tions: a) immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, i.e., the spouses, 
children, and parents of U.S. citizens 21 years of age and older, 
and b) special immigrants, including ministers of religion and 
others.
4. It established an annual Eastern Hemisphere quota of 170,000 
and a Western Hemisphere quota of 120,000. This was the first 
time that the Western Hemisphere was placed under a quota. 
However, the Eastern Hemisphere also was placed under a 20,000 
per country limit on numerically restricted quota numbers, but 
this country limit was not applicable to the Western Hemisphere. 7
5. Finally, it required that the Secretary of Labor certify that an alien 
attempting to enter as a worker would not replace a worker in the 
United States or adversely influence either the wages or working 
conditions of individuals similarly employed in the United States. 
This condition introduced a process known as labor certification 
that was applied to the third and sixth preference categories.
The single most important aspect of the 1965 amendments was the 
elimination of the national origin quota system, which had been in 
place for over 40 years. The second most important aspect was to 
bring the Western Hemisphere under a quota. The provision of a group 
of immigrants exempt from numerical restrictions was not new, but the 
three-tier system of numerically restricted immigration provided addi 
tional structure; the three tiers are hemisphere quotas (later, world quo 
tas), country quotas, and preference-category quotas.
The Immigration Act of 1990
With legal immigration rising during the 1960s and 1970s, and with 
illegal migration thought to be high and perhaps also rising, the federal 
government began to study and discuss various immigration issues 
during the late 1970s. The result, in 1979, was a Select Commission 
on Immigration and Refugee Policy that proposed sweeping changes in 
the nation's immigration laws. During 1984, both the Senate and 
House passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (Simpson- 
Mazzoli Bill), but this bill died in the conference committee estab 
lished to reconcile differences between the two versions. The Simp-
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son-Mazzoli Bill had three major provisions: 1) control of illegal 
migration, 2) legalization of alien status, and 3) reform of legal immi 
gration. When it became clear in the next (99th) Congress that the 
entire package was not ready to be acted upon, the various provisions 
were unbundled. The result was the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, which treated illegal migration, and the Immigration Act 
of 1990, which treated legal immigration.
The 1990 act bears a strong resemblance to the 1965 law it 
replaced. 8 Consequently, immigration under the previous law should 
provide a reasonable blueprint for likely U.S. immigration under the 
new law. Moreover, in a number of ways, the gender, age, and skill 
composition of immigrants under the new law should resemble that of 
their counterparts under the old law. For our purposes, the most impor 
tant provisions of the Immigration Act of 1990 are the following.
1. The worldwide immigration ceiling was raised to 700,000 for fis 
cal years 1992, 1993, and 1994, falling to 675,000 for 1995 and 
later years. The ceiling is, however, flexible in the sense that 
while immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are included under the 
worldwide quota "cap," their number is unlimited.
2. Family-based immigration is guaranteed at least 226,000 visas. 
These are allocated per year to four preference categories 
(Table 2.3).
3. Employment-based preferences are allotted 140,000 visas annu 
ally and are grouped into five preference classes (Table 2.3).
4. The family-sponsored and employment-based preference visas 
made available to citizens of a single independent foreign state 
may not exceed 7 percent of the total number of visas for that 
state. Since family preferences are set at a minimum of 226,000 
and the employment-based limit is set at a minimum of 140,000, 
the per-country ceiling for independent countries is raised to 
25,620. Moreover, at least 77 percent of the visa allotment 
involving spouses, minor children, and unmarried sons and 
daughters of lawful permanent residents is designated for spouses 
and minor children, and three-quarters of these are not subject to 
per-country limits. Prior to the 1990 act, the per-country quota 
was set at 20,000.
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5. So-called "diversity immigrants" were allocated 40,000 visas 
each in 1992, 1993, and 1994, with 1993 and 1994 gaining the 
unused numbers from the prior year. The diversity quota rose to 
55,000 per year beginning in 1995. Diversity immigrants are 
those aliens born in countries adversely affected by the 1965 law 
and their spouses and children. The 55,000 visas are to be allo 
cated to natives of countries that have sent fewer than 50,000 
legal immigrants to the United States over the previous five years. 
No single country can receive more than 7 percent (3,850) of the 
number available worldwide. To be eligible for a diversity visa, a 
prospective immigrant must have at least a high school education 
or its equivalent and at least two years of work experience in an 
occupation that requires at least two years of training and experi 
ence (and this experience must be during the five years immedi 
ately preceding the date of application). Thus, diversity immi 
grants are a kind of occupational immigrant, but without specific 
ity regarding the occupation. Clearly, diversity visas have consid 
erable potential to affect the source-country composition of U.S. 
immigration.
Recent U.S. Policy
Until very recently, Congress has dealt with immigration through 
specifically designed laws. However, during 1996, Congress wrote 
provisions regarding immigrants into legislation that, at least on the 
surface, had little or nothing to do with immigration. The best example 
is the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, which placed certain restrictions on the eligibility of legal 
aliens for federal public benefits (although certain of these restrictions 
were relaxed by Congress in 1997). Another example is the Anti-Ter 
rorism Act, which provides for summary dismissal under certain cir 
cumstances.
Ten years after the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) in an effort to control 
illegal migration, which was the primary goal of IRCA. The provi 
sions of IIRIRA went into effect on April 1, 1997, but many of these
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Table 2.3 Categories of Immigrants Subject to the Numerical Cap: 















2nd: Spouses, children, and 114,200d 




3rd: Married sons and 23,400d 
daughters of U.S. 
citizens
4th: Brothers and sisters of 65,000d 
U.S. citizens (at least 
21 years of age)
Immediate relatives of adult U.S. 
citizens (spouses, children, and 




2nd: Professionals with 40,040d 
advanced degrees or 
aliens of exceptional 
ability
3rd: Skilled workers, 40,040d 
professionals, needed 
unskilled workers and 
Chinese Student 
Protection Act
4th: Special immigrants 9,940
























a The annual limit is adjusted based on visa usage in the previous year.
b The number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens included in these figures is 
assumed to be 254,000. Immediate relatives may enter without any limitation; how 
ever, the limit for family-sponsored preference visa immigrants in a fiscal year is 
equal to 480,000 minus the number of immediate relatives admitted in the preceding 
year. The limit of family-sponsored preference visas cannot go below a minimum of 
226,000 (the worldwide limit of 480,000 minus 254,000).
0 Plus unused family fourth preference visas.
d Visas not used in higher preferences may be used in these categories.
e Plus unused employment fourth and fifth preference visas.
provisions are being challenged in courts of law. The IIRIRA legisla 
tion is regarded as a companion to the 1996 welfare reform legislation. 9
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE COMPOSITION 
OF IMMIGRATION
U.S. immigration law has profoundly influenced the composition of 
U.S. immigration in numerous ways. The direct effects are written into 
the law, which historically has made special provisions for skilled per 
sons and for certain males, for example. The indirect effects result 
from provisions of the law that affect from where immigrants may 
come or with whom they may come. Other aspects of U.S. law and 
U.S. policy that have nothing directly to do with immigration may also 
influence both the source countries of immigrants and the composition 
of various flows, especially gender and age composition.
One example of a direct influence is the emphasis that immigration 
law places on occupational skills relative to family reunification. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 established two 
occupational preferences that in 1991 potentially accounted for 54,000 
visas. In 1991, only 23,591 persons qualified for an occupational pref 
erence as "principals," as distinct from beneficiaries, who qualify as
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spouses and children of principals (31,358 in 1991). On the other 
hand, the Immigration Act of 1990, which took effect in November 
1991, provides for 140,000 employment-based immigrants (and their 
spouses and children). In fiscal year 1992, 51,787 employment-based 
principals were admitted; in fiscal year 1996, 51,079. Thus, the new 
law shifted considerably more emphasis to occupational skills.
A second example—one that potentially could have influenced gen 
der composition—is found in the Immigration Act of 1924. In this act, 
Congress made clear its desire for families not to be separated and for 
reunification of those families that were separated. Wives and unmar 
ried children under 18 of U.S. citizens were granted nonquota status. 
Moreover, preference quota status was granted to the spouses and 
unmarried children under 21 of U.S. citizens aged 21 and over, as well 
as to the wives and dependent children under age 16 of permanent resi 
dent aliens. Harper and Chase (1975, p. 13) argue that in its original 
form this law discriminated against women, because "an alien wife 
preceding her husband could not confer preference quota status on 
him, and an American citizen wife . . . could only confer preference 
quota status on her alien husband." Although amendments were made 
at later dates to lessen the impacts of these conditions, some degree of 
discrimination remained until the enactment of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952. Moreover, by granting "preference quota sta 
tus" to wives of quota immigrants aged 21 and over who were skilled 
in agriculture, the 1924 law made a further distinction based on gender. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the McCarran-Walter 
Act), among other things, eliminated discrimination between the sexes 
as a basis for exclusion.
The indirect influences of the law on immigrant composition are 
more subtle than those exerted directly, but they are no less important. 
For example, historically the occupational preferences have strongly 
favored the admittance of males, especially as principals. Such gender 
tilting is due in part to males in source countries having a higher prob 
ability of being "economic migrants" (persons who respond to eco 
nomic incentives) because of their higher labor force participation 
rates. The gender tilting is also due to the higher probability that males 
in most source countries will have more education than females, as 
well as claim to more personal resources to finance an international 
move.
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Another important indirect effect of immigration law is on the 
source-country composition of immigrants. Because different coun 
tries will provide immigrants who have, on average, different personal 
or family characteristics (such as years of schooling, occupational 
experience, and number of dependents), legal preferences or barriers to 
immigration from various parts of the world have almost certainly 
tilted immigrant composition in one way or another.
U.S. immigration policy in combination with foreign policy can also 
indirectly affect both the gender and age composition of immigration. 
For example, for many years, the United States has had a significant 
military presence in certain foreign countries such as Germany, Korea, 
and the Philippines. Because historically the military has been pre 
dominately male, foreign-born spouses of military personnel have been 
primarily female. Consequently, countries with a significant U.S. mili 
tary presence have relatively many young women qualify for perma 
nent resident alien status as the wives of U.S. citizens. Moreover, after 
residing continuously in the United States for at least five years, a per 
manent resident alien can qualify for naturalization. Upon obtaining 
citizenship, any naturalized citizen who is at least 21 years of age is eli 
gible to reunite with her (or his) parents, who are exempt from numeri 
cal restrictions. Thus, from the same countries that are sources of 
relatively many young female immigrants come relatively many older 
immigrants. In the modeling effort described below, we attempt to 
account for such countries.
Notes
1. These figures relate to gross immigration, not net immigration. Especially during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, return migration was consider 
able, amounting to perhaps 33 percent of gross immigration (Warren and Kraly 
1985).
2. The "demographic transition" refers to a society's passage from traditional to 
modern economic and social conditions. During this passage, both birth and 
death rates, which are initially quite high, fall. However, in many (but not all) 
cases during the transitional phase, death rates fall first and, because birth rates 
remain high for a time, population grows rapidly. Many possible reactions to the 
high rate of population growth are possible, including internal migration from 
rural to urban areas and emigration. See McNamara (1982).
3. In 1882, those persons deemed likely to become a public charge were added to the 
list of excluded persons, and in 1891, persons suffering from certain contagious
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diseases were placed on the list, along with polygamists and aliens assisted by 
others through the payment of passage. Anarchists, or persons who believe in, or 
advocate, the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the United 
States, or of all government, or of all forms of law, or the assassination of public 
officials were barred in 1903. Knowledge of English was made a requirement of 
naturalization in 1906. In 1907, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, and persons 
with physical or mental defects that could affect their ability to earn a living were 
barred from entry. In 1917, illiterate aliens were excluded from admission.
In 1940, past as well as present membership in proscribed organizations 
became grounds for barring entry. In 1950, present or past membership in the 
Communist party was added to the list. The exclusion or expulsion of aliens who 
persecuted others on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or political opin 
ion under the direction of the Nazi government of Germany or its allies was 
authorized in 1978. Certain grounds for exclusion, especially based on health 
considerations, were repealed in 1990.
4. Higman (1984) discussed the circumstances that led to the banning of Chinese. 
Among the factors that he noted are the completion of the Union Pacific Railroad 
in 1869 that resulted in what he calls "a large floating labor supply" (p. 34), a seri 
ous recession in the mid 1870s, cultural differences with persons of European 
ancestry, and the fact that the Chinese did not migrate freely but rather were con 
trolled by Chinese societies, which appeared to be a new kind of slavery.
5. Goldin (1994) discussed the reasons why restrictive legislation was not adopted 
much earlier in the 1890s. She concluded (p. 255) that "shifting political interest, 
generally favorable economic times, and a lot of good luck" (for those who came 
between 1890 and 1921) were the main reasons.
6. Of the 528,431 persons accepted as legal resident aliens during the 1930s, 
250,000 are estimated to have been refugees from Nazi persecution (Vialet 1980).
7. The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976 placed the Western 
Hemisphere under the annual 20,000 per country ceiling as well as under the pref 
erence categories. A later amendment in 1978 combined the separate Eastern and 
Western Hemisphere ceilings into a single worldwide ceiling of 290,000, which in 
1980 was reduced to 270,000 in connection with the Refugee Act of 1980.
8. The new law, like the old, provides for the unrestricted immigration of certain 
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. The new law places more emphasis on 
employment considerations, but the old occupational preferences (3rd and 6th) 
emphasized many of the same types of considerations. Legal resident aliens are 
still able to reunite with immediate relatives under a preference (though with an 
expanded number of available visas).
9. The 1996 welfare reform bill defines a new eligibility category for legal aliens, 
called qualified aliens, which includes lawful permanent residents, refugees, and 
those granted asylum, as well as certain others. Most qualified aliens were barred 
initially from food stamps and supplemental security income (SSI), which is a 
federal cash assistance program (supplemented in certain states) for the elderly, 
blind, and disabled. Moreover, the welfare reform law initially barred qualified
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aliens admitted to the United States before the law's enactment on August 22, 
1996, from all means-tested federal programs for their first five years in the 
United States. However, in 1997, Congress changed its position and approved the 
continuation of SSI and Medicaid for those legal immigrants who were in the 
United States on August 22, 1996. It also approved such benefits for those legal 
immigrants who were in the United States on this date but were not receiving 
these benefits, if they subsequently become poor or disabled. States also are per 
mitted to deny qualified aliens Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), 
which replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and 
various federally funded state programs such as child care and services for the 
elderly. Certain exceptions are made, including refugees and those granted asy 
lum during their first five years in the United States (extended to seven years in 
1997). Naturalized citizens are eligible for the benefits available to native-born 
citizens, but naturalization typically requires five years as a permanent resident 
alien.
Most federal public benefit programs have not been available to illegal 
migrants, but the law was silent on such eligibility for certain (minor) programs. 
The 1996 law defines "not qualified aliens" to include illegal migrants and bars 
their use of federal public benefit programs, as well as state and local programs. 
If states wish to make benefits available to nonqualified aliens, they must pass a 
law that allows them to do so. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that 
0.5 million aliens who presently receive SSI benefits could lose their eligibility, 
along with 1.0 million aliens currently using food stamps.

3 A Brief History of 
U.S. Immigration
Table 3.1 provides a decade-by-decade breakdown of U.S. immi 
gration from the 1820s to the 1990s. 1 Historically, the years of heavi 
est immigration were early in this century, when the annual gross flow 
exceeded one million during six different years with a peak at 1.3 mil 
lion in 1907. Between 1901 and 1910, 8.8 million immigrants were 
admitted to the United States, a figure unrivaled by any other decade in 
the nation's history. However, during the 1980s, 7.3 million persons 
entered. The recent surge of immigration has continued during the 
1990s; in 1991 alone over 1.8 million persons were admitted as legal 




During U.S. history, the source-country composition of immigration 
has changed considerably. Muller and Espenshade (1985), following 
others, characterized this changing composition as consisting of four 
overlapping waves (though the third of these four refers to internal 
migration and not directly to immigration). The first major wave began 
in earnest during the 1830s, when the number of arrivals jumped to 
599,125 from 143,439 during the 1820s. During the 1840s, arrivals 
totaled over 1.7 million, and this wave peaked during the 1880s.
Although immigration during the mid to late nineteenth century was 
certainly due to some combination of economic and social conditions 
in Europe and the promise of a better life in America, technological 
improvements in transporting people by sea, which allowed large num 
bers of persons to move relatively quickly, safely, and cheaply, were 
also important. Thomas (1973, p. 36) indicated that the first Cunard 
steamships were placed in service during 1840, revolutionizing ocean
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Table 3.1 Immigration to the








































SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza 
tion Service (1997), Table 1.
transport, although Scott (1972, p. 36) reported that in 1856, about 95 
percent of the immigrants who arrived in New York still came by sail. 
By 1873, however, the majority came by steam. 3 Gould (1979) noted 
three important consequences of the substantial reduction in the dura 
tion of the crossing. First, the opportunity cost of not working while 
on board the ship was greatly reduced. Second, the physical hardships 
of lengthy voyages, including hunger, thirst, sickness, and death, were 
eased by the faster crossing. Third, knowledge about opportunities in
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America, transmitted through private correspondence and through 
advertising by steamship lines, spread more rapidly.
The first wave originated in Europe, specifically in western and 
northern Europe. The Potato Famine (which struck continental Europe 
as well as Ireland), social and economic problems, demographic transi 
tions, and religious intolerence were common motivating factors for 
this wave of immigrants. Ireland was a major source country. Between 
1815 and 1845, an estimated 850,000 Irish crossed the Atlantic (Taylor 
1971).4 During the 1850s, 2.6 million immigrants arrived in the United 
States, 35 percent from Ireland. The 1850 U.S. Census reported 
962,000 persons born in Ireland; the 1890 Census, 1.9 million persons.
Immigration from Germany, which had begun during the 1830s and 
had continued to build during the 1840s, outstripped that from Ireland 
during the 1850s, when Germany supplied 37 percent of U.S. immi 
grants. As the nineteenth century wore on, Germany far exceeded Ire 
land as a source of U.S. immigrants, and the United Kingdom also 
became an important source. During the 1860s, the United States had 
over 2.3 million arrivals, with Germany accounting for 34 percent, the 
United Kingdom for 26 percent, and Ireland for 19 percent. These 
three countries of western Europe accounted for almost 80 percent of 
immigrant arrivals during the 1860s, but during this decade, immigra 
tion from Norway and Sweden also began to grow significantly.
The source-country pattern of U.S. immigration began to change 
during the 1870s. While the three traditional source countries 
remained important (accounting for about 61 percent of the arrivals), 
eastern and southern Europe for the first time began to supply signifi 
cant numbers, and immigration from northern Europe continued to 
grow. For example, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and the Soviet Union 
accounted for about 168,000 immigrants during the 1870s, and Nor 
way-Sweden accounted for another 211,000. 5 Both numbers were to 
grow markedly during the following four decades.
During the 1880s immigration increased sharply—5.2 million arriv 
als compared with 2.8 million during the 1870s—with rising numbers 
of immigrants from virtually every European country except France 
and Spain. For example, movement from Germany more than doubled, 
from about 0.7 million during the 1870s to 1.5 million during the 
1880s. Major increases also occurred from Austria-Hungary, the 
Soviet Union, Italy, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Belgium. Arriv-
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als from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark increased from 243,016 dur 
ing the 1870s to 656,494 during the 1880s. Immigration from the 
Americas was also of some significance; movement from Canada and 
Newfoundland amounted to 776,944 during the 1870s and 1880s. 6 
(Land arrivals from Mexico were not completely enumerated until 
1908, and between 1886 and 1893 no data whatsoever are available for 
Mexico, so the number of immigrants from Mexico is largely unknown 
for the nineteenth century.)
The Second Wave
The second wave of immigration noted by Muller and Espenshade 
was from southern and eastern Europe. This wave began seriously dur 
ing the 1870s and 1880s, but it was overshadowed by movement from 
western and northern Europe. During the 1890s, total arrivals fell to 
3.7 million; yet during this decade, movement from the Soviet Union 
and Italy more than doubled, with 0.5 million arrivals for the former 
and almost 0.7 million for the latter. Austria-Hungary sent another 0.6 
million. Together, these source countries accounted for 47.5 percent of 
U.S. immigration during the 1890s. On the other hand, migration from 
Germany declined by almost 1.0 million persons, that from the United 
Kingdom by well over 0.5 million, and that from Ireland by almost 0.3 
million.
The reasons for emigration from southern and eastern Europe were 
many. Just as the steamship was a permissive factor in the earlier emi 
gration from western European countries that had easy access to the 
Atlantic, the railroad was a permissive factor in later emigration from 
southern and eastern Europe because it provided relatively cheap, safe, 
and fast transport to Atlantic ports (Taylor 1971). Moreover, these 
countries were experiencing rapidly changing technology (and thus 
economic change), institutions, and ideas. Gould (1979, p. 617) noted 
that the "eastward march of personal freedom was obviously an impor 
tant part of the explanation of the corresponding geographical shift of 
the sources of European emigration as the nineteenth century ran its 
course."7 Demographic transitions occurring in these countries also 
encouraged immigration to the United States.
The first decade of the twentieth century stands out as the decade 
with the most immigrant arrivals in U.S. history: between 1901 and
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1910, 8.8 million persons entered the country. During this decade, 
Austria-Hungary supplied the United States with 2.1 million immi 
grants, the Soviet Union with 1.6 million, and Italy with 2.0 million, 
these three accounting for two-thirds of all arrivals.
With continued heavy movement from eastern and southern Europe, 
the 1911-1920 period promised to be another decade of mass immigra 
tion. Over 4.1 million persons arrived in the four years from 1911 to 
1914, but with the beginning of World War I, immigration was sharply 
curtailed. Only 1.6 million persons arrived between 1915 and 1920. 
With the imposition of the first binding entry quotas during the early 
1920s (the Chinese exclusion laws excepted), immigration declined to 
4.1 million during the 1920s, 2.3 million (or 56 percent) of which came 
during the first four years of the decade. The temporary quota restric 
tions of 1921 and 1922, followed by the first permanent restrictions 
embodied in the Immigration Act of 1924, spelled the effective end to 
the "second wave" of U.S. immigration. However, the quota restric 
tions imposed during the 1920s did not apply to Western Hemisphere 
countries, and partially as a consequence, Canada and Newfoundland 
(924,515) and Mexico (459,287) ranked first and second among source 
countries of U.S. immigration during the 1920s. 8
The Third Wave
Picking up on an earlier theme of B. Thomas (1973), Muller and 
Espenshade argued that black migration from the rural South to north 
ern cities began to grow significantly when immigration, which had 
been primarily directed to northern U.S. cities, declined. This north 
ward internal migration, which is the third wave, in fact was general 
and not restricted to blacks. It also coincided with significant move 
ment from farms and into urban areas and was motivated by growing 
job opportunities. In earlier years, these opportunities had been taken 
by low-skilled immigrant laborers, who were presumably good labor- 
market substitutes for less skilled blacks and whites from the South.
With the worldwide depression of the 1930s, immigration fell 
sharply: only 538,431 persons entered the United States during the 
decade, and net emigration probably occurred (Gemery 1994). 
Because of World War II, only 170,952 immigrants arrived during the 
first half of the 1940s. However, with the end of the war, immigration 
again began to build.
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The Fourth Wave
The fourth wave of migration consists primarily of Hispanics and 
Asians. Immigration from Mexico and the Caribbean began to grow 
significantly during the 1940s and 1950s. In 1943, Congress provided 
for the importation of temporary agricultural laborers from North, 
South, and Central America. This law formed the legal basis for the 
"Bracero" program, which involved the importation of agricultural 
workers from Mexico. Between 1942 and 1964, 4,646,399 contracts 
were written for Mexicans to work temporarily in U.S. agriculture 
(Congressional Research Service 1980, Table 30). A continuing flow 
of migrants (legal and illegal) since 1964 makes Mexico today the sin 
gle most important source of U.S. immigrants.
After restrictions on immigration from Asia were phased out begin 
ning in 1965, movement from this part of the world to the United 
States increased dramatically; clearly, the earlier entry restrictions had 
produced a pent-up demand. Thus, the sources of U.S. immigration 
shifted strongly away from Europe and strongly toward Asia and the 
Americas.
During the 1970s, as the numerically restricted component of U.S. 
immigration grew at high annual rates due to the family reunification 
provisions of the law, illegal migration (especially from Mexico but 
from elsewhere as well) was gathering momentum. Furthermore, ref 
ugee admittances, particularly from Southeast Asia, were sufficiently 
important that in 1980 specific legislation was passed to deal with 
them (Refugee Act of 1980). During the 1981-1990 period, the 
United States admitted 7.3 million persons as permanent resident 
aliens. In only one other decade (1901-1910) has the nation admitted 
more immigrants (8.8 million), and this decade is often characterized 
as one of "mass" migration.
During the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. birth rates were low. Conse 
quently, changes in the foreign-born population contributed impor 
tantly to overall U.S. population growth. Increases in the foreign-born 
population between 1980 and 1990 and between 1970 and 1980 of 5.7 
and 4.5 million, respectively, were the two largest decadal increases in 
the nation's history (Table 3.2). During the 1980s, the foreign-born 
population contributed 25.7 percent of the increment in U.S. popula-






















































































SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975); also 1980 and 1990 censuses.
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tion, a considerable contrast to the 1930-1970 period, when the for 
eign-born population declined absolutely.
The 1990s started with the admission of 1.8 million legal immi 
grants in 1991, 1.1 million of whom had been illegal aliens who were 
given legal status under terms of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986. Moreover, in 1990 Congress passed the Immigration Act 
of that year, which became effective in October of 1991 (fiscal 1992) 
and greatly increased the immigration quota ceilings. Thus, immigra 
tion promises to remain significant through and beyond the 1990s, and 
the composition of immigrant flows will surely have a role in the 
national debate on immigration.
SOURCE REGIONS OF IMMIGRANTS
Table 3.3 clearly shows the changing geographic sources of U.S. 
immigrants. During the 1850s, 94.4 percent of U.S. immigration was 
from Europe, and only 4.5 percent was from Asia and the Western 
Hemisphere. During the first decade of the twentieth century, Europe 
still contributed 91.6 percent of the immigrants, but by the 1950s, the 
European share had fallen to just over half. By the 1980s, not only had 
the volume of immigration increased appreciably, but the source-coun 
try composition of immigration also had changed dramatically. As a 
different view of this change, of the 45.2 million immigrants admitted 
to the United States as of 1970, 78.7 percent had a country of last resi 
dence in Europe; of the 17.1 million admitted between 1971 and 1995, 
13.6 percent came from Europe, 48.7 percent came from the Americas, 
and 34.6 percent came from Asia.
Layard et al. (1992) discussed how the changing political and eco 
nomic situation in Europe may ignite a major East-West migration, 
with some of the migrants seeking entry into the United States. 
Indeed, migration from Europe to the United States appears to be 
building once again. Immigration from Europe grew each year from 
1987 (61,174) through 1994 (160,916). Between 1991 and 1994 alone, 
222,585 persons were admitted from the Soviet Union (based on place 
of birth), and 100,597 from Poland. However, admittances from 
Europe declined to 128,185 in 1995.
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SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1990 Statistical Yearbook of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Government Printing Office: Wash 
ington D.C., 1991, Table 2.
a These data reflect country of last residence.
HISTORICAL U.S. IMMIGRATION: 
GENDER, AGE, AND SKILL
Many aspects of immigrant composition are important in terms of 
the demographic structure of the United States and the effects of immi 
gration on the U.S. economy. This study focuses specifically on gen 
der, age, and skill composition, each of which has been important in 
shaping the historical consequences of immigration in the United 
States. In this section, we briefly discuss the historical context of the 
contemporary compositional measures that we analyze later.
Gender Composition
In the first detailed analysis of migration using census data, 
Ravenstein asserted that "woman is a greater migrant than man" (1885,
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p. 196). His seventh law of migration is that females are more 
migratory than males (p. 199). Ravenstein's analysis concerned 
lifetime migration in the United Kingdom and used 1871 and, 
especially, 1881 census data. 9
In most major international migration flows of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centures, males commonly have made up more than half of 
the immigrants and frequently have accounted for far more than half. 
This gender composition characterized U.S. immigration through the 
entire nineteenth century and through the first 30 years of the twentieth 
(Table 3.4). From a high of 230.2 during the 1901 to 1910 period, this 
ratio fell steadily to 67.7 (the decadal low) during the 1941 to 1950 
period and remains below 100 in the 1990s.
The crossover from male-dominated to female-dominated immigra 
tion occurred in 1930 and appears, at least in part, to have been due to 
the imposition of binding immigration quotas by the United States dur 
ing the 1920s (though the ratio had been falling steadily for some 
years). The immigration quotas of the 1920s were particularly restric 
tive for immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, and flows from 
these countries were extreme in their orientation toward males. During 
the 1901 to 1910 period, the sex ratio for immigration from Greece was 
1703.2; comparable ratios for Italy, Austria-Hungary, and the Russian 
Empire were 372.6, 238.5, and 185.6, respectively. On the other hand, 
the Irish ratio was 90.1. 10 By curtailing flows from countries with tra 
ditionally high sex ratios, the immigration laws of the 1920s had an 
important effect on the immigration sex ratio that continues today.
Another factor that contributed to high sex ratios around the turn of 
the century was that many male migrants apparently entered the United 
States with the intention of residing here only temporarily and later 
returning home; this was particularly true of migrants from Italy. The 
data suggest that migrants from Greece and other countries of southern 
and eastern Europe also may have intended their stays to be temporary. 
Indeed, a large fraction of those from such countries did return home, 
but those males who stayed later reunited with their wives and families, 
which caused a subsequent reduction of sex ratios, especially after 
binding quotas were enacted. The tendency for early flows from a 
given source to be predominantly male and for later flows to be charac 
terized by family reunification and falling sex ratios is common today.
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a From Ferenczi and Willcox (1929), Table VII. 
b From Houstoun, Kramer, and Barrett (1984), Table A-l. 
c Excludes 1980.
d From U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1991), Table 11. 
e Excludes 1981.
f Excludes persons legalized under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Con 
trol Act of 1986. Numbers in brackets include IRCA legalizations. 
g From U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1996), Table 12.
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Age Composition
Immigrant age composition is more difficult to track over long peri 
ods of history than is gender composition because of changed age 
groupings in reported data. Table 3.5 shows the young adult age class 
as 15-40, 14-44, 16-44, and 15-44 for different periods. Neverthe 
less, certain generalizations can be made about the age composition of 
historical immigration to the United States.
Between the 1830s and the 1880s little change occurred in the 
aggregate age composition of U.S. immigrants; for example, the per 
centage in the 15-40 age class ranged between 66.3 and 68.4 (Table 
3.5), which is a very narrow band for a five-decade period. However, 
during the 1890s, as immigration from southern and eastern Europe 
surged, those who were 15 to 40 increased to 77.6 percent (1891-98). 
After the 1920s, the percentage in the 16^4 class fell, while the per 
centage of persons over 44 increased dramatically from 9.2 percent 
(1921-30) to 18.4 percent (1941-50). After a decline in the 1950s, the 
percentage of immigrants who are older has continued to rise: in 1995, 
19.4 percent of U.S. immigrants were over 44 years of age.
Skill Composition
In a number of papers, Borjas has argued that the skills or human 
capital embodied in successive immigrant cohorts declined during the 
post-World War II period. 11 Regarding immigration toward the end of 
the nineteenth century, Spengler (1956, p. 281) made the same claim:
The southward and the eastward shifts of the sources of immigra 
tion were accompanied by changes in the composition of the 
immigrant stream and in the nature of its impact on the American 
economy. An increasingly large proportion of the immigrants 
came from relatively underdeveloped agricultural countries, with 
the result that the occupational composition of the immigrants 
came to be increasingly inferior to that of an American population.
Available data regarding skill composition are not clean-cut. Occu 
pational classifications have changed over time. Moreover, occupa 
tions were for the most part self-reported, and different occupations 
could carry different connotations for people from different parts of the 
world. Perhaps most importantly, however, over time different per 
centages of immigrants actually reported an occupation. For example,
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SOURCE: For 1820-1957, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series C133-138, p. 62; 
for later years, various annual reports and statistical yearbooks of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service.
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during the 1901-10 period, 74.3 percent of the immigrants reported an 
occupation, whereas during the 1861-70 period, only 38.8 percent 
reported one.
Table 3.6 reports two measures of skill composition and lists them 
in two ways. First, it identifies immigrants classified as professional, 
commercial, or skilled and refers to this group as "skilled." Second, it 
breaks out the first two classes, professional and commercial, into a 
group called "highly skilled." For each group, percentages are reported 
relative to all immigrants and also to only those who reported an occu 
pation. These occupational classifications are used by decade, begin 
ning with 1821-30, but this classification scheme ends with 1898 data. 
After 1898, the occupational groupings are professional, technical, and 
kindred workers; managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm; and 
craftsmen, foremen, operatives, and kindred workers. These three 
groups at least roughly match those for the 1821-98 period, which can 
be observed by noting how similar the figures for 1899-1900 are com 
pared to the corresponding figures for 1891-98.
From each measure of skill reported in Table 3.6, basically the same 
conclusions may be drawn. First, as immigration from Ireland began 
to surge during the 1840s, skill composition declined sharply in terms 
of the percentages of immigrants classified as skilled and as highly 
skilled. Second, when immigration from Germany began to build dur 
ing the 1850s and 1860s, the skill composition rebounded. Third, the 
data affirm Spengler's assertion that when immigrant origins shifted 
toward southern and eastern Europe, the skill composition of the flows 
was low: the lowest percentages reported in Table 3.6 are for the period 
from 1881 to 1910. However, the downward shift appears to have 
occurred earlier, during the 1861-70 and 1871-80 periods, before 
movement from southern and eastern Europe became maximal. 
Fourth, after the imposition of entry quotas and during the period when 
immigration was at a low level for other reasons, the skill composition 
increased once again during the 1930s and 1940s.
The gender, age, and skill composition of historical U.S. immigra 
tion have been described in some detail (Ferenczi and Willcox 1929), 
but virtually no effort has been made to formally model these composi 
tional aspects. This observation parallels our earlier observation that 
compositional models of migration are rare even in the contemporary 
context.
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a For the 1821-1898 period, skilled refers to "professional," "commercial," and 
"skilled," whereas for the period beginning 1899, skilled refers to "professional, tech 
nical, and kindred workers," "managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm," and 
"craftsmen, foremen, operatives, and kindred workers."
b Highly skilled refers to the first two categories listed in note "a" for the respective 
periods..
c Occupational informa.tion is unavailable for 1980 and 1981 in published INS reports. 
For 1982-85, what had previously been called "professional, technical, and kindred" 
was called "professional specialty" and for 1986-90, "professional specialty and 
technical." The skilled group is not comparable for the period after 1982 due to 
changes in published occupational classifications.
d Due to the inclusion of persons legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986 in the 1989 and 1990 figures, these years are not comparable to earlier 
years. Thus, they are reported separately.
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Notes
1. Although "official" data such as those presented in this chapter frequently are 
used with no misgivings regarding their quality, the numbers are far from flawless. 
Immigrant records were not maintained consistently. For example, the definition 
of an "immigrant" changed several times during the nineteenth and early twenti 
eth centuries, which is at least in part responsible for U.S. immigration figures that 
do not coincide with (U.S.-bound) emigration figures provided by source coun 
tries. Moreover, immigrants arriving by sea were not always counted accurately, 
and migration over U.S. land borders often went unreported. See Gould (1979) 
for a discussion of certain shortcomings of historical U.S. immigration data.
2. Of the 1.8 million figure for 1991, over 1.1 million were legalized under the terms 
and conditions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. During 
1992, 1993, and 1994, a total of 193,642 were so legalized. The legalized individ 
uals were not new entrants to the United States but rather had entered the country 
legally and overstayed or had entered without documents. During 1992-1994, 
141,690 additional persons entered as "legalization dependents."
3. During the 1820s, an average voyage from Liverpool to New York by sailing ship 
required 40 days, but because of weather conditions, many voyages took much 
longer, even more than twice as long (Gould 1979, p. 613). In 1867, the average 
crossing for a sailing ship was 44 days, whereas that for a steamship was 14 days. 
During the 1870s and 1880s, the average crossing by steamship had fallen to 7-10 
days. The shorter time in passage greatly reduced sickness and the loss of life. 
Scott (1972, p. 29) reported death rates for arriving vessels of almost 25 percent 
during the late 1840s and illness rates of over 30 percent. However, these figures 
appear to be high, perhaps focusing on what Mokyr referred to as "coffin ships," 
on which between 30 and 45 percent of the passengers died at sea; many more 
died soon after arrival. During 1847, on-board mortality was quite high, but dur 
ing 1848 such mortality probably did not exceed 2 percent (Mokyr 1983, pp. 267- 
268).
4. According to Mokyr (1983, p. 230), until the early 1830s about two-thirds of the 
Irish emigrants preferred Canada as a destination, but after 1835 about three-fifths 
preferred the United States.
5. Of course, the Soviet Union did not exist as such during the 1870s, but the U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service reports historical data in this way.
6. Although some fraction of this number no doubt originated in Canada and New 
foundland, many ships bearing immigrants destined to the United States arrived in 
Quebec. Ships carrying raw materials from Canada to Europe found a profitable 
backhaul in migrant traffic (Gould 1979). Thus, data reporting country of last res 
idence could distort figures for country of birth.
7. Gould (1979, p. 616) noted that British restrictions on the emigration of skilled 
labor were lifted in 1825. Legal impediments to emigration were severe in eastern 
and central Europe until much later in the nineteenth century.
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8. Migration between Mexico and the United States has occurred during four major 
periods, the first of which coincided with the second wave of European migration 
to the United States (Weintraub et al. 1998). The Mexico-born population of the 
United States increased from approximately 100,000 in 1900 to about 1.0 million 
in 1930, due primarily to the northward movement of seasonal agricultural labor 
ers (along with refugees from the Mexican Revolution and some others).
During the 1930s, approximately 600,000 Mexico-born persons moved from 
the United States back to Mexico, with the consequence that the Mexico-born 
population of the United States declined to about 400,000 in 1940. This reverse 
flow makes up the second major period of migration between Mexico and the 
United States.
Weintraub et al. characterized the organized bilateral recruitment of Mexicans 
to work in U.S. agriculture (1942-1964) as the third major period of migration 
between Mexico and the United States. Even after the discontinuation of the 
Bracero program in 1964, flows of legal immigrants and illegal migrants from 
Mexico continued and grew as ties with family and friends in the United States 
expanded (Massey et al. 1987), thus constituting the fourth major period of Mex 
ico-United States migration.
9. "Lifetime migration" refers to persons who were residing in area j at time t and 
were born in some other area.
10. Data used to calculate the 1901-1910 sex ratios have been drawn from Reports of 
the Immigration Commission (1911, pp. 41-44). Some confusion appears to exist 
concerning the volume number of the report cited here. The Immigration Com 
mission published 42 volumes. The volume referenced above is listed in the pub 
lication itself as "Vol. 20" and carries the title Statistical Review of Immigration 
1820-1910 Distribution of Immigrants 1850-1900. But in the "list of reports of 
the Immigration Commission" this title is shown as volume 3; volume 20 is 
shown as Immigrants in Industries: Pt. 23, Summary Report on Immigrants in 
Manufacturing and Mining.
11. Much of this research is summarized in Borjas (1990).

4 The Immigration Data
The immigration patterns described in Chapter 3 are based primarily 
on census data. Although census data, particularly the Public Use 
Microdata Samples (PUMS), provide much detail on the foreign-born 
population of the United States, for the purposes of this study they 
have at least three serious shortcomings with respect to tracking immi 
grant composition. First, census data relate to the foreign-born popula 
tion as enumerated every 10 years. The foreign-born population 
consists of immigrants (legal resident aliens), nonimmigrants (such as 
visitors for pleasure and students), and illegal resident aliens. The 
present study focuses on legal immigrants only and thus requires an 
alternative data set.
Second, census data reflect only the "residual" foreign-born popula 
tion. A large fraction of those immigrants who legally enter the United 
States are thought to subsequently depart. Warren and Kraly (1985) 
argued that of the 30 million legal immigrants admitted to the United 
States between 1900 and 1980, about 10 million subsequently emi 
grated from the United States. Studying the 1971 U.S. immigrant 
cohort, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) showed that the fraction of immi 
grants that subsequently departs is a function of the country of birth, 
meaning that the residual foreign-born population enumerated in the 
census is self-selected because of the selective emigration of prior 
immigrants.
Third, the census involves a count only every 10 years. Conse 
quently, with the possible exception of examining specific entry 
cohorts of the foreign-born, changes over time in the various composi 
tional patterns of migration cannot be traced in any detail.
Due to these factors and others involving econometric procedures, 
we have chosen to use the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) data in this study. Because these data are annual and include a 
record for every legal resident alien granted entry into the United 
States, the analyst is able to study annual swings in compositional pat 
terns that may be due to economic, social, and political conditions in 
source countries and to economic conditions in the United States.
55
56 The Immigration Data
For many years the INS has published annual data on persons admit 
ted to the United States as legal resident aliens. 1 These publications 
also include information on persons naturalized and on those admitted 
as nonimmigrants. The published data have been widely used for 
descriptive purposes, but less commonly for analytical purposes. More 
recently, the INS has begun to make microdata available. The INS 
Public Use Tapes contain considerable detail on each person admitted 
as a legal resident alien. In spite of the fact that the microdata tapes 
include much valuable information, they have not been widely used for 
at least two reasons. First, and probably most importantly, the data for 
certain years are flawed, which has the potential to seriously interrupt 
any time series created from the tapes. Second, for the years included 
in the data, the number of microdata files is enormous because the 
United States admits immigrants in very large numbers. Partially as a 
consequence of these numbers and partially for other reasons, the INS 
Public Use Tapes are extremely cumbersome to use.
This chapter, which draws heavily from Greenwood, McDowell, 
and Trabka (1991), describes the INS Public Use Tapes (referred to 
also as "INS data") and their strengths and weaknesses. One of the 
major strengths of the data is the possibility of developing an annual 
time series on many variables relating to U.S. immigration. We docu 
ment the frequency and severity of certain flaws in the data, which are 
clearly a major source of weakness, including the years and the number 
of records for which the data are flawed. We also discuss methods of 
"correcting" the problems inherent in the data, so as to allow the use of 
a continuous time series in the panel-data models estimated below. 
Finally, we discuss changes over time in the gender, age, and skill com 
position of U.S. immigration, based on the INS data.
NUMBER OF RECORDS AND TYPES OF INFORMATION
The United States is the world's major country of immigration. 
Between 1991 and 1995, over 5.2 million persons were accepted as 
legal resident aliens. Consequently, the number of records in the INS 
data is enormous, even for a single year. Table 4.1 reports the annual 
number of U.S. immigrants beginning in 1972, which is the earliest
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year for which the Public Use microdata are available. 2 This table also 
subdivides the numbers for the two broad immigrant classes defined 
under U.S. law, namely, numerically restricted and numerically 
exempt. It further splits the exempt group into its two major compo 
nents, which are refugees and immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Not 
only are the numbers large even for the year with the smallest number 
of admittances (1972, 384,685); the numbers are also growing. The 
number of legal immigrants admitted in 1991 (1,827,167) was the 
highest annual total in U.S. history. 3
The INS data contain a record on each alien legally admitted to the 
United States for permanent residence. For individuals who are classi 
fied as "new entrants," the data are drawn from the U.S. Department of 
State form VISA OF-155 (Immigration Visa and Alien Registration), 
which is filled out at the time the individual is processed for admit 
tance. For those who were already in the United States in a temporary 
status but who were adjusted to legal permanent resident after petition 
ing the INS, INS Form 1181 is used.
The INS Public Use Tapes contain the following information on 
each alien who became a legal permanent resident of the United States 
between 1972 and 1991: port of entry, month of admission, year of 
admission, class of admission, country of chargeability, country of 
birth, country of last permanent residence, nationality, sex, age, marital 
status, occupation, state and area of intended residence, most recent 
nonimmigrant class of entry, most recent nonimmigrant year of entry, 
and labor certification. Almost 300 ports of arrival are listed in the 
data, as are the locations of INS District offices in the United States 
and in U.S. territories (such as Agana, Guam, and San Juan, Puerto 
Rico).
Immigrant class of admission refers to the specific condition that 
entitles the person to become a permanent resident of the United 
States. Information on class of admission contains considerable detail, 
such as preference category and/or precise type of family relationship 
under which admittance was gained, new arrival versus adjustment of 
status, the refugee act under which admittance was gained, and type of 
special immigrant. For particular categories of immigrants, both the 
person qualifying for admission and his or her dependents are counted 
against the category; consequently, principals are distinguished from 
beneficiaries.
Table 4.1 Immigrants by Type of Admission, 1972-1991






















































































































1989 1,090,924 280,275 810,649e 217,514 84,288
1990 1,536,483 298,306 l,238,177e 231,680 97,364
1991_________1,827,167_____293,846_______l,533,321 e________237,103__________139,079_____
SOURCE: United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report (1966-1977) and Statistical Yearbook of the Immigra 
tion and Naturalization Service (1978-1991).
a This column includes immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, refugee and asylum adjustments, and special immigrants. The last of these is 
given by the difference between the "total" column and the sum of the two columns to its right.
b Data prior to 1978 are not comparable because most refugees entered as numerically restricted. During 1978, 1979, and 1980, refugees 
also entered as restricted, but their numbers were dwarfed by those who entered as numerically exempt under special legislation.
c TQ = transitional quarter.
d Includes only Cuban refugees, Indochinese refugees, and other.
e The 1989 figure was inflated by the legalization of almost 478,814 resident aliens under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986. During 1990, 880,372 persons were legalized, and during 1991, 1,123,162 persons were legalized. These individ 
uals are not included on the INS Public Use Tapes.
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For those who adjust their status, the INS data report the most recent 
nonimmigrant class of entry, of which 35 separate designations are 
included; among these designations are temporary visitor for pleasure, 
temporary visitor for business, temporary worker, exchange visitor, 
student, and many more. The most recent year of nonimmigrant entry 
also is given.
Country of chargeability is the independent country to which the 
immigrant is credited; country of chargeability is almost always coun 
try of birth. Each independent country was limited to 20,000 numeri 
cally restricted immigrants per year under the immigration law that is 
studied here (the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 
1965), whereas in 1991 dependencies of independent countries were 
limited to 5,000 per year of the 20,000 limit. Over 230 separate codes 
are included for various countries of birth. Country of citizenship is 
reported under nationality.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
The Volume of the Data
The first problem encountered in working with the INS data 
involves sheer volume. In addition to dealing with a very large number 
of observations (totaling well over 10 million for the period 1972- 
1991), users of the data are confronted with a mind-boggling array of 
variables that must somehow be organized. The possible combinations 
of characteristics that might be used as variables for purposes of analy 
sis are far in excess of one billion.
We were guided in our choice of information by two thoughts, 
namely, the goals of the study and the theoretical model or models that 
yielded hypotheses to be tested. The objective of our study is to ana 
lyze the gender, age, and skill composition of legal U.S. immigrants. 
To meet this goal, we specified models that required information on 
country of birth, year of admission, class of admission (numerically 
restricted or numerically exempt), gender, age (three groups), and 
occupation (three groups). Our models also require that this informa 
tion be cross-tabulated. For example, we not only needed to retain the
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number of male immigrants, but also the number of these males who 
were numerically restricted, aged 20-34, and professional and techni 
cal workers. The lack of the necessary data on the independent vari 
ables of the model limited us to a maximum of 60 countries. In order 
to produce an annual time series for each of the 60 countries of birth 
for 20 years (1972-1991), we aggregated individuals from each coun 
try into 36 cells (two classes of admission times two gender distinc 
tions times three age groups times three occupational groups), which is 
a manageable number of variables.
Immigrant Source Countries
For every immigrant, the INS Public Use Tapes contain three types 
of information on source country or countries: country of birth, country 
of last permanent residence, and country of nationality. Because the 
objective of our research is to explain various compositional aspects of 
U.S. immigration, some countries had to be eliminated because infor 
mation on the explanatory variables of our models simply is not avail 
able. We exhaustively sought data for as many countries as possible. 
We finally had to settle on 60 source countries for which we had infor 
mation on all the necessary variables (Table 4.2). The various conti 
nents and regions of the world are reasonably well represented among 
the set of 60 countries.
Periodicity of the Data
The INS data are available on a fiscal-year, rather than a calendar- 
year, basis. This means that for the years 1972-1976, the data refer to 
immigrants who entered the United States from July through June of 
the following year (e.g., 1972 data are for July 1971 through June 
1972). The year 1976 included a transitional quarter (July, August, 
September), which is specifically identified as a separate period. 4 
After this, the data refer to October of the previous year through Sep 
tember of the fiscal year in question.
Refugees
From an analytical perspective, the presence of refugees in the data 
file has the potential to cause serious problems. As shown in Table 4.1,
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a In the analytical work that follows, Israel is not included in "Asia," but rather is grouped with 
"Europe"; also, "Western Hemisphere" refers to the groups of "North and Central America" and 
"South America" in this table.
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aggregate refugee admittances have been quite irregular; for example, 
122,472 were admitted or adjusted in 1978, 32,049 in 1979, and 
156,601 in 1982. This irregularity is compounded because during cer 
tain years, refugees tend to have been admitted or adjusted in large 
blocks from specific source countries (e.g., 67,985 from Cuba in 1977, 
but 3,885 in 1982; 86,777 from Vietnam in 1978, but 1,435 in 1977; 
25,476 from Haiti in 1988, but only 5 in 1985). The arrival of refugees 
in the United States is not actually listed in the INS data; the refugees 
appear only when they adjust their status to permanent resident (and 
some refugees may never adjust their status). Thus, refugees have some 
potential to overwhelm the normal immigration numbers for certain 
countries, causing tremendous spikes in the annual series.
The movement of refugees to the United States is probably moti 
vated by reasons different than those of other migrants, although they 
also presumably seek better employment opportunities and higher 
wages. To a larger extent than with other immigrants, however, refu 
gee admittances are discretionary on the part of U.S. authorities, who 
must decide which potential immigrants qualify as refugees, how many 
to accept in any given year, and from where to accept them. It is pre 
cisely this discretion and the resulting irregular admittances of refu 
gees from different countries that has the potential to overwhelm any 
effort to empirically estimate a model using the INS data.
The problem of refugees can be eliminated in either of two ways. 
First, the major source countries of the refugees can be eliminated from 
the database, because country of birth is one of the variables in the INS 
data. In our research, we took this approach not so much because of 
refugees themselves, but because of the unavailability of other infor 
mation on those countries, such as gross domestic product per capita, 
measures of educational attainment, etc. Second, because refugees can 
be specifically identified according to their entry class, they can be 
selectively eliminated from the data for any country of birth included 
in the researcher's working data set. 5 We also used this approach, even 
though for most of our 60 countries very few refugees remained in our 
data set because their major countries of origin had been eliminated.
As shown in Table 4.3, when refugees and IRC A legalizations are 
removed from the data, the 60 countries in our sample accounted for 
between 58.2 and 73.6 percent of all nonrefugee immigrants 20 years 
of age and older. A definite downward trend exists in this percentage,



































































































































SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1994 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
Table 1; INS Public Use Tapes, 1972-1991.
a Excludes refugees and legalizations under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Detail in the INS Statistical Yearbooks 
may not match the totals shown here because some classes of refugees are not labeled specifically in the Yearbook, but they can be found 
in the Public Use Tapes by the Act under which they were admitted.
b The total number of immigrants shown here differs from that reported in the INS Statistical Yearbook due to a problem with the data for 
1979. Neither measure is accurate; the total in the Yearbook contains duplicate records, and the total shown here represents approxi 
mately 85 percent of total immigration in 1979 because the duplicate records have been eliminated.
66 The Immigration Data
presumably because the source countries became more diversified over 
the 20-year period. These 60 countries account for a sufficiently high 
fraction of all immigrants that considerable confidence can be placed 
in any empirical results obtained by using them. Countries excluded 
from the list that have been the source of important nonrefugee move 
ments in recent years include the Dominican Republic, China, and 
Iran.
Age Detail
In the INS data, a single age is reported for each immigrant. 
Although some immigrants may not know their exact age (a problem 
that is not uncommon around the world), we have no reason to believe 
that this is a serious problem in the INS data.
The models developed below emphasize individual decision mak 
ing, assuming rational agents who seek to maximize their utility. 
Because children typically do not make their own decisions about 
whether or not to migrate to the United States, we have eliminated chil 
dren from the immigration data that we analyze: specifically, all per 
sons in the INS files who were under 20 years of age at the time of 
entry have been removed from the data. Within the group 20 and over, 
we identify three age classes: 20-34, 35-54, and 55 and over. Our 
empirical work especially focuses on the groups of age 20-34 and 55 
and over.
Occupational Information
The occupational information in the INS data has some potential 
problems. 6 First, the occupation listed by the immigrant is self- 
reported. Some experts argue that different occupational titles may 
mean different things in different countries, thus perhaps making a 
given occupational title noncomparable across source countries. Sec 
ond, a large fraction of the immigrants either had no occupation or 
chose to report none, perhaps because they were not entering under an 
occupational preference and were therefore not required to give one. 
Moreover, for those immigrants who enter as principals under the third 
and sixth (occupational) preference categories, reported occupation 
refers to the job they were to be taking in the United States and not
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their last job. 7 For everyone else, the occupation refers to the last job 
held in the country of last permanent residence. For those who adjust 
their status, this last job could be in the United States. 8
The first problem (if indeed it is a problem) can be addressed by 
grouping occupations into broad categories. Thus, only intentional 
misreporting that would significantly misrepresent a person's occupa 
tion would present a problem, and misreporting does not appear to be a 
concern. Perhaps a second reason for using broadly defined occupa 
tions is that the number of cross-classifications of the data is held to 
manageable proportions. This is especially true when the data are split 
into two genders, three age groups, and two classes of immigrants (i.e., 
numerically restricted and numerically exempt). Thus, two broad 
occupations are defined in our work: 1) professional, technical, and 
kindred workers plus managers, officials, and proprietors (not includ 
ing farm proprietors); and 2) craftspersons and laborers. The second 
group includes everyone who declared an occupation and is not 
included in the first group. A third category includes occupation not 
reported, homemakers, the unemployed or retired, and students (not 
including those under 20, who were eliminated from our data set).
The second problem, of not reporting an occupation, is potentially 
more serious. For each of 60 source countries, Table 4.4 reports the 
average percentage of persons 20 years of age and older who reported 
an occupation over the period 1972-1991. These percentages vary 
widely. The problem for analytical purposes is one analogous to 
selectivity and results in measurement error. Moreover, these percent 
ages may differ because labor force participation rates differ across 
countries, or because different proportions of men and women are 
included in the flows (the latter being related to labor force participa 
tion). In the empirical work on skill composition that is reported in 
Chapter 8, we include in each regression a variable for the percentage 
of the immigrants from country / in year t who fail to report an occupa 
tion. This variable is treated as endogenous (that is, assumed to be cor 
related with unobserved country-specific effects) and thus provides a 
control for the percentage who do not report an occupation.
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Table 4.4 Persons 20 Years Old and Over Who Reported an Occupation: 
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FLAWS IN THE INS DATA
For certain years, two types of flaws are present in the INS Public 
Use Tapes, and because each could cause a discontinuity in the time 
series on immigrant admittances from various source countries, each 
must be addressed.
Missing Records for 1979
The data for 1979 are not complete: only about 85 percent of total 
admittances are included in the file. The INS discovered eight years 
later that a number of 1979 entries were exact duplicates (one immedi 
ately following the other with the same immigrant identification num 
ber) and concluded that these were due to a conscious human act. The 
INS then purged the file of all such duplicate observations. (The INS 
1979 Statistical Yearbook erroneously includes these duplicate entries.) 
The INS determine'd that the duplicate records were substituted for 
actual immigrants and based on preference-category expectations 
determined that about 15 percent of all 1979 immigrant records were 
lost.
Because there is no way of restoring the missing information, we 
felt it necessary to carefully examine the 1979 data to determine, to the 
best of our ability, whether any bias was introduced by what might 
have been the systematic exclusion of a certain group or groups. We 
studied aggregate time-series information on many variables, such as 
gender, age by gender (with 12 specific age classes identified), and 
occupation. We found no indication that 1979 data were unusual, in 
the sense that no break occurred in the temporal patterns of the frac 
tions of all immigrants who were accounted for by our various groups.
Thus, we used the 1979 data as we received them. In our analytical 
model, we control for unobserved temporal effects that, among other 
things, could account for any anomaly for 1979. We feel that, for our 
purposes, the problem with the 1979 data is not a major obstacle.
Missing Information for Certain Years
The second flaw in the INS data is perhaps more serious, but unlike 
the 1979 problem, it is correctable. For the years 1980-1983, informa-
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tion on gender, occupation, country of last permanent residence, port 
of entry, marital status, nationality, state and area of intended resi 
dence, nonimmigrant class of entry, and nonimmigrant year of entry is 
missing from a number of records. Experts at INS, who were not 
working for the agency when the problem occurred, have no idea what 
caused the information to be lost. 9 Elimination of refugees from the 
sample removes many of the incomplete records, but for the 60 coun 
tries used in our study, a large number of observations (Table 4.5) 
remain with no information on gender and occupation, which are criti 
cal variables for our study. 10
For the records with missing information, gender was imputed in the 
following way. First, for the observations with no missing data, gender 
was transformed into a dummy variable (1 = female; 0 = male) and was 
regressed on other immigrant characteristics for which information 
was complete. The independent variables in this regression were pref 
erence category (six dummies, one for each of the six preference cate 
gories), age, principal immigrant versus beneficiary (dummy), new 
arrival versus adjustment of status (dummy), and labor certification or 
not (dummy). For certain years, two different labor certification vari 
ables were used. These regressions were estimated separately for each 
of the 60 countries and for each year (for a total of 240 regressions; for 
exceptions, see Appendix A, Table Al). The R2 values for each country 
and each year for which data were imputed are reasonably high, with 
almost all in excess of 0.40 and most at or above 0.50 (Table Al). 
These regressions were then used to predict gender for the observations 
for which this information was missing. For predicted values of 0.5 
and higher, 1.0 was assigned to the observation (female); for those with 
a predicted value of less than 0.5, zero was assigned (male).
The same procedure also was followed in an attempt to impute the 
missing values for occupation. However, this effort was unsuccessful. 
For every source country, the percentage of total immigration 
accounted for by those who reported no occupation far exceeds the 
percentage who reported one of the two broad occupational groupings 
with which we worked. Consequently, based on predicted values, the 
regression assigned the category with the highest probability, which 
was almost always "no occupation reported."
As an alternative, we compared the observations with missing data 
to those with complete data for the entire sample and several of the
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largest source countries. For the most part, the percentage of immi 
grants in each classification was found to be very similar. For example, 
in the complete group, 1.4 percent are first-preference immigrants, 
41.0 percent are numerically exempt, and 24.5 percent are adjustments 
of status; the respective percentages for the missing group are 1.4, 
41.4, and 24.2." We thus assumed that the occupational distribution 
also was comparable between the two groups, and we allocated the 
same percentage of the incomplete observations to each of the three 
occupational groups as that group represents of the complete observa 
tions.
This procedure was followed separately for each country and for 
each year. This approach obviously has the shortcoming of not assign 
ing occupations to the micro observations, as we did with gender, 
which prevents occupations from directly being cross-tabulated with 
other variables. When we needed to cross-tabulate information (for 
240 cells), the same procedure was followed, with the missing observa 
tions assigned to the 240 cells in the same proportion that those cells 
represented in the complete sample. This procedure, however, over 
writes the individual gender estimates by assigning all attributes 
(numerically restricted/exempt, gender, age, and occupation) of the 
cell.
As shown in Table 4.6, for 1981 the observations for which informa 
tion is missing are strongly biased toward adjustments of status. The 
same is also true for 1982 and 1983, although the bias is not quite as 
strong. For 1980, new arrivals and adjustments have virtually the same 
distribution. For 1981, 1982, and 1983, the observations with partial 
information lean toward the numerically exempt category relative to
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the numerically restricted category, although the bias is not as strong as 
for new entrants/adjustments. Table 4.6 also reports differences within 
preference categories.
The INS is certain that the missing information relates to specific 
months during which individuals gained legal resident alien status. 
This type of omission is not as serious as one related to other variables, 
such as port of entry, because here the omissions would have been sys- 
tejnatically biased toward specific source countries.
GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE INS DATA
Compared to cross-sectional data, time-series data on migration are 
quite rare. However, even when time series data are available, they 
rarely provide detailed migrant characteristics (e.g., gender, age, mari 
tal status, education, employment status, and earnings). For example, 
for the United States, the major time-series data set relating to internal 
migration is the Internal Revenue Service file. These data provide con 
siderable spatial detail (states and counties), and income class, but con 
tain no information on gender, age, or any other demographic measure 
of interest.
A major advantage of the INS data is that they have both a temporal 
(year) and a cross-sectional (source-country) dimension. Moreover, 
they provide considerable demographic detail. Economic information 
on the immigrants is largely lacking, which is a serious drawback to 
economists, but the INS Public Use Tapes are the best available data 
source for the study of U.S. immigration by immigrant class. Although 
the INS Public Use Tapes have shortcomings, these data also present a 
great research opportunity.
COMPOSITION OF U.S. IMMIGRATION, 1972-1991
In Chapter 3, we considered historical trends beginning in 1821 in 
gender, age, and skill composition. Here we focus on the 1972-1991 
period and (for the most part) on the 60 countries that make up our
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sample. During this 20-year period, noteworthy aggregate changes 
occurred in each measure of composition that we study. For specific 
countries, the changes were often quite pronounced.
Immigrant Gender
Although many believe that immigration is dominated by young 
males, and although this belief is accurate for international migration 
in parts of the world, it is not true for legal immigration to the United 
States, at least with respect to legal immigration over the last 25 years 
(Table 4.7). 12 Through the 1970s, the gender composition favored 
females by between 7.2 percentage points (1976) and 4.4 percentage 
points (1979). However, during the 1980s, the flows began moving 
toward equality and during most years slightly favored males. This 
change was due in part to the increased admittance of refugees, which 
tend to be strongly oriented toward males. For example, in 1984, 56.6 
percent of 92,127 refugees were males; corresponding figures for 1986 
and 1988, respectively, are 56.0 percent of 104,383 and 55.2 percent of 
81,719. 13
During the early 1990s, the gender composition shifted strongly 
toward males. In 1990, the differential favored males by 6.6 percent 
age points; in 1991, almost two-thirds of the legally admitted immi 
grants were male. However, this shift was transitory and was 
associated with the legalization of previously illegal migrants under 
IRCA. Persons of Mexican birth were the primary beneficiaries of 
legalization (in 1991, 79.0 percent of 946,167 persons born in Mexico 
who received legal status were male). 14
An important aspect of gender composition is immigrant class of 
entry. Table 4.8 reports, by gender, immigrants who entered as numer 
ically restricted and numerically exempt from our 60-nation set. These 
data exclude both refugees and persons legalized under IRCA. Several 
points are noteworthy. First, the 60-country sample favors females 
more than does overall immigration. The percentage of females in the 
sample never falls below 50.3 percent for any year. Second, the pattern 
seen earlier, in which the female share falls toward 50 percent and then 
begins to rise again, is more characteristic of numerically exempt 
immigrants than numerically restricted immigrants. In many years, the
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SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statisti 
cal Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, vari 
ous years.
a Number is taken from INS Public Use Tapes and does not include 
refugees.
76 The Immigration Data
Table 4.8 Gender of Numerically Restricted and Numerically Exempt 
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differential favors exempt females by over 10 percentage points and in 
some cases by over 20.
Immigrant Age
The age composition of U.S. immigration also has changed over 
time (Table 4.9). The percentage of male immigrants accounted for by 
the youngest age class (under 10 years old) has fallen regularly since 
1970 (in 1970, 19.0 percent, but in 1992, only 9.8 percent). The per 
centage of male immigrants of age 50 and over has risen regularly, 
from 7.9 percent in 1970 to 11.3 percent in 1992. The percentage aged 
20-29 first increased (from 24.5 percent in 1970 to 30.0 percent in 
1982) and then declined (to 26.9 percent in 1988).
As is the case for males, the percentage of females under 10 years 
old has fallen steadily, from 16.7 percent in 1970 to 9.9 percent in 1992 
(Table 4.9). 15 The percentage of females aged 50 and over increased 
from 9.2 percent in 1970 to 14.4 percent in 1992. The percentage of 
women in this age class consistently has been greater than the percent 
age of men. The longer life expectancy of females is one explanation 
for their relatively heavier representation in the older age classes. 
Notable is the decline in the percentage of female immigrants aged 20- 
29, who accounted for 31.3 percent of female immigrants in 1976 but 
26.6 percent in 1992. This decrease, as well as decreases for each 
younger age class, was offset by increases for each of the older age 
groups, not just for the group 50 and over.
As with gender composition, age composition is highly sensitive to 
whether the immigrants are numerically restricted or numerically 
exempt (Tables 4.10 and 4.11). For the 60-country sample, the age 
composition of males and females within each class of entry is quite 
similar. However, for each year, the exempt group has far larger shares 
of persons in the 55-64 age class than the restricted group, which is 
due to the family reunification provisions of U.S. law. Moreover, 
among exempt immigrants, the age group 55-64 has grown quite dra 
matically, to more than 20 percent of each gender in 1991. This growth 
has been mainly at the expense of the youngest age group reported 
(20-34), because the 35-54 age class also has increased over time. 
Differences in age composition between numerically restricted and
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Table 4.10 Age of Numerically Restricted Male and Female Immigrants 
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Table 4.11 Age of Numerically Exempt Male and Female Immigrants for 






















































































































































Legal U.S. Immigration 81
numerically exempt immigrants again serve to emphasize the impor 
tance of disaggregating along these lines.
When we move beyond these aggregate figures to study the gender 
and age composition of immigration from specific countries, we 
uncover considerable variability. Table 4.12 reports gender and age 
composition in broad terms for 1972 and 1988 for selected countries. 
(We report 1988 data because they include no legalizations, in contrast 
to 1989-1991 [see Table 4.1]). Four observations are noteworthy. 
First, wide variations in gender composition exist across countries for a 
given year. For example, in 1972, 70.8 percent of immigrants from 
Germany were female, versus 45.4 percent from India; in 1988, 72.1 
percent from Germany and 41.1 percent from Haiti were female. Sec 
ond, for any given country of birth, considerable changes have occurred 
over time in gender composition. In 1972, 54.3 percent of immigrants 
from Haiti were female, but in 1988, only 41.1 percent; from the U.K., 
58.9 percent were female in 1972, and 49.6 percent in 1988.
Third, for any given year, gender-specific age composition also var 
ies widely among countries. For example, in 1988, 3.6 percent of the 
female immigrants from Germany were 50 years of age or older, versus 
23.8 percent from India. For the same year, only 11.0 percent of the 
male immigrants from Haiti were less than 20 years of age, versus 42.9 
percent from Korea. Fourth, for any given country of birth, consider 
able changes have occurred in gender-specific age composition over 
time. India and the Philippines provide strong support for this observa 
tion. In 1972, 1.5 percent of the male immigrants and 1.5 percent of 
the female immigrants from India were 50 and over; by 1988, the com 
parable figures were 20.3 percent and 23.8 percent. For the same 
years, the percentage of male immigrants 50 and over from the Philip 
pines grew from 6.1 percent to 20.4 percent, and the percentage of 
females from 7.1 percent to 21.9 percent. The countries reported in 
Table 4.12 were chosen because they are or have been particularly 
important sources of U.S. immigrants; other countries may have even 
greater ranges.
Skill Composition
For numerically restricted immigrants 20 years of age and over in 
our 60-country sample, Table 4.13 reports annual data for our three
Table 4.12 Gender and Age of U.S. Immigrants from Selected Countries, 1972 and 1988
















































































































SOURCE: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 7972 Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Table 9; 
Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1988, Table 12.
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Table 4.13 Numerically Restricted U.S. Immigrants Aged 20 and Over, 

























































































































































PTK = professional, technical, and kindred plus managers, officials, and proprietors.
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occupational groups (i.e., professional, technical, and kindred workers, 
as well as managers, officials, and proprietors; all others who report an 
occupation; and no occupation reported, homemakers, unemployed 
and retired persons, and students). Table 4,14 shows the same data for 
numerically exempt immigrants. To ascertain the significance of any 
trend in the data reported in Tables 4.13 and 4.14, we estimated the fol 
lowing simple regression for each share:
Eq. 4.1 PCT, = a, + ftr + e,-,
where PCT, is the percentage point share for each group identified in 
the two tables and Tis a simple linear time trend (i.e., 7=1,2,..., 20). 
The regression results are reported in Table 4.15; all estimated constant 
terms and coefficients are highly significant.
Among numerically restricted males, the share of the highest skill 
class fell significantly, but so did the share of immigrants with less 
skills (Table 4.15). The percentage reporting no occupation increased. 
Among numerically restricted females, the share of the group with the 
highest skills also declined significantly, but the share in the lower skill 
class increased significantly and the share reporting no occupation 
declined (Table 4.15).
The highest-skilled numerically exempt males behaved much like 
numerically restricted males in that their share also declined, but it fell 
much more rapidly between 1977 and 1988. The share of less-skilled 
immigrants also declined and those who reported no occupation 
increased (Table 4.15), The pattern for numerically exempt females in 
the highest skill class increased significantly over the 1972-1991 
period, but the overall share for this group is not large, as indicated by 
the relatively low constant term (o^-) reported in Table 4.15. As with 
numerically restricted females, the share of numerically exempt 
females with less skills increased, and the share reporting no occupa 
tion declined.
As suggested by Borjas (e.g., 1990) in connection with census data, 
the fraction of males with the highest skills declined significantly over 
the 1972-1991 period. However, the fraction with lower skills also 
declined. One explanation that Borjas offers for declining skill compo: 
sition is that immigrants have increasingly originated in countries with
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Table 4.14 Numerically Exempt U.S. Immigrants Aged 20 and Over, by 

























































































































































a PTK = professional, technical, and kindred plus managers, officials, and proprietors.
86 The Immigration Data




























































a *** inciicates absolute t > 1.96.
b PTK = professional, technical, and kindred plus managers, officials, and proprietors.
Legal U.S. Immigration 87
less-skilled occupational structures. Since our sample of countries is 
large, this is also a possible explanation for our observation.
The overall percentage of females in the highest skill class fell, but 
that for the relatively small group of numerically exempt females 
increased (Table 4.15). Although the number of females in the highest 
skill class remained relatively low, it increased by a factor of almost 4 
between 1972 and 1991. The percentage of females who reported no 
occupation decreased, but the corresponding percentage of males 
increased fairly substantially (Table 4.15). We do not know exactly 
why this latter increase occurred. It probably was in part the result of 
the increased fraction of older males who entered the United States, but 
other factors were undoubtedly also operating.
Notes
1. See U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Statistical Yearbook of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, for data from 1978 to the present. For 
earlier years, a limited number of variables is available in various INS annual 
reports.
2. Although 1971 data are not available on the INS Public Use Tapes, they have been 
used to conduct quite innovative research. See Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982).
3. The figure for 1991 includes 1,123,162 immigrants who were legalized under the 
terms of IRCA. Such legalized immigrants are not represented in the data used in 
this study; we analyze "normal" immigration.
4. In our analytical work, this quarter is not included in any way.
5. Using refugee designations in the microdata files, we were able to exclude certain 
individuals who are not discernible in the published INS data.
6. For 1972 and 1973, immigrant occupations correspond to the occupations 
reported in the 1960 census. For 1974-1982, immigrant occupations correspond 
to those used in the 1970 census. For 1983-1991, the categories correspond to 
those given in the 1980 census, which relative to the previous censuses used far- 
more-aggregated categories.
7. For these individuals, the prospective U.S. employer actually reports a job title in 
the labor certification process, and this title yields occupation.
8. Regarding occupation coding, Michael D. Hoefer of the Demographic Statistics 
Branch of INS writes that "since new arrivals are coded at a central location . . . 
their quality is better than for adjustments. I have reason to believe that this is true 
based on comparing the occupational distributions by visa type. The percentage 
of unknown occupations is lower for new arrivals than adjustments; and this holds 
even for labor qualifying immigrants, who have the same source document for 
both adjustments and new arrivals" (private correspondence to M.G.).
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9. Partial information regarding the lost files was created by INS through the use of 
separate records. However, the information on these records was not as extensive 
as that on the lost files.
10. For example, for 1980, of 132,541 records with missing data, 55,500 are for refu 
gees.
11. A particularly large discrepancy does occur in 1981, with 71.6 percent of the 
missing observations being adjustments of status compared with only 13.7 per 
cent in the complete group. However, even for 1981 the approach used here could 
not have been badly misleading. The vast majority of observations with missing 
information are from countries that supplied the United States with relatively 
many immigrants, and for these countries the observations with missing informa 
tion were only a small fraction of the total. Thus, the distributions were based on 
relatively large fractions of the total, not on relatively small fractions.
12. A widely distributed U.N. document concerned with international migration 
asserts that "generally, migrants have included a larger number of males than 
females and have been over-represented in the working age and under-represented 
in the ages of childhood and old age, compared to the total population" (United 
Nations 1979, p. 54).
13. More recently, however, the gender composition of refugees has become more 
equal. In 1993, 51.0 percent of 127,343 refugees were male; in 1994, 50.9 per 
cent of 121,434 refugees were male; and in 1995, 51.5 percent of 114,664 were 
male (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997, p. 92).
14. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1992, p. 52.
15. Although in more recent years the male and female shares of children in the U.S. 
immigration flow have converged, in general the male share under 10 years old is 
greater than the female share in this age class. Many explanations are possible for 
this phenomenon, ranging from more purely demographic to more purely eco 
nomic. For example, due to gender-selective abortions and infanticide, many 
countries around the world are known to have female population deficits. The 
same forces that favor such behavior could also cause female children to be left 
behind when part of a family migrates. Preferences for male adoptees in the 
United States could have the same result. Finally, such a phenomenon could be 
part of family long-term investment strategies that favor sending male children to 
the United States.
5 Modeling Flows 
of U.S. Immigration
"Determinants" of migration is a term used to broadly describe the 
factors that influence decisions to migrate. An empirical model of the 
determinants of U.S. immigration assesses which factors are statisti 
cally significant and which are not in shaping migration flows to the 
United States.
The importance of two types of characteristics may be assessed. 
First, personal characteristics (such as age, gender, schooling, marital 
status, English language ability, and many more) are of interest, but the 
data set that we use contains a limited number of personal characteris 
tics. Second, place characteristics are potentially important. Because 
we know the country of birth of each legal resident alien allowed to 
enter the United States, we are able to develop a fairly rich set of infor 
mation concerning where the migrants came from.
The models developed in this study are based on the immigrant's 
country of birth for two main reasons: 1) under U.S. immigration law, 
country of birth is a primary consideration for admission as a (numeri 
cally limited) legal resident alien; and 2) most legal immigrants have a 
country of last permanent residence that is the same as their country of 
birth. 1
PRIOR MODELS
Much of the research on the determinants of U.S.-bound migration 
has focused on the nation's laissez-faire period, when institutional 
impediments to immigration were either nonexistent or few and when 
restrictions on emigration from source countries were low. This focus 
is perhaps chosen because binding immigration constraints (such as 
were put in place during the early 1920s) blunt the economic forces 
underlying migration.
From an economist's perspective, differential economic opportunity 
plays a key role in explaining international migration in general and
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U.S. immigration in particular. The usual starting point for most eco 
nomic analyses of the determinants of international migration is the 
expected utility model, in which an individual economic agent (i.e., a 
potential migrant in a particular source country) is assumed to maxi 
mize a utility function subject to a budget constraint. Money or real 
wage (or income) differentials are presumed to reflect opportunities for 
utility gains. Correspondingly, various measures of job opportunities 
are presumed to reflect the probability of employment. The potential 
immigrant is then assumed to select from among alternative destination 
countries the one that maximizes expected utility net of the costs of 
moving. 2 Of course, most potential migrants stay where they are either 
because the benefits of moving to another country are sufficiently low 
or because the costs are sufficiently high.
In the context of nineteenth and early twentieth century migration 
from Europe to the United States, two related questions have been at 
the center of the debate regarding the determinants of the movements: 
1) Were migration flows from Europe to America caused by economic 
conditions in Europe (the push of low wages and lagging employment 
opportunities) or by economic conditions in America (the pull of rela 
tively high wages and attractive employment opportunities)? 2) Were 
differential job opportunities more or less important than differential 
wages in determining the volume of transatlantic migration?
Economic historians, demographers, and others have long debated 
these questions. 3 The debate has typically concerned transatlantic 
migration until the early 1920s, when entry barriers in North America 
appear to have significantly curbed the flows.4 Jerome (1926) was one 
of the first to study this issue. He examined immigration from Europe 
over a 100-year period up to the imposition of U.S. immigration quotas 
in the 1920s. He concluded that economic conditions in the United 
States were primarily responsible for short-cycle movements in Euro 
pean emigration to the United States. Kuznets and Rubins (1954) 
agreed with Jerome's findings.
Long cycles in transatlantic migration also have been studied. 5 
Thomas's (1973) basic theme was that the interaction between the 
United Kingdom and the United States played a crucial role in these 
cycles. Thomas viewed the Atlantic economy of the period as consist 
ing of Great Britain and a periphery of developing countries, including 
the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia. Thomas did not
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downplay the role of the United States in determining transatlantic 
migration, but rather placed Great Britain on a more equal footing. He 
felt that before 1870, conditions in Europe were probably more impor 
tant than those in the United States, but after 1870 these positions were 
probably reversed.
Because long swings in European migration to the United States 
seem to have coincided for most source countries, Kuznets (1958) 
leaned strongly toward the importance of economic forces in the United 
States: "Since it is highly unlikely that the timing of either birth cycles 
or 'push' elements was the same in so many different parts of the world, 
the similarity must be ascribed to some 'pull' factors" (p. 31). Easterlin 
(1961) also argued for the dominance of conditions in the United States.
Swedish migration to the United States during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries has been studied intensely, starting with 
D.S. Thomas (1941). Contrary to the generalizations of Kuznets and 
others, she concluded that economic conditions in Sweden were rela 
tively more important than those in the United States. Wilkinson 
(1967), in his analysis of long swings in Swedish emigration to the 
United States, found that changes in U.S. labor demand were more 
important than those in Sweden. On the other hand, Quigley (1972), 
studying migration from the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of 
Sweden to the United States between 1867 and 1908, came down 
squarely on the side of Thomas. His regression analysis shows that "the 
influence of both Swedish agricultural and industrial conditions was as 
important as corresponding conditions on the United States" (p. 121). 
Quigley's findings suggest that emigration from the agricultural sector 
was at least as sensitive to Swedish agricultural wages as to those in the 
United States. Industrial wages in the United States provided a strong 
attraction, but emigration from the Swedish industrial sector was very 
sensitive to Swedish industrial wages. U.S. agricultural and industrial 
wages are significant in Quigley's regression, but the coefficients are 
not nearly as high as that for Swedish industrial wages.
Wilkinson (1970) developed annual time series data (1870-1913) on 
immigration from Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Italy, Russia, and France, as well as data relating to output and income 
in the various countries. In his regression analysis, he also used a mea 
sure of migrant stock (the number of persons born in country i and liv 
ing in the United States at time i) as an explanatory variable. An
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important distinguishing feature of Wilkinson's study is that he specifi 
cally tests for the relative importance of income and job opportunities, 
where the latter variable is proxied by output. Wilkinson concluded 
that "European migration to the United States prior to World War I was 
significantly influenced by both employment opportunities in the par 
ticular European country ... and the gain in real income to be achieved 
by migration to the United States" (p. 277). He found that employment 
opportunities in the United States were much less important than real 
wages. Moreover, the stock of past migrants proves to be critical for 
each country he studied except Russia. In addition, Wilkinson con 
cluded that output expansion in the United States had no influence on 
migration from either the United Kingdom or Germany to the United 
States. Because the United Kingdom and Germany were major 
sources of U.S. immigrants during the nineteenth century, these find 
ings appear to be in sharp contrast to those of Kuznets and others, and 
they have not gone unchallenged.
Gallaway and Vedder (1971), using British data that report annual 
migration flows (1860-1913) from the United Kingdom to the United 
States, as well as to Australia, Canada, and South Africa, developed 
regression results somewhat different than those of Wilkinson. They 
found that higher unemployment rates in the United Kingdom were 
marginally significant in explaining migration to the United States, but 
unemployment rates and changes in wage levels in the United States 
were not significant. However, four of five dummy variables that 
depict various "panics" in the United States are negative and highly 
significant, suggesting that business conditions in the United States 
were indeed important. Gallaway and Vedder attribute the differences 
between their findings and Wilkinson's to what they judge to be an 
inappropriate use of lagged variables by Wilkinson. On balance, Gall- 
away and Vedder concluded that both push and pull forces were operat 
ing to drive transatlantic migration, but the pull forces were dominant.
Hatton and Williamson (1994) argue that no consensus exists on the 
push versus pull issue, in part because the issue is a "false one." Poten 
tial migrants almost certainly base their decisions on a comparison of 
alternatives (including the present location), but ad hoc models com 
bined with shaky data have yielded conflicting conclusions.
In general, historical studies of migration from Europe to the United 
States and Canada suggest that economic conditions in the destination
Legal U.S. Immigration 93
countries, especially high wage rates and employment opportunities, 
were attractive. Economic conditions in Europe also were of some 
important in explaining the flows, and demographic conditions in 
source countries almost certainly played a role. The costs of migrating 
were important as well. In this respect, past settlement was a key 
determinant of migration flows, because family and friends who previ 
ously migrated provided not only information about America, but also 
cultural, linguistic, and religious ties to the former place of residence.
MODELING THE DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION 
TO THE UNITED STATES
Numerous motives obviously underlie the decisions about whether 
and when to move to the United States. The model developed here 
emphasizes the importance of both differential economic advantage 
between various source countries and the United States, as well as the 
ease with which a prospective migrant can transfer accumulated occu 
pational skills to the U.S. labor market (Greenwood and McDowell 
1991). Moreover, we presume that, ceteris paribus, the presence or 
absence of different types of social programs in source countries will 
influence differential economic advantage, because these programs 
entail income transfers between various groups in those countries.
Potential migrants are assumed to be optimizers who choose their 
utility-maximizing location subject to their budget constraint. The 
potential migrant's utility in the home country is a function of income 
and the relative "attractiveness" of the home country. The individual 
decides to move to the United States when expected maximum utility, 
which is a function of expected market earnings, income transfers, and 
amenities, exceeds anticipated utility in the home country by an 
amount greater than the costs associated with migration.
The ease or difficulty of migrating to the United States is influenced 
importantly by U.S. immigration policy. U.S. entry requirements may 
alter the force of economic and other types of influences in numerous 
ways. For example, a large and growing group of immigrants has been 
exempt from the quota limitations of U.S. law, and they incur lower 
costs of moving to the United States both because they need not wait
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for a preference visa and because of their family ties. Another group 
has already entered the United States as nonimmigrants and has 
already borne many of the costs associated with migration; certain 
members of this group are able to "adjust" their status to legal resident 
alien (i.e., immigrant).
An important aspect of this chapter is to estimate the magnitudes of 
the influence of various determinants of U.S. immigration. In the 
model that follows, immigrants who are numerically restricted are dis 
tinguished from those who are numerically exempt. The models esti 
mated in this study contain several vectors of variables, including 
differential economic opportunity, the cost of migration, the political 
attractiveness and religion of potential source countries, U.S. immigra 
tion policy, and social programs in origin countries, as well as certain 
features of these programs. (See Appendix B for definitions of the 
variables.) The models are of the following general form:
Eq. 5.1 mit - fy vijt + eit
where
mit = the rate of U.S. immigration from country / during year r, and
the rate is defined relative to the population of / during t\ 
fy. = j vectors of estimated coefficients; 
vijt = J vectors °f explanatory variables relating to country / during
year t\ and 
eit = error terms.
Differential Economic Opportunities
The differential economic opportunity vector contains five elements: 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of country / relative to that of 
the United States, measured in U.S. dollars; the rate of growth of real 
GDP in country / averaged over the three previous years relative to a 
comparable rate for the United States; country f s central government 
revenues, expressed as a percentage of /'s GDP; the percentage of f s 
population residing in urban areas; and the percentage of country /'s 
labor force that is female.
Countries with a relatively high per capita GDP have smaller earn 
ings differentials relative to the United States, which should reduce
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emigration. In countries with relatively rapid growth of real GDP, job 
prospects in the country ought to be more attractive, again reducing 
emigration. Central government revenue as a percentage of GDP mea 
sures the extent of government taxes (and perhaps of government trans 
fer activity) within a country. The burdens of taxes fall most heavily 
on workers, who tend to be those individuals in the age groups with the 
highest propensities to migrate. Given that we directly control for 
numerous types of transfers (which are discussed in detail below), we 
expect higher levels of government revenues to encourage migration.
The percentage of the source-country's population that is urban pro 
vides a measure of economic development; ceteris paribus, the rate of 
migration to the United States ought to be lower from more highly 
urbanized and developed countries. Female participation in formal 
labor markets is proxied by the percentage of country /'s labor force 
that is female. Where jobs in formal labor markets are relatively more 
available to women, their employment prospects at home should be 
better, with the consequence that their emigration should be discour 
aged. However, higher female labor force participation should also 
reflect a larger pool of potential economic migrants from country i to 
the United States, thus clouding the expected direction of its influence. 
Therefore, we do not specify a priori a sign on female labor force in 
the immigration-rate regressions.
Migration Costs
The vector for the costs of migration to the United States contains 
six variables, three associated with direct entry costs and three associ 
ated with the costs of transferring skills. Direct entry cost variables 
include distance (the estimated airline mileage between the principal 
city of country i and the nearest major U.S. city); country f s crude 
birth rate; and a measure of the number of U.S. armed forces personnel 
(as well as U.S. citizen employees of the military) who were stationed 
in country / during year t, relative to the population of / during year t.
Distance serves as a proxy for the money costs (as well as the non- 
money costs) of moving farther away from relatives and friends. High 
birth rates are likely to be associated with larger family size, and the 
larger the family, the higher the migration costs. Finally, spouses of 
U.S. military personnel enter the United States as numerically exempt
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from immigration quotas, and, after a five-year wait and meeting other 
requirements, they may qualify for U.S. citizenship. As U.S. citizens 
21 years of age and older, they may reunite with their parents, who are 
also exempt from quota restrictions. Therefore, potential immigrants 
from source countries with higher direct costs (e.g., more distant, 
higher birth rate, few U.S. military persons) should, on average, have 
lower propensities to migrate to the United States.
Migration costs are also incurred because some portion of an immi 
grant's accumulated human capital (knowledge and skills) may not be 
perfectly transferable internationally. Three variables are included to 
capture these losses: a dummy variable that equals 1 if country /'s offi 
cial U.N. language is English; a measure of country f s education level, 
which is proxied by the number of students at the third level (i.e., uni 
versities and other institutions of higher education) expressed as a frac 
tion of total population (and then multiplied by 100); and the number 
of natives of country i who attended a U.S. university during t, as a pro 
portion of the country's population aged 20 to 24.
Expected skill losses should be lower for potential migrants from 
English-speaking countries. Better educated individuals generally 
have higher propensities to migrate, and they also should be better able 
to adapt to the requirements of a new occupational environment; a 
higher general level of education also may reflect an occupational mix 
that is more like that of the United States. Finally, receiving an educa 
tion at a U.S. university should enhance the ease with which an indi 
vidual can transfer job skills to the United States. Because lower skill 
losses should encourage migration, immigration to the United States 
ought to be greater from English-speaking countries, from countries 
with a relatively high level of education, and from countries that send 
relatively many students to the U.S. schools.
Political Attractiveness and Religion
The political attractiveness of a country is presumed to be reflected 
by its political competitiveness, which is measured by an index of 
political rights ranging from 1.0 for countries with a fully competitive 
electoral process to 7.0, indicating least free (Gastil 1987). Countries 
with politically competitive systems are considered to be relatively 
attractive. Political repression should be a push factor for emigration,
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but, if domestic political repression is associated with emigration 
restrictions, emigration will be reduced.
The measures of religion used here distinguish countries that are 
primarily Catholic or Muslim, where a country is designated as Catho 
lic (Muslim) if the country's population is made up of at least 50 per 
cent Catholics (Muslims). Since Catholicism is the single largest 
religious denomination in the United States, we expect immigrants 
from countries designated as Catholic to find social assimilation easier, 
which should encourage their migration. We do not specify a sign for 
the influence of being from a Muslim nation. 6
U.S. Immigration Policy
U.S. immigration policy clearly can influence the rate of migration 
to the United States. We believe that because of policy impacts on both 
the cross sections (i.e., source countries) and time series (i.e., years), 
controls must be introduced for U.S. immigration policy (Greenwood 
andMcDowe!11991). 7
To account for policy differences and changes in the law, our model 
includes variables that reflect the spatial and temporal aspects of U.S. 
policy. We distinguish three regions of the world: Asia (not including 
Israel), the Western Hemisphere (1972-1976), and all other countries. 
The last group is the benchmark, and immigration from the Western 
Hemisphere (1972-1976) and from Asia is examined by the use of two 
regional dummies. One dummy variable equals 1 for Western Hemi 
sphere countries for the years 1972 through 1976, and the other equals 
1 if country i is in Asia. These dummies are included to account for 
differential treatment, possible non-policy-related discrimination, 
divergence between policy guidelines and implementation, and the 
importance of intervening alternative destinations for potential 
migrants to the United States.
Other aspects of U.S. immigration law affect the costs of entry into 
the United States. For instance, the law facilitates the entry of foreign- 
born relatives of U.S. citizens and legal resident aliens. Migration 
costs are thus lower for persons who have citizen relatives in the 
United States, as proxied by the number of recent naturalizations of 
persons born in country /. The number of U.S. naturalizations of per-
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sons born in country / are summed over year t and the prior four years 
and are expressed relative to the population of / during t.
During the period 1977-1982, 147,538 preference numbers were 
issued under the Silva program, which was instituted under court order 
to provide replacement visas for numbers originally used for Cuban 
refugee adjustments. Visas available under the Silva program went to 
independent Western Hemisphere countries and were assigned in addi 
tion to the annual worldwide ceiling. As a practical matter, Mexico 
was allocated the majority of Silva visas, receiving 117,045 (79 per 
cent). The numbers of such visas received by Mexico in the years 
1977-1982 were 3,629, 49,481, 6,333, 4,242, 53,168, and 192, respec 
tively (U.S. Department of State 1987, Table VIII). To account for the 
Silva program, a dummy variable is included that indicates a large 
number of Silva admittances from country i during year t (equals 1 for 
Mexico in 1978 and 1981).
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 provided 
for 5,000 nonpreference visas in both 1987 and 1988. Nonpreference 
(lottery) visas had not been available for some years, but the IRCA leg 
islation made them available over and above the normal allotment of 
numerically restricted visas for aliens born in countries from which 
immigration had been adversely affected by the 1965 Amendments to 
the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 A dummy variable is used to 
control for the influence of these lottery issuances. This dummy vari 
able equals 1 if the number of NP-5 and OP-1 lottery issuances 
charged to country / was greater than 5 percent of the number of 
numerically restricted immigrants for year t who were born in that 
country.
Social Programs in Source Countries
We are unaware of any previous attempt to introduce an extensive 
set of social program indicators for source countries into a model of 
U.S. immigration. Neither are we aware of any effort to include such 
variables in a model of migration to any other country, in spite of the 
fact that many countries, especially in Europe, have social program 
systems that are more extensive and more generous than that of the 
United States. To study the importance of such programs, we had to 
develop the data set ourselves, drawing the basic information from the
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Social Security Administration's Social Security Programs throughout 
the World. In the various models that we estimate, the social program 
vector includes several variables relating to the population covered by 
the specific program (coverage) and, given coverage, includes other 
variables relating to various features of the programs (features).
The basic idea that underlies the inclusion of these social program 
variables in the model is that the presence or absence of different types 
of social programs will influence differential economic advantage, 
since the programs entail income transfers among groups in the source 
countries. The extent to which benefits are provided to various groups 
depends on the particular program, program coverage, and other spe 
cific program features.
Eleven variables are included in the vector of social programs in 
country i. The social programs considered include those providing 
old-age pensions, sickness-related benefits, unemployment benefits, 
and family allowance subsidies. Old-age pension programs ordinarily 
take the form of pensions payable for life (or at least a considerable 
number of years). Old-age pension programs may provide pensions 
that are universally available (to all residents or citizens) or that are 
employment-related (available only to wage earners and salaried 
employees). Universal and employment-related programs also gener 
ally differ in terms of financing: whereas universal pension programs 
are usually financed from general government revenues, employment- 
related systems generally are financed through some combination of 
employer and employee contributions.
To distinguish the characteristics of old-age pension programs, we 
include three variables: a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country has 
a program providing pensions that are universally available; a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a country has an employment-related pension 
program that operates as a social insurance system; and a dummy vari 
able that equals 1 if a country has an employment-related pension pro 
gram that operates as a provident funds system. 9 We also include a 
control indicating if a country has an old-age pension program contain 
ing a stipulation that the pension is not payable abroad or is payable 
abroad only under "limited" conditions.
Sickness-related programs also can be either universal or employ 
ment-related. One variable is used to indicate whether coverage is uni 
versally available to all residents or citizens. Three additional variables
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are included to identify specific program features: 1) those for which 
cash sickness benefits are paid when short-term illnesses prevent the 
insured individual from going to work; 2) programs providing mater 
nity benefits that are paid to working mothers during some designated 
period before and after the birth of a child; and 3) programs providing 
health-care benefits, which are usually provided in the form of medical, 
hospital, and pharmaceutical benefits.
The unemployment-benefits programs included are those that gener 
ally provide compulsory insurance of a fairly broad scope, covering the 
majority of employed persons, regardless of the type of industry, or at 
least covering those workers in industry and commerce. Family allow 
ance programs provide regular cash payments to families with chil 
dren. Such payments may be either universal (provided to all resident 
families with a specific number of children) or employment-related 
(provided only to the families of wage and salary workers). In certain 
countries these programs may also include school grants, birth grants, 
maternal and child-health services, and sometimes even allowances for 
adult dependents. Two variables are included to indicate whether 
either a universal or employment-related family allowance program is 
available in country i.
To determine the effect of the various social programs on the (nor 
malized) volume of immigration from a source country, we must first 
determine the programs' net cost-benefit impacts on natives of the 
country, particularly those natives who are the most likely to migrate. 
Other things being equal, young workers are more likely to migrate 
than older individuals. While old-age pension programs may provide 
attractive benefits to all individuals who ultimately receive them, such 
benefits are generally available only after some lengthy period of 
employment or residence. Therefore, the tax and/or wage contribution 
burdens imposed on younger workers may actually induce a larger vol 
ume of migration. Such an impact may be particularly pronounced in 
situations where old-age pensions are universally available. In such 
cases, not only are their benefits delayed to some future period, but the 
younger workers (through either tax or wage effects) also bear a sub 
stantial current burden of paying for the benefits received by other indi 
viduals. Thus, we anticipate that the presence of a universal old-age 
pension program in country / will encourage a higher rate of emigra 
tion.
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For employment-related pension programs, this expectation is less 
certain. For instance, to the extent that younger workers anticipate that 
the present values of their future old-age benefits outweigh the current 
costs being imposed on them, the presence of such programs will not 
increase their propensity to migrate. Indeed, compared with the alter 
native of no pension program, employment-related pensions may serve 
to reduce migration. Moreover, a provident funds system does not 
entail an obvious transfer from younger to older workers. Such pro 
grams may stimulate migration, in that they provide an opportunity to 
save resources necessary to cover the costs of relocation. However, for 
individuals who have a vested interest in an old-age pension program, 
constraints on the ability to internationally transfer the pensions should 
discourage migration.
Programs that provide maternity benefits, employment-related fam 
ily allowances, and unemployment insurance are the most likely to 
provide net benefits to young workers and their families. Conse 
quently, we expect the presence of these programs to reduce the rate of 
immigration to the United States. The same expectation also may be 
attached to universal family allowance programs, though it is less clear 
here given the nature of transfers in programs providing universal ben 
efits.
The effects of programs relating to sickness are not clear. For 
instance, in countries in which cash benefits are paid to individuals 
with illnesses that prevent them from working, these benefits are gen 
erally available to all workers. While the potential for such illnesses 
may increase with age, we cannot determine the net costs and benefits 
to particular groups of workers because those costs and benefits are 
generally tied to earnings. Without a more detailed characterization of 
the benefits and financing of such programs, we are unable to antici 
pate their effect on the rate of migration. Health care in the form of 
medical, hospital, and pharmaceutical benefits most likely assists older 
individuals, because sicknesses that result in such medical expenses 
generally increase with age. On the other hand, those benefits are also 
of value to young families, especially those with children. However, if 
such benefits are universally provided, we expect the cost burden 
imposed on workers to induce a higher rate of migration.
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This model has been estimated by means of a number of econometric 
techniques that are appropriate for panel data, including random effects, 
one-way fixed-effects-time, one-way fixed-effects-countries, and the 
Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable technique. These techniques are 
described in Appendix C. Depending upon the specific technique used, 
the resulting estimates differ somewhat. In this and subsequent chap 
ters, we focus on the Hausman-Taylor estimates. The Hausman-Taylor 
approach (Hausman and Taylor 1981) uses instrumental variables, 
accounts for both temporal and country-specific effects, and is particu 
larly appropriate when temporally invariant variables (labeled z) are 
included in the model and when certain variables may be endogenous. 
Variables that vary both temporally and among countries are labeled x. 
A subscript 1 indicates an exogenous variable, and a subscript 2 indi 
cates and endogenous variable. (For comparative purposes, Appendix 
C reports estimates using other econometric approaches.)
The Hausman-Taylor approach specifically accounts for variables 
that vary only cross-sectionally (i.e., across countries). Distance, 
English language, the control for Asian nations, and the religion con 
trols are obvious candidates for this set of variables. Moreover, 
although the social program measures may vary through time for any 
given country, in practice they need not do so. Thus, each social pro 
gram variable was checked for each country. In no instance did any 
social program variable fail to change in any country. Thus, each of 
these variables was treated as temporally varying.
The Hausman-Taylor approach also requires a distinction between 
variables that potentially may be correlated with unobservable country- 
specific effects (endogenous variables) and variables that are not so 
correlated (exogenous variables). Frequently, no theory underlies the 
partitioning of the endogenous and exogenous variables; however, we 
wished to develop an underlying rationale. Our key to making the par 
tition was to ask which variables could reflect "choice" (and conse 
quently a taste for the U.S. lifestyle) and which could relate to potential 
work ethic or desire for education. Any such variable could be corre 
lated with the unobservables. For example, naturalizations could 
reflect a taste for the United States. English language could lead to
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better knowledge about the United States through education, movies, 
newspapers, and television, thus leading to a correlation with the coun 
try-specific effects. Similar arguments could be made with regard to 
the education level in the source country, as well as to the number of 
foreign students from country i and U.S. military personnel in country 
/. We interpret our notion of choice broadly to include social choice. 
As a consequence, government revenue, political competitiveness, 
birth rate, female labor force participation, and the various social pro 
gram variables are treated as endogenous, or potentially correlated 
with country-specific effects. Thus, the vector (jc,) for time- and coun 
try-varying exogenous variables includes relative per capita income; 
relative growth of GDP; percentage of population in urban areas; the 
control for the differential treatment of the Western Hemisphere 
natives during the 1972-76 period; the lottery program visas; and the 
Silva program. For temporally invariant exogenous variables, the vec 
tor (Zi) includes distance; the control for Asian nations; and the two 
controls for the primary religion being either Catholic or Muslim. Our 
division of variables between exogenous and endogenous has the prac 
tical consequence of placing a heavy burden on the estimation tech 
nique.
Table 5.1 contains Hausman-Taylor estimates of the basic model of 
U.S. immigration (with no social program variables), as well as three 
models that include the vector of social program variables so that we 
can see how the inclusion of the social program variables contributes to 
explaining the determinants of U.S. immigration. (Appendix D, Table 
Dl contains means and standard deviations for all variables used in the 
study, and Table D.2 contains r-statistics corresponding to Table 5.1). 
The following discussion focuses only on the regressions that include 
the social program vectors (right-most three columns in Table 5.1), and 
all statements of effects should be read with the implicit qualification, 
ceteris paribus.
Wage or income differences between the United States and source 
countries have frequently proven to be significant determinants of U.S. 
immigration (Greenwood and McDowell 1991; Lucas 1976). Higher 
per capita income (or related measures) in source countries or smaller 
differences relative to the United States discourage migration to the 
United States. Whether with respect to historical or contemporary U.S. 
immigration, such measures have rarely failed to provide significant
Table 5.1 The Rate of Migration to the United States, 1972-1991: 
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimates3- 15
Vector/variable
Diff. Econ. Opportunity
Relative per capita income (;ci)
Relative growth of GDP (x,)
Government revenues (x2)
% Urban (*,)
% Female in labor force (;c2)
Migration costs
Distance from U.S.A. (z\)
Birth rate (x2)
U.S. military presence (jc2)
Education (x2)
English language (z2)
U.S. college students from i (jc2)





Per capita naturalizations (x2)







































































Silva visas (x,) 0.160




Employment-related old-age (jc2) -
Provident fund old-age (jc2) -
Old-age pension not portable (x2) -
Universal sickness (jc2) -
Cash sickness benefits (x2) -
Maternity benefits (x2) -
Medical benefits (jc2) -
Unemployment insurance (x2) -
Universal family allowance (x2) -
Employment family allowance (x2) -
Control














































a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 <t< 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Appendix Table D2 contains the actual r-statistics that
correspond to this table. 
b The interpretation of the coefficients reported in this table for the rate model are not directly comparable to those for the composition
models reported in the following chapters. 
c No social program variable. 
d Includes social program variables.
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explanations. Thus, our results, which show the coefficient on relative 
income to be statistically insignificant in the regression for all immi 
grants, are somewhat surprising. This finding appears to be due in part 
to our choice of an econometric estimator, because (as indicated in 
Appendix C, Table Cl) the more common one-way fixed-effects-time 
estimate of relative income is negative and highly significant. We 
believe that we are appropriately picking up country-specific effects 
with the Hausman-Taylor estimator and thus better controlling for such 
effects. Nonetheless, the lack of significance of relative income is sur 
prising.
However, for those who are numerically exempt, the coefficient on 
relative income is negative and marginally significant. Thus, those per 
sons who are not subject to entry restrictions (and thus the most likely 
to reflect the force of economic incentives) have some tendency to 
come from countries with lower relative incomes.
The coefficients of relative economic growth are positive and reflect 
marginal significance (Table 5.1); we had anticipated a negative sign. 
One possible explanation for the positive sign is that economic growth 
provides assets that help potential migrants pay the costs of an interna 
tional move, but this explanation is not entirely satisfactory. Thus, our 
two key measures of differential economic opportunity behave disap 
pointingly. Government revenue has the expected sign and is highly 
significant for all immigrants and for numerically restricted immi 
grants, but not for those who are exempt. Thus, higher tax and transfer 
activity encourages the departure of young and highly mobile individu 
als. Percent urban has the expected negative sign and is highly signifi 
cant in each regression (Table 5.1). Thus, U.S. immigrants have a 
strong tendency to originate in less-urbanized and presumably less- 
developed countries. Female labor force participation does not have a 
particularly strong influence on migration rate in any regression includ 
ing social program variables (perhaps because the marriage-market 
scenario is gender-specific and our data, at this point, are not decom 
posed by gender).
The migration costs vector performs somewhat better than that for 
differential economic opportunity. Distance and the associated higher 
costs of moving significantly discourage migration to the United 
States. Higher birth rates in source countries also significantly discour 
age migration, presumably by raising the cost of family migration.
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Countries having a significant U.S. military presence send more 
migrants to the United States, but the relationship is only significant 
(marginally) in the numerically restricted regression.
While the influence of education is positive in three regressions 
(Table 5.1), it is significant only for the numerically restricted immi 
grants. Although the influence of English language is positive and 
highly significant in the basic model, this variable is not statistically 
significant when social programs are introduced. Thus, although 
English language and level of education play some role in influencing 
immigration to the United States, they do not play a particularly prom 
inent role. This finding has important policy implications, because it 
suggests that numerically exempt immigration is not from countries 
with relatively high levels of educational attainment. If the migrants 
from such countries reflect source-country characteristics, exempt 
immigration is not keeping pace with restricted immigration in terms 
of providing the United States with well-educated newcomers.
Finally, contrary to expectations, countries that send more students 
to the United States (as nonimmigrants) tend to have lower rates of 
restricted immigration. This finding is surprising, but it may reflect a 
strategy to circumvent U.S. immigration restrictions: for countries with 
long waits for legal resident alien status, moving as a student may pro 
vide an alternative means of entering the United States.
Researchers have long known that political conditions in potential 
source countries provide a major inducement for immigration to the 
United States. Clearly, refugees are one example, but refugees are not 
included in this study. The coefficient on political competitiveness is 
positive and highly significant, which suggests that even "normal" 
flows to the United States are driven to some extent by dissatisfaction 
with suppressive political regimes. On the other hand, religion does 
not appear to directly influence decisions to move to the United States.
Parents, spouses, and children of U.S. citizens 21 years of age and 
older are exempt from numerical restrictions on immigration; thus, 
persons who have become naturalized U.S. citizens greatly facilitate 
movement to the United States. The variable for per capita naturaliza 
tions is positive and highly significant, reflecting the importance of this 
legal avenue for U.S. entry. The lottery program of the late 1980s also 
boosted U.S. immigration, especially numerically restricted immigra 
tion. Because the lottery recipients entered as restricted and not as
108 Modeling Flows of U.S. Immigration
exempt, this finding makes sense. However, the Silva program does 
not appear to have influenced the immigration rate.
During the first five years studied, U.S. entry requirements for 
Western Hemisphere immigrants were not as stringent as they were for 
natives of Eastern Hemisphere countries. Thus, the coefficients indi 
cating that this differential treatment is associated with fewer immi 
grants is somewhat surprising. However, when the demand for entry 
from Western Hemisphere countries was low, the political cost to the 
United States of sustaining a good neighbor policy was also low. As 
the demand for immigrant visas from these countries increased, the 
cost of maintaining such a policy rose. Consequently, Congress placed 
Western Hemisphere countries under essentially the same admission 
criteria as Eastern Hemisphere countries. This argument suggests that 
entry restrictions favoring natives of Western Hemisphere countries 
were themselves endogenous with the flows from these countries.
The unique variables in this study are those relating to social pro 
gram availability in source countries. Among these variables, that for 
the availability of unemployment insurance programs particularly 
stands out: the coefficients on this variable in both the "all immigrants" 
and the "numerically restricted" regressions have the highest t-value of 
any variable in these Table 5.1 regressions (see Appendix D, Table D2). 
The presence of unemployment insurance significantly discourages 
migration to the United States, and because the incidence of unemploy 
ment is highest among those labor force members in their low to mid 
twenties, unemployment insurance discourages migration by the indi 
viduals who have the highest propensity to migrate.
Numerically exempt immigrants tend to be considerably older than 
restricted immigrants (because the exempt group contains parents of 
U.S. citizens), and perhaps as a consequence, unemployment programs 
are not significant in the regression for exempt immigrants.
Old-age pension programs have little influence on the rate of immi 
gration; the only effect of such programs involves portability. For 
countries where pension programs are not portable, the rate of migra 
tion to the United States is lower, particularly for exempt immigrants, 
who are presumably older; i.e., U.S. citizens—probably naturalized 
citizens, because their parents had been living abroad—are more likely 
to bring their parents to the United States if the parents are not required 
to give up their pension benefits.
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Sickness and maternity programs also play a role in shaping immi 
gration to the United States. In the regression for all immigrants, a sig 
nificantly lower rate of immigration is evident from countries 
providing cash sickness benefits, and a significantly higher rate from 
countries with maternity benefits. The influence of the availability of 
medical benefits is negative and marginally significant. The influence 
of cash sickness benefits is strongly negative for both restricted and 
exempt immigrants; maternity benefits stimulate only the flow of the 
restricted group, and medical benefits appear to only retard the flow for 
the exempt group. Thus, the availability of both cash sickness benefits 
and health-care benefits discourages movement to the United States. 
The fact that the influence of medical benefits is negative and signifi 
cant only for exempt immigrants (primarily of spouses and parents of 
U.S. citizens and who are generally older) is noteworthy. Although we 
anticipated a negative sign on the variable for maternity benefits, for 
reasons that are not clear, maternity benefits provide a push, especially 
for the numerically restricted group.
The family allowance variables suggest a modest retarding effect on 
migration to the United States, especially for numerically restricted 
immigrants. Such programs provide benefits to families with relatively 
young children, where the parents are in those age classes with fairly 
high migration propensities. The younger numerically restricted group 
is deterred by such programs, whereas the older numerically exempt 
group is unaffected by them.
SUMMARY
In this chapter we have developed a model of the determinants of 
immigration that contains vectors of variables reflecting differential 
economic opportunity, migration costs, political conditions in source 
countries, U.S. immigration policy, and social programs in source 
countries. The last of these is unique. Using panel data for 60 coun 
tries of birth of U.S. immigrants and for 20 years (1972-1991), we 
obtained Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimates of the 
parameters of the model.
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The model generally performs well. Other things being equal, U.S. 
numerically restricted immigrants tend to come from countries that are 
growing relatively fast and that have high government revenues as a 
percentage of GDP. More of all U.S. immigrants came from countries 
that have relatively suppressive political regimes and that have rela 
tively many naturalized U.S. citizens from the country. Source-country 
factors discouraging migration include distance from the United States, 
a high birth rate, a sickness and medical benefits system, relatively 
many students from the country studying in the United States, and an 
unemployment insurance system. Family allowance systems tend to 
discourage numerically restricted migration to the United States, but 
the influence of such programs is not great.
When immigrants are distinguished as numerically restricted versus 
numerically exempt, differences in the empirical results are generally 
as anticipated. The group that is the least constrained in expressing its 
economic motivation is the exempt group, and this group has a ten 
dency to originate in countries with lower incomes relative to the 
United States. Because the exempt group is made up primarily of 
spouses and parents of U.S. citizens, it tends to be somewhat older. 
Probably as a consequence, the exempt group is not significantly dis 
couraged from migrating due to the presence of an unemployment 
insurance program, whereas the restricted group is strongly discour 
aged. Moreover, the availability of health-care benefits discourages the 
migration of the exempt group, as does the lack of portable pension 
benefits. Finally, whereas greater distance and the associated higher 
costs of migrating discourage each group from moving to the United 
States, the coefficient on the distance variable is over twice as high in 
absolute value for numerically restricted immigrants. Not only do 
older exempt immigrants have greater assets to cover the costs of mov 
ing over longer distances, but also their costs of moving are likely to be 
subsidized by U.S. citizen relatives living in the United States.
In subsequent chapters, we use essentially the same variables to 
develop models of the gender, age, and skill composition of U.S. immi 
gration.
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Notes
1. The movement from country A to B to C is sometimes called "geographically 
indirect" movement from A to C. The term "indirect immigration" has also fre 
quently been used when an individual moves from country A to country B, but in 
country B gains nonimmigrant status. At a later date, the person may adjust his/ 
her status to legal resident alien, in which case the immigrant is called "indirect." 
The "indirect" here obviously refers to legal status in the receiving country and 
not to the actual geographic path the individual took to get there.
Greenwood and Trabka (1991) used the INS Public Use Tapes to show that 
between 1972 and 1987 the percentage of geographically indirect migration to the 
United States ranged from 7.2 percent (1981) to 14.8 percent (1984). The 
increased number of geographically indirect moves during the 1980s was clearly 
due to the increased number of refugees accepted by the United States (Green 
wood and Trabka 1991). Refugees were even more responsible for the increase in 
legally indirect movement, which tripled in number and doubled in percentage 
between 1972 and 1987. As noted in Chapter 4, refugees have been removed 
from our data set. Their removal greatly reduces any problems stemming from 
differences between countries of birth and countries of last permanent residence. 
Thus, our choice of country of birth as the country of an immigrant's origin 
appears to be acceptable for most migratory moves to the United States that we 
study here.
2. Most migration models fail to incorporate information about alternative opportu 
nities and focus solely on the chosen destination. This is particularly true of mod 
els of the determinants of international migration, in large part due to 
shortcomings of available data.
3. Gould (1979) provided a fairly comprehensive survey of the causes of European 
emigation, with special emphasis on efforts to empirically model the determinants 
of European intercontinental movements. Hatton and Williamson (1994) sur 
veyed more recent studies of international migration that in many cases incorpo 
rate improved historical data.
4. We use the term "appear" because some scholars argue that the flows were 
already tapering off by the early 1920s and thus that immigration restrictions did 
not have the force they may have had in earlier years. However, if the effects of 
World War I are taken into account, the flows do not appear to have begun to fall. 
In 1921, before the temporary entry restrictions that were imposed in that year 
became effective, 805,228 persons entered the United States.
5. The term "Kuznets cycles" has also been used to denote long swings, which are 
thought to be 15 to 25 years in length.
6. Tyree and Donato (1985) argued that fewer females immigrate to the United 
States from Muslim countries. If their position is correct, we should be able to 
detect this influence in our gender models.
7. Policy controls that have only a temporal dimension are picked up by the equiva 
lent of the temporal fixed effects that we employ in estimating the model and can-
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not be introduced otherwise. However, certain temporal policy effects discussed 
below apply only to specific sets of countries, and thus dummy variables reflect 
ing these policies may be included.
8. The NP-5 program created by IRCA allotted visas on a first-come, first-served 
basis. The OP-1 program was established by Section 3 of the Immigration 
Amendments of 1988, and visas allotted under it were based on a bona fide lot 
tery. Each program involved nonpreference visa allocations.
9. Pension programs that operate as social insurance systems base eligibility for pen 
sions on the length of employment, and the amount of individual pensions is usu 
ally related to the level of the worker's prior earnings. Such programs are 
financed largely from special contributions (e.g., a percentage of earnings) by 
workers and employers and in most instances are compulsory. On the other hand, 
provident funds systems are essentially compulsory savings programs in which 
regular contributions withheld from employees are matched by those of their 
employers. These contributions are set aside in a special fund and then later 
repaid to the worker, as a general rule, in a single lump sum.
6 The Gender Composition 
of U.S. Immigration
The gender composition of U.S. immigration is important for sev 
eral reasons. First, females are less likely than males to be "economic 
migrants," migrants motivated by economic advantages and costs; 
females are more likely to be "tied movers" as defined by Mincer 
(1978). Partly as a consequence, female immigrants tend to have lower 
labor force participation rates and lower earnings than their male coun 
terparts. Second, the child-bearing capacity of female immigrants 
increases the potential for growth of the second-generation immigrant 
population. Because neither the 1980 nor the 1990 census asked a 
question concerning the nativity of parents, we are not able to easily 
assess the number of persons who in 1990 had foreign-born mothers. 
Third, females have a longer life expectancy than males. Conse 
quently, those female immigrants who qualify for social services and 
benefits (such as Social Security and Medicare) will, on average, 
demand them for a longer period of time.
In this chapter, we discuss factors that influence the gender compo 
sition of immigrant flows. Understanding the gender composition 
requires consideration of the incentives surrounding the various 
"modes" by which an immigrant may enter the United States. First, an 
immigrant can enter independently, presumably with economic incen 
tives primarily in mind. While such economic migrants often are 
thought to be male, the gender composition of immigrant flows varies 
across source countries depending upon source-country characteristics 
(Donato 1992). Alternatively, immigrants may enter as either non-eco 
nomic or tied migrants. Non-economic migrants move for the purpose 
of family reunification or to form a family, for instance, as the spouse 
of a U.S. citizen. Thus, consideration must be given to source-country 
characteristics that determine the gender composition of immigrants 
who marry U.S. citizens (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990). Tied migrants 
enter the United States as part of an immigrant family unit. Given 
independent economic migrants as primarily male and tied migrants as 
primarily female, variations in the gender composition of immigration
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from various source countries will be a function of the relative incen 
tives of family-unit migration (Borjas and Bronars 1991; Mincer 1978) 
versus single-unit independent migration.
THE GENDER COMPOSITION MODEL
The general form of the model is that of Eq. 5.1. In addition to the 
variables summarized in Chapter 5, the gender composition equation 
includes two variables expected to specifically reflect the propensity of 
females to migrate: the population sex ratio in country i (the ratio of 
males to females in the indigenous population); and the relative educa 
tion of females as compared with males (the percentage of country f s 
female population that is at the third level relative to the percentage of 
country f s male population at that level). The sex ratio controls for the 
gender composition of source country f s indigenous population; the 
relative education of females is substituted for the general population's 
education level, which is used as the control for educational attainment 
in the rate regression.
Consider economic migrants. The propensity of females to migrate 
internationally is expected to be a function of their educational attain 
ment and the degree to which they are economically active. Other 
things being equal, highly educated individuals have higher propensi 
ties to migrate, so as females attain higher levels of education relative 
to males, the female share of the migration flow should increase. If we 
view migration as another form of human capital development, eco 
nomically active individuals are more likely to migrate than individuals 
who do not participate in the formal labor market. Therefore, as the 
extent of female labor force participation rises, the probability that they 
will become international migrants is enhanced.
Economic migrants should be particularly responsive to the factors 
that reflect differential economic advantage and relative migration 
costs. For economic migrants, whether male or female, lower costs 
and/or greater returns to migration should cause a larger flow. Ideally, 
within the set of potential economic migrants, to distinguish between 
the migration propensity of women versus men, we would want to 
know gender-specific differences in the costs and returns to migration.
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For example, if the wage differential between the United States and the 
country / were greater for women than for men, a larger proportion of 
the flow should be women. Unfortunately, gender-specific data per 
taining to source countries are generally unavailable.'
A distinction between female and male migration does exist, how 
ever: males are generally presumed to be economic migrants, but the 
same is not true of females. As noted by Tyree and Donate (1986, p. 40) 
"the majority of immigrant women do not move alone, but are married 
and move with their husbands." Whereas the extent of this character 
ization may have changed over time, and although it may be different 
for different source countries, females still are characterized frequently 
as either non-economic or tied migrants in international migration 
flows. Given this characterization of females, the proportion of total 
immigrants that is female should vary with the ratio of economic to 
non-economic/tied migrants: as the ratio falls, the proportion of total 
immigrants who are females should rise.
The factors included in the differential economic opportunities vec 
tor are expected to be of particular importance in influencing the ratio 
of economic to non-economic migrants. For example, a higher level of 
development should lower the propensity to migrate of economically 
active individuals (mostly male), and higher source-country income 
should increase the relative flow of non-economic migrants (mostly 
female) because higher income retards the flow of economic migrants. 
Thus, such factors should cause an increase in the proportion of 
migrants that is female.2
The effect of migration costs on the gender composition of migrants 
should vary. For instance, given that a high birth rate in country / is 
associated with larger family size, there will be higher migration costs 
for family-unit migration, which should cause fewer females to come 
from, nations with high birth rates. Certain other migration costs (e.g., 
skill losses) will be relevant only for economic migrants. The higher 
the migration costs incurred by economic migrants (but not by non- 
economic migrants), the lower the ratio of economic to non-economic 
migrants. Thus, migration flows from source countries where skills are 
relatively less transferable to the United States should have a greater 
share of females. Moreover, certain evidence (e.g., Duleep and Sand 
ers 1993; Long 1980) suggests that family investment strategies may 
be used to facilitate adjustments for expected skill losses—during the
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initial years in the United States, the husband invests in U.S.-specific 
skills, and the wife works to support these investments—thus relatively 
more family-unit migration (and consequently more tied female 
migrants) is induced under circumstances where skill losses are 
expected to be greatest.
English-speaking persons typically bear lower costs of adjusting to 
the U.S. labor market, and so English-speaking nations should have a 
greater share of males in their migrant flows. However, this expecta 
tion is somewhat ambiguous, since language familiarity facilitates 
social and cultural assimilation, which are also important to non-eco 
nomic migrants. Receiving an education at a U.S. university should 
make it easier to transfer job skills to the United States. Hence, nations 
with relatively large numbers of students attending U.S. universities 
should have a greater share of males in their migrant flows. Jasso and 
Rosenzweig (1990) argue that the number of immigrant husbands of 
U.S. citizens would reflect the origin country's number of students in 
the United States, and that immigrant wives of U.S. citizens would be 
disproportionately drawn from countries that host U.S. military instal 
lations.
The expected relationship between the costs imposed on all 
migrants (e.g., political considerations, distance) and the gender com 
position of migration can be complicated by a number of factors. For 
example, countries with relatively unattractive political environments 
also may have restrictions, such as emigration barriers, that distort (in 
unknown ways) migration flows. A plausible argument exists for more 
immigrant wives than husbands coming from more distant nations 
(e.g., Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990), but other considerations also may 
be at work. If men are disproportionately represented in the pool of 
potential economic migrants, distance may actually discourage male 
migration, because distance (among other factors) proxies intervening 
opportunities and thus the opportunity costs of migrating to any given 
destination; that is, the greater the distance, the greater or better are 
likely to be the alternative opportunities within the given radius of a 
move.
The Roman Catholic Church has the largest membership of any 
single denomination in the United States and may be expected to play 
an important role in the social and cultural assimilation of immigrants, 
which would seem of particular relevance for non-economic migrants.
Legal U.S. Immigration 117
Moreover, in countries where Catholicism is the principal religion, the 
maintenance of family units may play a more prominent role in deter 
mining migration decisions. Thus, we expect more family-unit migra 
tion, and consequently relatively more females, from countries where 
Catholicism is the primary religion. On the other hand, in countries 
dominated by Muslim religious beliefs, females may feel inhibitions 
regarding emigration, especially emigration as single and unattached. 3
Of the U.S. institutional considerations, the number of prior immi 
grants from country / who have become U.S. citizens should be of par 
ticular relevance in determining the gender composition of U.S. 
immigration. An increased number of prior immigrants from country i 
lowers the direct entry costs for potential migrants in i, which should 
be particularly relevant for non-economic migrants. Hence, the num 
ber of prior immigrants who become U.S. citizens should positively 
influence the proportion of females in the flow.
In terms of social program variables, consider first the coverage of 
the various programs. Programs that are universally available should 
provide benefits that are of particular importance to potential non-eco 
nomic migrants. Moreover, since universal programs are generally 
financed from general government revenues and therefore supported 
by taxes, the economically active population will bear the burden of 
paying for the benefits. Therefore, universal social programs should 
stimulate the flow of economic migrants and reduce the number of 
female migrants, ceteris paribus. The effect of employment-related 
programs will vary. For instance, the presence of unemployment bene 
fits should retard the flow of economic migrants and thus increase the 
proportion of female migrants. On the other hand, a family allowance 
program is likely to be of particular importance in family-unit migra 
tion decisions, and the female share of migration flows should be lower 
from countries where such programs are available.
There is less certainty about the effects of sickness programs. To the 
extent that these programs are employment-related and provide net 
positive benefits to their participants, sickness programs should reduce 
the flow of economic migrants and increase the proportion of females 
who migrate. On the other hand, the availability of maternity benefits 
in country / should retard the flow of female migrants.
Old-age programs are not typically gender-specific; however, they 
can influence the ratio of economic to non-economic migrants.
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Because universally available old-age programs would be of particular 
importance to potential non-economic migrants, the share of female 
migrants from countries having such programs should be lower. Old- 
age programs related to employment (and thus primarily affecting eco 
nomically active individuals) may retard migration, in the sense that 
these individuals anticipate future benefits. However, once received, 
such benefits may actually provide older individuals with the wealth 
necessary to cover the costs of relocation. Where these old-age bene 
fits are not payable abroad, the flow of individuals who have been eco 
nomically active should be reduced if the old-age program is 
employment-related.
ESTIMATION OF THE GENDER EQUATION
The methodology we used to examine immigrant composition has 
long been employed by economists to analyze systems of consumer 
demand/expenditure equations (e.g., Leser 1961; Pollak and Wales 
1969; Parks 1969; and Barten 1977), as well as systems of cost-share 
equations (e.g., Berndt and Wood 1975). We are unaware of any previ 
ous attempt to use such an approach to study the composition of migra 
tion, except for Greenwood, McDowell, and Waldman (1996). In the 
context of immigration to the United States, the sum over various com 
ponents gives total immigration during a given year (e.g., sum over g 
gender groups, n age groups, or m occupational classes). The approach 
also allows a natural transition to various subgroups. For example, the 
immigrant population may first be distinguished by gender, and then 
each gender group may be distinguished by age.
Let i represent source country, j represent the variable (/=!,...,«), 
t represent the year, and g represent the gender. The approach employs 
total immigration of a given type as the dependent variable and can be 
expressed in the following way, where lMMigt represents total immi 
gration from country i, of gender g, during year t:
Eq.6.1 lMMigl = P 
where
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The conditions state that the coefficients on the control total (in this 
case, total immigration) must sum to 1.0 across the two gender equa 
tions. Moreover, the coefficients on each independent variable must 
sum to zero. Thus, if each independent variable were set at zero, the 
gender shares would sum to 1.0, as they logically must. Furthermore, 
any change in an independent variable that increases (decreases) one 
share (say, for males) must correspondingly decrease (increase) the 
other so that the shares continue to sum to 1.0. The coefficients on the 
various independent variables are interpreted as a change in the abso 
lute number of immigrants of type g due to an incremental change in 
the independent variable. Note, however, that (3g provides an estimate 
of the share of total allocated to each gender. Each composition equa 
tion is estimated as a system of equations.4
Estimation of the gender composition model is accomplished by 
pooling time-series and cross-section data, and several econometric 
issues arise. These issues were discussed in Chapter 5 in reference to 
the estimation of the rate equation, and they remain equally relevant 
within the current context. We have tested for appropriateness of the 
random effects versus the within estimator. Since the null hypothesis 
(that the random effects and the right-hand-side variables are uncorre- 
lated) is rejected, we employ the Hausman-Taylor estimator described 
in Appendix C. 5
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 6.1 reports coefficients and significance levels for all male and 
female U.S. immigrants. Table 6.2 reports comparable findings for 
female numerically restricted and numerically exempt immigrants. 
Although the gender-specific regressions presented in Table 6.1 for all 
males and females are almost mirror images, we have reported both to 
clearly show the properties of the modeling approach described above.
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Table 6.1 Gender Composition of Total U.S. Immigrants:
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimate3
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
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a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < r < 1.67. The
actual r-statistics are reported in Appendix Table El. 
b Refers to the ratio of the female to the male education variables.
Note that the coefficients on the control variable for total immigration 
from country i during year t (Table 6.1, last line; = Z2 _ jIMM^- t ) 
sum across the gender equations to 1.0 and that the coefficients on each 
other explanatory variable sum to zero. The /-statistics corresponding 
to Tables 6.1 and 6.2 are reported in Appendix E, Tables El and E2.
When pair-wise comparisons are made in Table 6.2 between numer 
ically restricted and exempt immigrants, considerable differences are 
evident within many of the vectors. This finding highlights the impor 
tance of disaggregating the immigration flows. Only the estimated 
relationships between the female share of migrants and female labor 
force participation, birth rate, and the Silva program maintain their 
signs with significance across the groups. We expect exempt immi 
grants to better reflect the force of economic incentives.
The vector of variables reflecting differential economic opportunity 
should be relatively more important for economic than for non-eco 
nomic migrants, and thus better source-country economic opportuni 
ties should be associated positively with the female share of migrants. 
The strongest support of this hypothesis is found in the extent to which 
the source country is urbanized: enhanced domestic employment and 
earnings opportunities significantly reduce the flow of economic 
migrants and therefore increase the share of female migrants, espe 
cially those numerically exempt. A significantly positive relationship 
also exists between the relative size of central government and the
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Table 6.2 Female U.S. Immigrants By Entry Class:
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimates3
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female labor force
Migration costs
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a *** Indicates t> 1.96; ** indicates 1.67<f< 1.96; * indicates 1.29<f< 1.67. Actual
^-statistics are reported in Appendix Table E2. 
b Refers to the ratio of the female to the male education variables.
female share in the numerically restricted category, perhaps reflecting 
lower migration costs associated with leaving a relatively unattractive 
source country.
In contrast to our expectation, however, higher source-country 
incomes reduce the share of female migrants (Table 6.1). This finding 
may reflect economic incentives that are operating in accordance with 
underlying gender-specific wage differentials. Also contrary to our 
expectations is a highly significant negative relationship between the 
female share of migrants and the female percentage of the total labor 
force. The reason for this finding may be that, as suggested by Mincer 
(1978, p. 769), "trends toward equalization of labor market experience 
of men and women may contribute to a decrease in migration rates of 
married couples." That is, wives who are economically active may 
reduce family-unit migration, thereby increasing the ratio of economic 
to non-economic migrants and decreasing the female share of interna 
tional migrants. Furthermore, the source countries where the female 
percentage of labor force is high also may provide better relative eco 
nomic opportunities for females (as compared with males). 6
The influence of distance from the United States is negative for 
females (positive for males) in the regression for all male and female
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U.S. immigrants (Table 6.1). Therefore, this result does not support 
the hypothesis that distance will discourage male migration, nor does it 
support the role of distance suggested by Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) 
in determining the gender of a spouse who enters the United States via 
the marriage market. Rather, the evidence suggests that migration 
costs that are incurred by all migrants, but for which only economic 
migrants receive offsetting economic returns, will cause the ratio of 
economic to non-economic migrants to rise. The female share of 
migrants also may fall with distance if diseconomies are associated 
with moving families over greater distances (for example, the higher 
costs of return trips to visit with family members before full family 
reunification occurs).
Perhaps the most surprising finding concerns the birth rate variable. 
We hypothesized that higher birth rates (presumably, larger families) 
would discourage family-unit migration, but a larger share of women 
are represented in immigration flows from countries with high birth 
rates. On the other hand, consistent with our hypothesis, as women 
become more educated relative to men, the female share of immigrants 
rises.
The influence of U.S. military personnel in the country of origin is 
positive for females and is highly significant in the equations for all 
males and females (Table 6.1). Our hypothesis with respect to U.S. 
military personnel is further substantiated when immigrants are distin 
guished by entry class. Because spouses of U.S. citizens are numeri 
cally exempt and the U.S. military is predominantly male, the influence 
of U.S. military personnel should be positive for numerically exempt 
females, which it is. In the regressions for numerically restricted 
immigrants, the presence of U.S. military personnel does not signifi 
cantly influence the gender composition of migrants (Table 6.2). There 
is also evidence of another marriage market. The female share is nega 
tively related to the number of foreign students attending U.S. colleges 
and universities (Table 6.1). Moreover, the foreign-students variable is 
marginally significant in the equations for the numerically exempt 
immigrants (Table 6.2). Thus, the number of immigrant husbands of 
U.S. citizens is positively associated with the origin country's number 
of students attending U.S. colleges and universities.
Other influences may be associated with foreign students as well. 
For instance, we expect that skill losses would be lower from countries
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that send a relatively large number of students to the United States, so 
the United States should receive relatively more economic (male) 
migrants from these countries. Natives from English-speaking nations 
also should experience greater ease in transferring their occupational 
skills. However, the evidence does not support these hypotheses. If 
attending a U.S. university facilitates skill transfer and therefore 
induces more male economic migrants, this expected effect would be 
supported by a negative coefficient in the regressions for female 
restricted immigrants (Table 6.2), but this is not found. The influence 
of English language is positive and highly significant for females 
(Table 6.1) and for exempt females (Table 6.2), suggesting that lan 
guage serves a crucial role in facilitating social and cultural assimila 
tion (which appears to be of particular importance to female migrants). 
Social and cultural assimilation also may be facilitated by religious 
institutions, and the evidence is strong that larger shares of female 
migrants come from nations where Catholicism is the primary religion. 
On the other hand, Muslim nations provide relatively fewer female 
immigrants, especially in the numerically restricted class.
We are surprised to find that naturalized U.S. citizens do not have 
more influence on the gender composition of migrants. We hypothe 
sized that such U.S. citizens would be relatively more important for 
potential non-economic migrants and that the law ought to favor 
women. Our evidence supports this hypothesis only for the numeri 
cally restricted class (through which unmarried adult sons and daugh 
ters of U.S. citizens, as well as brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens at 
least 21 years of age, and their spouses and children, are allowed to 
enter the United States).
For restricted immigrants, a higher share of female migrants entered 
the United States from the Western Hemisphere nations during the 
1972-76 period. Because Western Hemisphere nations were not sub 
ject to the preference quota system until after 1976, and because the 
preference quota system is heavily oriented toward family reunifica 
tion, one might have expected relatively more economic (males) in the 
migration flows that occurred prior to the change in law. In another 
instance, for all immigrants (Table 6.1) and for numerically exempt 
immigrants, a significantly higher share of Asian migrants are women. 
This finding may be a result of pre-1965 discrimination in U.S. immi 
gration policy, with our sample period being a period of catching up, in
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which family members (perhaps primarily female) are reunited with 
the first wave of immigrants that arrived after the changes in immigra 
tion law. This finding also may reflect some combination of the impor 
tance of intervening opportunities for natives from Asian nations and/ 
or relatively lower wages for women in Asian nations. 7 The large num 
ber of U.S. military personnel in Asia during the sample period also 
may have a positive influence on the relative share of female migrants. 
Although we did not attach an expectation to the effects of either pro 
gram, we note that, while the lottery system for allocating visas 
resulted in relatively fewer female migrants, the Silva program visas 
resulted in a significantly larger share of female migrants.
Several of the social programs have a significant influence on the 
gender composition of immigrant flows. For instance, as expected, 
countries with unemployment insurance programs send relatively more 
females to the United States. Old-age pension programs appear to 
have more influence on the gender of numerically restricted immi 
grants than on the exempt. For numerically restricted immigrants, as 
expected, old-age programs that are employment-related reduce the 
flow of economically active individuals, who are primarily male. For 
the numerically exempt, some evidence exists of the opposite effect, 
possibly because once the benefits are provided, these individuals have 
the wealth necessary to cover the costs of relocation.
The results shown in Table 6.1 support the hypothesis that employ 
ment-related sickness programs induce relatively more females to 
migrate to the United States. We argued that employment-related cash 
benefits for illnesses should reduce the flow of economic migrants, and 
the evidence for all males and females supports this position. How 
ever, between numerically restricted and exempt immigrants, a number 
of striking differences are found. For instance, whereas the presence of 
employment-related sickness programs is associated with a higher 
share of females in the flow of exempt immigrants (as expected), uni 
versal sickness programs also are associated with a higher share of 
females among the numerically restricted immigrants (which was not 
expected). We do not know the precise reason for these differences. In 
addition, we are not clear about why the availability of maternity bene 
fits (Table 6.1) or employment-related family allowance programs 
(Table 6.2, numerically exempt) positively influence the share of 
migrants that is female. Although this evidence is not strong, we had
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expected the opposite, since each of these programs should serve to 
retard the flow of family-unit migration.
SUMMARY
We are somewhat surprised that the factors associated with eco 
nomic opportunities do not provide more support for our hypotheses 
regarding gender composition, especially the findings for the numeri 
cally exempt class. On the other hand, the factors associated with 
migration costs have considerable influence on the gender composition 
of U.S. immigrants, and, with the exception of the birth rate variable, 
the findings are not unexpected. One implication of this evidence is 
that, if the level of education of females worldwide continues to rise 
relative to that of males, the female share of U.S. immigrants also 
should rise. English-language familiarity is a strong factor in female 
immigration to the United States. The evidence also supports the 
hypothesis that gender sorting occurs within the operation of marriage 
markets and that this sorting provides a means of entry for foreign- 
born spouses of U.S. citizens. One such market appears to be linked to 
foreign students at U.S. schools, increasing the entry of foreign-born 
males. On the other hand, more foreign-born wives come from nations 
hosting relatively large numbers of U.S. military personnel.
Our evidence suggests that the culture of Muslim nations tends to 
restrict the movement of potential female migrants, but this relation 
ship is not particularly strong. On the other hand, especially for 
exempt females, the Catholic Church is a positive factor. U.S. immi 
gration policy also has a significant influence on gender composition, 
although this influence is probably an unintended side-effect. For 
example, the recent lottery programs had a definite male tilt.
Regarding social programs in the source country, the findings for 
numerically exempt immigrants provide more support of our hypothe 
ses than those for the restricted class. However, except for employ 
ment-related sickness programs and unemployment insurance, the 
overall influence of the various social programs on gender share is not 
very strong. In particular, the findings do not support our hypotheses
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concerning the influence of universal program coverage or specific 
programs designed to provide maternity and family allowance benefits.
Notes
1. Evidence concerning gender wage differentials is very limited. For example, con 
sidering female to male hourly earnings in manufacturing in 17 advanced industri 
alized countries, Blau and Ferber found "no uniform patterns emerge from an 
examination of the data . . . except that women are always paid less than men" 
(1992, p. 314). However, their data indicate that, in comparison with the other 16 
industrialized nations in three time periods (i.e., 1973, 1982, and 1988), the ratio 
of women's to men's hourly earnings is lower in the United States than in the 
other country in 37 of 48 comparisons.
2. In stating this expectation, we assume that the gender wage differential does not 
vary across countries, but as noted earlier, we have reason to believe that this dif 
ferential does vary. For a sample of 36 countries in 1990, the United Nations 
(1995, Table 5.20, p. 128) provides data on average female wages in manufactur 
ing as a percentage of a comparable measure for males. Comparing the United 
States with the other 20 countries classified as "developed" indicates that female 
wages relative to male wages are higher in the United States in only 2 of 20 com 
parisons. However, in comparison with the other 15 nondeveloped countries, rel 
ative female wages in the United States are higher in 7 of the 15. This evidence 
may suggest that, where a higher level of development or higher per capita 
income exists in the source country, the wage differential between the United 
States and country i is lower for females than males. If this is the case, then rela 
tive income may be negatively related with the share of female migrants.
3. Tyree and Donato (1985) argued that, where the "status" of females is especially 
low, they do not have sufficient control over their fates for emigration to be a via 
ble option. Tyree and Donato also observe particularly high male-to-female ratios 
for immigrants from Muslim countries.
4. An alternative to the specification described here is to employ actual shares as the 
dependent variables. In this case, for any given country/year the dependent vari 
ables of the system would sum to 1.0. Moreover, if the right-hand-side indepen 
dent variables contain the same number of countries/years for each data partition 
on the left-hand-side of the regression, the constant term would sum to 1.0 and the 
coefficients of each independent variable would sum to zero. Greenwood, 
McDowell, and Waldman (1996) employed this methodology to study the occupa 
tional composition of a class of male U.S. immigrants.
We do not adopt this approach here because to "balance" the model requires 
that entire countries be dropped from the data set. As immigrant groups are more 
and more finely identified, zeros begin to appear in the data. For example, if in a 
given year no females 20 and over from Tanzania reported an occupation, all 
observations on Tanzania would have to be dropped from the analysis of occupa 
tional composition (because the shares would be undefined due to division by
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zero). In fact, if the strict share methodology were followed, the occupational 
runs reported below for certain entry classes would contain only 37 countries. 
This lack of decomposability leads to sufficient lack of comparability for us to 
dismiss this approach.
5. % = 20.19 rejects the random effects estimator.
6. Borjas and Bronars (1991) provided an analysis of the types of families that are 
likely to migrate and of the types of individuals who are likely to characterize 
links in the immigration chain.
7. Data from the United Nations (1995, Table 5.20, p. 128) indicate that female 
wages relative to male wages are particularly low in Asian nations, where females 
average only 63.6 percent of male wages, compared with 76.5 percent in non- 
Asian countries. This gender wage differential should serve to further stimulate a 
higher share of female migrants from Asian nations.

7 The Age Composition 
of U.S. Immigrants
The age composition of U.S. immigrants is important for several rea 
sons. First, the age at which immigrants enter the United States is a 
determinant of the benefits that will be derived by the United States 
from the presence of the immigrants. The estimated present value of 
immigrants' income earned in the U.S. economy has been suggested as 
a measure of the immigrants' value (or gross benefit) to the economy 
(McDowell and Singell 1993). Other things being equal, immigrants 
who migrate at younger ages will also enter the U.S. labor force at a 
younger age, and thus they provide greater benefits to the economy.
Evidence also strongly suggests that the age at migration is an 
important determinant of how well immigrants do once they enter the 
U.S. labor force (Smith 1991; Friedberg 1993; McDowell and Singell 
1993). Immigrants who enter at a younger age appear to assimilate 
more rapidly into the economy. Thus, the younger the age at which 
immigration occurs, the more similar will be the career earnings pro 
files of the foreign-born and native-born workers. Such similarity in 
earnings profiles is in marked contrast to the situation that is often 
ascribed to immigrants, where, when compared with native-born work 
ers of similar characteristics, the immigrants suffer an earnings disad 
vantage during their initial years in the U.S. labor force (Chiswick 
1978).
Younger immigrants also tend to become more proficient in 
English-language skills during their post-entry years than immigrants 
who enter at older ages (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Chiswick and 
Miller 1992; Chiswick 1993). Apparently, either learning new lan 
guage skills is easier (i.e., less costly) for younger individuals or, given 
the longer period over which to derive the benefits from human capital 
investments, younger immigrants have a greater incentive to invest in 
English-language skills. Greater proficiency in English further aug 
ments the immigrants' labor force productivity and also facilitates their 
more general social and cultural assimilation.
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The age composition of immigrants is also important because, 
together with gender composition, it can influence the overall U.S. fer 
tility rate in subsequent years. When immigration is concentrated in 
the childbearing years, the United States may experience subsequent 
augmentation in population growth rates. Moreover, relevant to the 
social security system, the age composition of newly entering immi 
grants may alter the extent of general population aging and thus affect 
the overall U.S. worker-to-dependent ratio (Arthur and Espenshade 
1988). In addition to the demographic implications, the age composi 
tion of immigrants may influence the costs that they impose on the 
U.S. economy, including, for younger immigrants and families, the 
costs on social service providers such as the public school system, and 
for older immigrants, the costs of social services such as health care.'
In this chapter, we discuss factors that influence the age composition 
of immigrant flows. Our model of age composition is tied to the con 
cept of the marginal migrant. In the context of the model, the marginal 
migrant is the individual for whom expected U.S. utility minus home- 
country utility just equals migration costs. By focusing on the mar 
ginal migrant, we are able to generate hypotheses concerning how var 
ious factors influence the age composition of immigrant flows.
THE AGE COMPOSITION MODEL
The general form of the age-composition model follows that of 
Eq. 5.1. In addition to the variables noted in Chapter 5, the age 
composition equation includes a control variable that reflects the 
median age of the source country's population in year t. The median 
age of source country populations varies widely, from a low of 14.6 
years to a high of 38.3 years. The inclusion of this variable pro 
vides at least a crude control for the age of the population at risk to 
migrate. Relative to the gender composition equation (Chapter 6), 
median age now replaces the population sex ratio as the basic con 
trol variable; also in the age equation, the general education level 
(which is measured in gender-specific terms in the gender-specific 
model) is used as the measure of educational attainment.
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The Concept of the Marginal Migrant
To understand who (i.e., younger versus older) among the source 
country's indigenous population choose to emigrate, we use the con 
cept of the marginal migrant. In general, individuals will decide to 
move to the United States when the expected benefits from doing so 
exceed the expected foregone home-country benefits by an amount that 
is greater than the costs of migration. For the marginal migrant, the 
returns (total U.S. benefits accruing from migration minus foregone 
home-country benefits) must equal migration costs; thus, the net 
migration benefit is equal to zero.
To illustrate the concept of the marginal migrant, we consider a sim 
plified characterization of country /'s indigenous population in which 
we allow members of the indigenous population to differ in age, while 
assuming that all individuals are endowed with a given level of occupa 
tional skills. We make this assumption about occupational skills in 
order to focus on the age at which migration occurs. 2 In this simplified 
form, the equilibrium condition for the marginal migrant may be 
expressed as
Eq.7.1 Zf= jvv7.-vv^l+r)~(r ~° = Ct ,
where
a is the age of migration,
T is the age of the immigrant at death,
Wj and Wj are the respective U.S. and country-of-origin wage per
unit of occupational skill, 
K* is the index of the occupational skill, and 
r is a discount rate.
The left side of Eq. 7.1 therefore represents the discounted total 
returns accruing to the marginal migrant who moves from country i toy 
at age a; the right side represents the total migration costs (C/) 
incurred by an individual who migrates from country /. Total migra 
tion costs include direct entry costs, skill losses associated with less- 
than-perfect international skill transferability, and the foregone relative 
attractiveness of the country of origin. 3
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For the marginal migrant who is age a, the decision to migrate is 
one of indifference, since the expected benefits from migration are 
exactly offset by the migration costs. However, within country /'s pop 
ulation, other individuals who also possess the skill level K* will find 
emigration beneficial if they are younger than age a, and individuals 
older than a would incur negative net benefits from migration and thus 
would not find migration beneficial. Therefore, given the age a at 
which net benefits are zero, this equilibrium condition determines the 
ages at which individuals will find migration beneficial, and hence 
determines the age composition of immigrants. The younger the age of 
the marginal migrant, the younger the overall age composition of 
migrants from country i to the United States.
In this model, the age at migration is considered to be the choice 
variable. The marginal migrant is presumed to be capable of adjusting 
to any factors that would alter either the returns on or the costs of 
migration ("adjusting" means choosing to migrate at a younger or at 
an older age). Hence, the general age composition of migrants from 
country / will be responsive to factors related to relative economic 
advantage between / and the United States as well as to the total migra 
tion costs.
Figure 7.1 diagrammatically shows these relationships. For those 
for whom migration is profitable, the return on migration declines with 
age, because those who migrate at older ages eliminate the returns that 
are discounted least. Given costs of migration from country / to coun 
try j of Cij and an expected differential return, /?,-(oc), that is a function 
of age at migration, the marginal migrant would move at age oc0 . If 
costs were higher, such as C • •', the marginal migrant would move at 
an earlier age, cx^; for example, C--' could refer to migration from a 
more distant country, from a politically more desirable country (where 
the opportunity cost of departing is greater), or from a non-English- 
speaking country. In each case, the costs of transferring accumulated 
occupational skills to the United States would be higher, and the mar 
ginal migrant would move at an earlier age. (In Figure 7.1, we have 
assumed that costs are independent of age, but this assumption easily 
could be relaxed.) If expected returns to the marginal migrant were 
higher at every age, as shown by Rff (oc) in Figure 7.1, the marginal 
migrant would be older (a2). This could be the case, for example, for
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more highly educated individuals or for individuals in lower-income 
source countries.
Clearly, this model could be complicated considerably by relaxing 
various assumptions that were explicitly or implicitly made in develop 
ing it.4 For example, the accumulated stock of human capital (K) could 
be made a function of age, as could the costs of migration. However, 
the model is sufficient to allow us to specify hypotheses concerning the 
variables included in the model of migrant age composition.
Hypotheses
To illustrate the types of hypotheses that can be based on the con 
cept of the marginal migrant, we consider the expected effects of the 
factors in the differential economic opportunity vector. Other things 
being equal, higher country-of-origin wages per unit of human capital 
will decrease the returns to migration. In response, the marginal 
migrant must adjust by moving at a younger age in order to raise 
returns so that net benefits again equal zero. Therefore, if relative per 
capita income is a proxy for the country-of-origin wages relative to
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those of the United States, younger migrants should come from source 
countries with relatively higher per capita gross domestic product.
Employment opportunities in country / also should influence the age 
composition of migrants. For instance, higher levels of development 
and rapid economic expansion are generally associated with relatively 
more and better employment opportunities, and so the expected bene 
fits of migrating would be lower, ceteris paribus. Thus, younger work 
ers will choose to migrate earlier, and relatively fewer older workers 
will migrate at all. However, there may not be a neutral impact across 
age groups, as our theory of the marginal migrant presumes. If more 
rapid economic expansion and employment opportunities are of partic 
ular importance for the younger members of the labor force, relatively 
more of the older workers will migrate. Moreover, for individuals who 
are not economically active (e.g., older individuals who are beyond 
working age), employment opportunities should not inhibit their incen 
tive to migrate. Thus, under these circumstances, a relatively larger 
share of migrants from countries providing better employment oppor 
tunities should be older. Given the competing hypotheses, we are 
unable to attach an unambiguous expectation to the effect of employ 
ment opportunities on immigrant age composition.
The marginal migrant also will adjust to differences in the direct 
costs of migration. If higher migration costs are not linked to any age- 
specific cost differences, then they would cause the marginal migrant 
to adjust by migrating at a younger age. However, the direct costs of 
migration may not be spread evenly throughout all age groups. For 
instance, the presence of U.S. military personnel reduces the costs of 
migration primarily through the marriage market, where potential 
wives of U.S. servicemen would benefit most. The parents of the for 
eign-born spouses also may ultimately benefit from this connection, 
but the presence of U.S. military personnel does not provide an obvi 
ous advantage for other potential migrants. High birth rates may also 
act differentially, being particularly relevant in the migration decisions 
of younger individuals and their families; high birth rates and larger 
families thus should reduce the flow of relatively younger individuals.
Less-than-perfect international transferability of skills also imposes 
costs on migrants. Where skill-transfer costs are higher, the greater 
expected skill losses should cause the marginal migrant to migrate at a 
younger age. Therefore, since migrants from English-speaking nations
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should experience lower skill losses, economic migrants from such 
nations should be relatively older than migrants from other nations. 
Moreover, relatively more older non-economic migrants should come 
from English-speaking countries because language skills are important 
for social and cultural assimilation and, if they do not possess English- 
language skills upon entry, older immigrants are less likely to become 
proficient in English. Prospective migrants (especially non-economic 
migrants) from countries where Catholicism is the primary religion 
should face lower adjustment costs in terms of social and cultural 
assimilation, and immigrants from these nations should be relatively 
older.
Among U.S. immigration policy factors, the number of prior immi 
grants from country / who have become U.S. citizens is of particular 
relevance in determining the age composition of migrants. Because of 
the lower direct entry costs for potential immigrants, the age of immi 
grants should be associated with the number of U.S. citizens who orig 
inated from a given country of origin, especially in the numerically 
exempt class (spouses and parents of U.S. citizens); however, the pre 
cise overall effect is unclear, because spouses tend to be younger and 
parents tend to be older. 5
In the vector of social programs, old-age pension programs that 
transfer wealth from working-age individuals to older individuals 
would be expected to discourage older persons from moving while 
encouraging younger persons to move. However, not all pension pro 
grams constitute an income transfer—provident fund systems are a 
good example—and even if a transfer is involved, the net effect is not 
necessarily to reduce the age composition of migrants. If benefit pay 
ments are internationally transferable, the added income from the pen 
sion program may induce relatively more older individuals to migrate. 
Furthermore, younger workers may anticipate that the present value of 
their future old-age benefits outweighs the current costs being imposed 
on them and decide not to migrate. Therefore, the overall impact of 
employment-related old-age programs on the age composition of 
migrants is ambiguous.
Other features of old-age pension programs may cause a differential 
impact on particular age groups. For instance, whether financed indi 
rectly through income taxes or directly through employee and/or 
employer contributions, universal pension programs transfer income
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from the younger to the older, retired population. Under these circum 
stances, workers are less likely to anticipate that their benefits will out 
weigh their current costs, and therefore, such programs are expected to 
induce a relatively larger flow of young migrants.
By similar reasoning, universal sickness programs also should 
encourage the migration of younger individuals. However, specific 
features of medical, cash sickness, and maternity benefits present a 
more complicated picture. Women of child-bearing age should be dis 
couraged from leaving countries with such programs both because of 
the maternity benefits that accrue to themselves and because of the 
medical benefits that accrue to their children; their husbands also 
should be discouraged from emigrating. Likewise, older persons 
should be less likely to leave countries with sickness and medical ben 
efits. Cash sickness benefits should be relevant only to persons who 
are working-age individuals, so these benefits should encourage the 
flow of the oldest age group of potential migrants, which includes indi 
viduals who are not economically active.
Unemployment insurance generally constitutes a transfer from older 
working age groups with typically lower unemployment rates to 
younger age groups with typically higher unemployment rates. As a 
consequence, we expect the presence of unemployment insurance to 
discourage the migration of younger persons and to encourage the 
migration of older persons. Finally, family allowance programs should 
discourage migration of individuals in the 20-34 age class and their 
families.
ESTIMATION OF THE AGE COMPOSITION EQUATIONS
The statistical methodology used to estimate the age-composition 
equation is essentially the same as that for estimating the gender com 
position of immigrant except for the focus on age shares rather than 
gender shares. In our age analysis, we do not present the results for all 
age groups; we focus on only the shares of immigrants aged 20-34 and 
those aged 55 and older, which are the two extremes of the migration- 
age spectrum. Individuals aged 20-34 are most likely to be interna 
tional migrants and are more likely to be economically active, and
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therefore they are more responsive to basic economic incentives. Indi 
viduals aged 55 and older are often out of the labor force.
Because we present the results for only two age groups, our inter 
pretation of the coefficients in the regressions is slightly different than 
for the gender regressions. In the gender equation, the coefficient on 
the control total (e.g., total immigration of individuals aged 20 or older, 
regardless of gender) must sum to 1.0 across all gender groups. How 
ever, in this chapter we essentially present two separate models, one 
focused on persons 20-34 relative to those 35 and older and the second 
focused on persons 55 and older relative to those 20-54. Within each 
set, the adding-up property holds. However, the two age groups that 
occupy our attention (20-34 and 55 and older) are not estimated as 
parts of the same system of equations.
A practical reason for examining only two age groups at a time is 
that the generalized least squares feature of the Hausman-Taylor meth 
odology, as well as its instrumental variables feature, destroy the add 
ing-up property for all cases except the special case of a two-group 
decomposition.6 Although multiplying each equation of the system by 
a weight generally negates the adding-up property that is inherent in 
data, that this is not true for two-equation systems. 7
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
All Immigrants
Table 7.1 reports coefficients and significance levels for all immi 
grants (i.e., males and females combined) aged 20-34 and aged 55 and 
older, where the totals are aggregated across the restricted and exempt 
classes. (The corresponding /-statistics are provided in Appendix Table 
Fl).
In the economic opportunities vector, we find strong support for our 
hypotheses concerning how these variables will influence the age com 
position of migrants. For instance, higher relative per-capita incomes 
lower the returns to migration for individuals at every age, and conse 
quently, individuals who choose to migrate do so at a relatively 
younger age. A significantly larger number of migrants aged 55 and
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older, and significantly smaller number of migrants aged 20-34, come 
from source countries with higher levels of development (as reflected 
by the degree of urbanization) and with more rapid growth of GDP. 
The influence of relative government size is positive (negative) and 
highly significant for the share of migrants aged 20-34 (aged 55 and 
older). Thus, in countries where government revenues are large, the 
flow of younger migrants is stimulated and that of older individuals is 
lessened (apparently because of government benefits to older individu 
als for which they are less likely to bear a proportionate share of the tax 
burden).
We have considerably less evidence that either migration costs or 
political/religious considerations significantly influence the age at 
which migration occurs, with two exceptions. English language has a 
particularly large and significant influence on the number of individuals 
aged 55 and older who migrate to the United States: per year, over 
2,000 additional individuals aged 55 and older migrate from an 
English-speaking nation relative to a non-English-speaking nation. 
This finding suggests that familiarity with language plays a particularly 
critical role in facilitating the social and cultural assimilation of older 
migrants. Second, the education level in the source country is signifi 
cant; more highly educated individuals should be better able to adapt to 
their new situation, and the lower adjustment costs should thus induce 
relatively older persons to move, which is what the evidence indicates.
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On the other hand, contrary to our expectations, fewer migrants aged 
20-34 come from nations that are more distant from the United States; 
one possible explanation is that more potential intervening opportuni 
ties attract relatively young economic migrants to locations other than 
the United States.
Factors associated with U.S. immigration policy significantly influ 
ence the age composition of migrants. While we did not develop an 
hypothesis regarding either the lottery visas or the Silva program, the 
evidence clearly indicates that each program resulted in significantly 
fewer migrants aged 55 and older and more migrants aged 20-34. The 
Silva program had a particularly large effect, with over 3,000 addi 
tional migrants aged 20-34 from Mexico during both 1978 and 1981. 
The differential treatment of migrants from the Western Hemisphere 
during 1972-1976 had the opposite effect: the lower immigration bar 
riers appear to have increased the relative age of migrants.
Old-age pension programs appear to have some influence on the age 
structure of migrants, but contrary to our expectation, they do not sig 
nificantly discourage the flow of older migrants. Younger persons are 
only slightly influenced by old-age programs, but (as expected) they 
have a higher propensity to migrate if pensions are universally pro 
vided. Other specific features of employment-related programs have 
very different effects. For instance, whereas employment-related old 
age programs that are of the social insurance variety significantly 
reduce the number of migrants aged 20-34, provident funds reduce the 
flow of migrants aged 55 and older. A key difference in these programs 
may be the waiting period before any benefits can be received. 8 Social 
insurance programs generally provide benefits only at a specified 
retirement age, but provident funds can often be received at an earlier 
age, thus, providing the opportunity to accumulate assets and allow 
persons to emigrate before the age of 55.
Within health-related programs, we do not find the anticipated effect 
that universal programs retard the flow of older migrants, but cash sick 
ness benefits available only to economically active individuals do 
reduce the flow of younger migrants, as expected. Also as expected, 
countries with unemployment social insurance programs send rela 
tively fewer (more) young (older) migrants to the United States, though 
the significance of the effect is not high. Contrary to our hypothesis, 
significantly more migrants aged 20-34 come from nations where
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maternity benefits are provided, and the evidence does not indicate that 
family allowance programs retard the flow of young individuals and 
their families. Finally, that medical benefits positively influence the 
number of migrants aged 55 and older is somewhat surprising.
Immigrants By Gender
Table 7.2 presents separate results for male and female immigrants 
by age; corresponding f-statistics are presented in Appendix Table F2. 
Certain factors have similar effects on the age composition of both 
genders; these effects are most apparent for those aged 55 and older 
and, in particular, in the differential economic opportunity vector. Sig 
nificantly more older male and female migrants come from source 
countries characterized by high levels of development and rapid 
growth of GDP, and larger government revenues (and their associated 
benefits and taxes) tend to retard the flow of older migrants, regardless 
of gender. These effects are expected. Also as expected, employment- 
related sickness benefits that are specifically geared toward the eco 
nomically active positively influence the flow of older migrants. 
English-language skills also are particularly important in facilitating 
the migration of persons aged 55 and older, whereas both the lottery 
and Silva programs resulted in significantly fewer older migrants of 
both genders.
For immigrants aged 20-34, the most obvious similarities across the 
genders concern the influence of U.S. immigration policy, in particular, 
the lottery program and the differential treatment of Western Hemi 
sphere natives. In other areas, however, the differences across gender 
are striking. For instance, evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
higher source country incomes tend to decrease the relative age of 
migrants is found primarily for males, but the other factors in the dif 
ferential economic opportunity vector (except for female labor force 
participation) are only significant in the regressions for females. 9 
Moreover, factors associated with migration costs appear to be much 
stronger forces in shaping the age composition of female migrants. 
Certain U.S. immigration policy variables also influence the number of 
female, but not the number of male, migrants. For instance, prior 
immigrants who have become U.S. citizens, the Silva program, and
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a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 <t< 1.67. Table F2
reports the corresponding /-statistics. 
b ln the gender-specific regressions, the education control variable is measured specific to
the respective gender. 
c ln the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to the
respective gender.
being from an Asian nation all positively affected the number of female 
immigrants aged 20-34, while not significantly influencing the males. 
For social programs, pair-wise comparisons across the gender regres 
sions also indicate considerable differences. For males aged 20-34, 
few social programs appear to have any effect even at the lowest level of 
significance. However, several social program variables have a highly 
significant influence on the number of female migrants aged 20-34. 
For example, employment-related old-age programs significantly 
reduce the number of young female migrants, but if the program is of 
the provident funds variety, significantly more young females migrate. 
On the other hand, if pension benefits are not internationally transfer 
able, the number of young female migrants is reduced, which is unan 
ticipated. The availability of maternity benefits positively influences 
the number of female migrants aged 20-34, another unanticipated 
result. More consistent with our hypotheses, the availability of other 
health-related programs (i.e., sickness and medical) significantly influ 
ence the number of young female migrants, but these effects are either 
not significant or only marginally significant for males. The reason for 
the differences in results across gender is not totally clear.
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Male and Female Immigrants By Entry Class
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 present age-composition results for numerically 
restricted and numerically exempt immigrants; corresponding ?-statis- 
tics are found in Appendix Tables F3 and F4. As noted in the context 
of gender composition, differences are evident within many of the vec 
tors when comparing between the numerically restricted and exempt 
classes. However, when we compare the effects of specific factors on 
the age composition of male versus female immigrants, differences 
across genders appear to lessen once the data are disaggregated by 
entry class.
For numerically restricted immigrants, the factors included in the 
differential economic opportunity vector do not play a strong role in 
determining the age composition of either gender. Although providing 
some evidence consistent with our hypotheses, the findings concerning 
the factors listed under "migration costs" also are not found to be par 
ticularly robust or highly significant. 10 Apparently (as with the gender 
composition model), even though we have attempted to control for 
U.S. policy-related considerations, immigration restrictions blunt most 
of the expected effects of these economic incentives.
Political and religious considerations have some effect on the age 
structure of numerically restricted immigrants. The effect is most 
apparent for religion (Table 7.3), where significantly fewer males and 
females aged 55 and older come from nations where Catholicism is the 
primary religion, which is not what we anticipated. To an even greater 
extent, U.S. immigration policy-related factors affect the age of numer 
ically restricted migrants. For example, whereas the lottery program 
significantly reduced the relative age of migrants, the Silva program 
and the differential treatment of the Western Hemisphere generally 
increased their relative age. Moreover, significantly fewer restricted 
male and female immigrants aged 55 and older came from Asian 
nations, ceteris paribus. The one factor for which a clear difference is 
evident across genders is the influence of U.S. citizens." Significantly 
fewer females aged 55 and older and more females aged 20-34 came 
from nations from which more natives became U.S. citizens. Within 
the class of numerically restricted immigrants, adult daughters and sis 
ters who are less than age 35 are apparently the primary beneficiaries 
of the lower entry costs associated with U.S. citizenship.
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Many of the social programs considered play a significant role in 
affecting the age of restricted migrants, and the effects are generally 
consistent across genders. For example, universal-coverage programs 
that are likely to be important to older persons (i.e., universal old-age 
and sickness programs) induce relatively more migrants aged 20-34 
(Table 7.3). On the other hand, universal programs serving the inter 
ests of younger individuals and their families (i.e., universal family 
allowances) induce more individuals aged 55 and older of both genders 
to migrate. Moreover, for both males and females, employment- 
related old-age pension programs tend to increase the relative age of 
migrants, as do employment-related sickness benefits, which we 
expected. Although the direction of the relationship is not expected, 
the impact of maternity benefits also is consistent across genders.
Although social programs importantly affect the age of numerically 
restricted immigrants, such is not the case generally for numerically 
exempt immigrants (Table 7.4). Instead, the factors in the economic 
opportunities vector serve as primary determinants of the age composi 
tion of the exempt group. This is especially true for older male and 
female migrants and for female migrants aged 20-34. For numerically 
exempt males aged 20-34, only relative income and female labor force 
participation are significant. The effect of relative income is as 
expected. Although we did not predict the effect of female labor force 
participation on the age of male migrants, this positive relationship 
could have been caused by the added competition faced by males for 
jobs in markets where females represent a relatively large percentage 
of the labor force. For the other variables, as the findings relate to both 
male and female migrants aged 55 and older and female migrants aged 
20-34, the signs on all the coefficients are in the expected direction and 
the level of significance is high, thus providing strong support for our 
hypotheses concerning the influence of economic opportunities in 
shaping the age composition of both male and female numerically 
exempt immigrants, who we expect to better reflect the forces of eco 
nomic incentives.
The influence of migration costs on exempt immigrants is similar to 
that for numerically restricted migrants: migration costs are not pri 
mary determinants of age composition, particularly for males. A nota 
ble exception is the influence of English-language skills in shaping a 
relatively older flow of exempt immigrants. The presence of U.S. mili-
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Table 7.3 Age Composition of Numerically Restricted Immigrants: 
Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimates3
Aged 20-34 Aged 55 and older
Variable Males Females Males Females
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
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a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 <t< 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Table F3
reports the corresponding ^-statistics.
In the gender-specific regressions, the education control variable is measured specific to
the respective gender. 
c In the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to the
respective gender.
tary personnel positively affects the entry of females aged 20-34. 
However, the reason that birth rate is associated with a larger number 
of female migrants aged 20-34 is unclear. Moreover, while the rela 
tionship is expected, we are uncertain of the reason that nations with 
more highly educated females send relatively older female migrants, 
while the age of male migrants is not affected by education.
U.S. immigration policy and political/religious considerations also 
influence the age of numerically exempt immigrants. For instance, as 
with numerically restricted immigrants, the lottery generally decreased 
the relative age of exempt immigrants, whereas the differential treat 
ment of Western Hemisphere natives during 1972-1976 increased their 
relative age. 12 However, unlike restricted migrants, numerically 
exempt males from Asian nations tend to be older than other migrants, 
ceteris paribus. This finding may be due to the presence of intervening 
opportunities that attract the younger economic migrants. More older 
male and female exempt migrants came from nations with unattractive 
political environments and from nations where Catholicism is the pri 
mary religion. Both findings are as anticipated.
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Table 7.4 Age Composition of Numerically Exempt Immigrants: 
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a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 <t< 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Table F4
reports the corresponding /-statistics.
In the gender-specific regressions, the education control variable is measured specific to
the respective gender. 
c In the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to the
respective gender.
SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to model the age composition of U.S. 
immigrants in a fashion that we believe is unique, and with the inclu 
sion of a vector of social programs variables. By using INS microdata 
to identify and cross-classify various groups, we have been able to dis 
tinguish the age composition of numerically restricted and numerically 
exempt U.S. immigrants, by gender.
Our analysis has found that the economic opportunity variables are 
generally strong and work in the expected directions. For example, 
higher source-country incomes relative to the United States result in 
more younger and less older immigrants. This finding is particularly 
interesting because these same factors do not play an especially signif 
icant role in explaining the rate of U.S. immigration. Migration costs 
and political/religious forces are not particularly important determi 
nants of age composition, in spite of the fact that certain of these costs 
and forces are consistently important in explaining the rate of immigra-
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tion from the various source countries. One general conclusion from 
these observations is that whereas the rate model identifies certain 
forces that are critical in shaping the volume of movement from vari 
ous source countries, it conceals forces that are important determinants 
of age composition.
Another general conclusion is that U.S. immigration policy, perhaps 
in indirect or unintended ways, has influenced the age composition of 
immigrants. A larger number of prior immigrants who have become 
U.S. citizens lowers the direct entry costs for potential immigrants. 
These lower costs have primarily served to facilitate the entry of 
young, adult, numerically restricted female immigrants, suggesting 
that adult daughters and sisters less than age 35 are the primary benefi 
ciaries. Moreover, whereas both the lottery and Silva programs 
resulted in significantly fewer migrants aged 55 and older and more 
migrants aged 20-34, the differential treatment of potential migrants 
from the Western Hemisphere nations had the opposite effect. The 
sensitivity of migrant age composition to such factors should be kept in 
mind by policymakers in their attempts to formulate optimal immigra 
tion policies.
Because we feel that this chapter breaks new ground in the study of 
immigrant age composition, we are less concerned than we might oth 
erwise be that a number of variables, particularly social program vari 
ables, have unanticipated effects for which we do not have good 
explanations. Nevertheless, many social program variables prove to be 
significant determinants of age composition. As far as we know, this 
study is the first to show that source-country social programs play any 
role in determining the age structure of migrants to the United States.
Notes
1. Simon (1984) has noted that the largest single category of transfer payments or 
services received by immigrant families is that for schooling costs of children 
aged 5-17.
2. This assumption is relaxed in the next chapter that focuses on the skill composi 
tion of immigrants.
3. The concept of relative attractiveness incorporates the idea that nonmonetary 
characteristics associated with country / and the United States may enter the deci 
sion maker's utility function and therefore influence the decision to migrate. If we 
assume that these characteristics are included in a vector x, the foregone relative
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attractiveness of the country of origin could be expressed as (or,- - xj), where the 
subscript j represents the United States. Therefore, more highly valued nonmone- 
tary characteristics associated with the country of origin imply higher migration 
costs. Alternatively, if Xj is actually higher than *,-, this concept may be better 
interpreted as an opportunity cost of not migrating which, of course, would be 
lower the higher x ,-. Moreover, if Xj is higher than jc,-, the individual will choose to 
migrate only if the added value attached to the nonmonetary characteristics (plus 
any net gains in earnings if he or she is economically active) exceeds the "other" 
costs (i.e., direct entry costs and possible skill losses).
t. Measuring the benefits of migration solely in terms of earnings differentials 
essentially presumes that individuals are all economically active which, of course, 
is not realistic. Individuals may choose not to be economically active because of 
their age (e.g., retirement from work) or for other reasons, perhaps related to gen 
der differences in the propensity to work in the formal labor market. For such 
individuals, employment opportunities would play a less important role in the 
decision of whether to migrate, though for spouses of economically active mar 
riage partners such considerations still play a critical role. Rather, for individuals 
who are not economically active, the decision of whether to migrate would entail 
a more direct comparison of the other migration costs incurred and the change in 
the value of the nonmonetary characteristics associated with the move.
5. This effect on age composition may be clearer for the numerically restricted 
immigrant class, where unmarried adult sons and daughters as well as brothers 
and sisters of U.S. citizens 21 years old and over may enter.
6. This "problem" results in at least three options. First, we could live without the 
adding up property and argue that this property now holds only approximately. 
Because we view the adding-up property as inherent to the estimation of a system 
of share equations, we reject this option. Second, we could use a simple econo 
metric technique like one- or two-way fixed effects. However, Appendix C makes 
a strong case for the Hausman-Taylor approach over these alternatives. Finally, 
we could estimate a series of two-equation systems that satisfy the adding-up 
property. This last option is preferable to the use of a still more sophisticated 
approach suggested by Berndt and Savin (1975) that requires a number of addi 
tional simplifying assumptions.
7. Consider a two-equation system that includes an adding-up property:
Eq. Fl y = a, T + a2x + e, , and 
Eq.F2 T-y = P 1 r +
where T is the "control total," y is a component of T, x is a vector of explana 
tory variables, and £j and e2 are error terms. Now subtract T from both sides 
of Eq. F2 to yield
Eq.F3
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If we multiply Eq. F3 through by -1, we obtain 
Eq.F4 y = (l-pjjr-pjjr-e^
Even if we multiply all terms in Eq. Fl and F2 by a weight (w), the following con 
ditions hold in the two-equation system:
Eq.FS a, = 1 - p^ anda2 = -p2
8. Another difference is that provident funds programs are generally associated with 
developing countries, whereas employment-related social insurance old-age pro 
grams are more frequently found in developed nations with at least a relatively 
high degree of industrialization.
9. For potential female migrants, higher rates of female labor force participation 
may reflect generally better earnings opportunities for female workers, and there 
fore relatively more young female migrants should come from source countries 
where the female percentage of total labor force is relatively high.
10. The evidence indicating that, for both males and females, birth rate is positive and 
significant for immigrants aged 55 and older is consistent with our hypotheses. 
However, the findings that more immigrants aged 55 and older come from nations 
that are more distant from the United States and that fewer women aged 55 and 
older come from English-speaking nations are not expected.
11. Note also that, whereas both the Silva program and the differential treatment of 
Western Hemisphere natives during 1972-1976 have a significantly positive effect 
on both males and females aged 55 and older, a significantly negative effect 
occurs on migrants aged 20-34 only for males with the Silva program and only 
for females from the Western Hemisphere during 1972-1976. We suspect that 
information related to specific policy-related features of these programs may 
explain these differences.
12. We do not understand why the lottery and Silva programs influence exempt immi 
grants, because these variables reflect admission programs that affected restricted 
immigrants. Exempt immigration could be affected in later years after the 
restricted immigrants acquire U.S. citizenship, but how the exempt category 
would be influenced in the years of the programs is not clear.
8 The Skill Composition 
of U.S. Immigration
A strong focus of current debates regarding U.S. immigration pol 
icy is the issue of whether a decline has occurred in the quality of U.S. 
immigrants (e.g., Borjas 1985 and 1987b) or not (e.g., Chiswick 1986). 
Recent literature seems to indicate that the quality of immigrant skills 
has in fact declined (Borjas 1995) relative to those of native-born 
Americans.
The skill composition of immigrants has many potential effects on 
the U.S. economy. The supply of highly skilled immigrant workers is 
often stressed as critically important to maintaining a vibrant and com 
petitive U.S. work force in an economy that is increasingly becoming 
more globalized. Moreover, in an era of rapid technological change, 
high-skilled workers are necessary to maintain productivity at the fron 
tiers of technological developments.
Skill levels have many other potential influences, including many of 
the influences discussed earlier in the context of the age composition of 
migrants. High-skilled workers are more economically productive 
than low-skilled workers and therefore add more to overall U.S. pro 
ductivity. Moreover, their higher incomes contribute more to the pri 
vate sector in terms of consumption expenditures and to the public 
sector in the form of tax payments. High-skilled workers also are less 
likely to experience periods of unemployment and thus are less likely 
to impose a net burden on the U.S. economy. Furthermore, by virtue of 
their education and innate abilities, high-skilled workers are likely to 
be more proficient in English or to learn English-language skills more 
quickly, and therefore they are able to assimilate more rapidly in the 
U.S. economy. Given the linkage between skill level and income/edu 
cation levels, the skill composition of immigrants also may have links 
to the dependency ratio within immigrant families and may affect the 
overall U.S. fertility rate in subsequent years. Moreover, crime rates 
are related to income and education levels. Therefore, the skill level of 
migrants may affect the extent to which immigrants impose a net cost 
on the U.S. society.
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THE SKILL COMPOSITION MODEL
The Marginal Migrant Once Again
The general form of the skill composition model follows that of 
Equation 5.1, and we again use the concept of the marginal migrant. In 
our prior discussion in the context of age composition, we assumed 
that all members of the indigenous population were endowed with a 
given amount of human capital. Clearly, in order to discuss skill com 
position, this assumption must now be relaxed. We here assume that, 
over time, potential immigrants accumulate occupational skills through 
formal schooling and occupational experience. Individuals differ in 
terms of the rate at which these occupational skills are accumulated 
(e.g., different innate abilities). As a consequence, within any particu 
lar age group of country f s indigenous population (e.g., those individu 
als aged a*), individuals possess different skill levels. While we 
presume that the skill levels of the indigenous population are a contin 
uous spectrum from low to high, for convenience we categorize mem 
bers of the population as being either low- or high-skilled workers.
In its modified form, the equilibrium condition for the marginal 
migrant in age group a* now may be expressed as:
Eq. 8.1 Z ^(w •- VV;)^**(1 + r ) = Ci »
where
a* is age at migration for a specific age group,
T is the age of the immigrant at death,
Wj and W} are the respective U.S. and country-of-origin wage per unit
of occupational skill,
A'** is the index of the marginal migrants occupational skill,and 
r is a discount rate.
The left side of Eq. 8.1 therefore represents the discounted total returns 
accruing to the marginal migrant who possesses skill level K** and 
moves from i to j at age a*. The right side of Eq. 8.1 represents the
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total migration costs incurred by an individual who migrates from 
country /. Once again, these total migration costs (C,) include direct 
entry costs, skill losses associated with less-than-perfect international 
skill transferability, and the foregone relative attractiveness of the 
country of origin.
For the marginal migrant in age group a*, the decision to migrate is 
one of indifference, since the expected benefits from migration are 
exactly offset by the migration costs. However, within country f s 
indigenous population, other individuals who are also aged a* will find 
it beneficial to migrate if they possess a skill level that is higher than 
£"**, since such individuals would receive net positive benefits from 
migrating. Therefore, within the group of individuals of age a*, given 
the skill level K** at which net benefits are zero, the marginal migrant 
equilibrium condition determines the skill levels at which other mem 
bers of the indigenous population would find migration beneficial and 
hence determines the skill composition of immigrants. The higher the 
skill level of the marginal migrant, the more highly skilled the overall 
skill composition of migrants.
Since we are now focusing on a particular age group (a*), the skill 
level of the marginal migrant is now considered to be the choice vari 
able. Once again, the marginal migrant is presumed to be capable of 
adjusting to any factors that would alter either the returns to or the 
costs of migration ("adjusting" here means choosing to migrate at a 
higher or lower skill level). 1 Such an adjustment would be expected if, 
for example, migration costs were higher; the marginal migrant will 
adjust by moving at a higher skill level and, by doing so, increase the 
returns to migration in order to offset the higher costs. Hence, the 
overall skill composition of migrants from country / will be responsive 
to factors related to relative economic advantage between / and the 
United States, as well as to the total migration costs incurred by those 
who choose to migrate from i to the United States.
Figure 8.1 illustrates these relationships. The return on migration 
increases with the skill level of the potential migrant, because those 
who migrate at a higher skill level receive the same wage per unit of 
occupational skill but over more units of skill than the low-skilled indi 
vidual. Given costs of migration from country i to country j of C,y and 
the expected differential return, /?,•(£), that is a function of the skill 
level possessed at migration, the marginal migrant aged # * would
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move at skill level A'Q**. If costs were higher, however, such as C-•', 
the marginal migrant would move at a higher skill level, A"2 **. For 
example, C-'could refer to migration from a more distant country or 
from a non-English-speaking country. If the expected returns on 
migration were higher at every skill level, such as shown by R^(K)— 
for example, for individuals in lower-income source countries—the 
marginal migrant would possess a lower skill level (A^**). Other 
things being equal, any factors that would result in higher returns or 
lower costs to individuals who migrate would induce relatively fewer 
of the high-skilled individuals to become international migrants.
One important feature of Eq. 8.1 should be noted. This equation 
specifies the equilibrium condition for the marginal migrant (i.e., net 
benefits to migration equal zero) for only the a* age group. In a more 
complicated form of the model, a similar condition may be specified 
for the marginal migrant in all other age groups. Other things being 
equal, the only difference in the specifications for the other age groups
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is that the indexed skill level of the marginal migrant in younger 
(older) age groups would be associated with a lower (higher) skill level 
than K**. However, the adjustments made to differences in the returns 
and/or the costs of migration would be the same within each age group. 
Therefore, within each age group, the skill level of migrants would be 
responsive to factors related to relative economic advantage between 
country / and the United States, as well as to the total migration costs 
incurred by those who choose to migrate. Hence, if individuals are 
allowed (conceptually) to adjust within all age groups, any factors that 
are associated with lower returns to individuals who migrate would 
induce a relatively more skilled flow of international migrants. Simi 
larly, the higher the costs imposed on migrants, the more highly skilled 
the international migrants.
Hypotheses
Consider the expected effects of the factors included in the differen 
tial economic opportunity vector, other things being equal. Higher 
country-of-origin wages per unit of human capital will decrease the 
returns to migration at all skill levels, so migrants should possess a rel 
atively higher average skill level if they come from source countries 
with relatively higher per capita gross domestic product. 2 Djajic 
(1989) also notes that a lower wage differential will induce migration 
of individuals with a higher average skill level.
Other factors may influence relative earnings as well. For instance, 
high government revenues are likely to be associated with higher taxes, 
which will tend to increase the relative after-tax wage differential. 
However, given their progressive nature, these taxes should fall dispro 
portionately on the higher-income (highly skilled) individuals, lower 
ing the net wage of the higher income workers relatively more than that 
of the lower-income workers. 3 Thus, high government revenues should 
induce relatively more high-skilled individuals to migrate.
Higher levels of development and more rapid short-term expansion 
of country /'s economy are both generally associated with enhanced 
employment opportunities, meaning the expected benefits from migrat 
ing are generally lower, ceteris paribus. Thus, relatively more high- 
skilled workers would choose to migrate. However, if the level of 
development is particularly relevant in determining the employment
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opportunities for the more highly skilled individuals, a negative rela 
tionship may exist. Rapid economic expansion and the associated 
enhanced employment opportunities may be of particular importance 
for the economic prospects of the low-skilled workers, which would 
tend to reinforce our hypothesis that relatively more high-skilled work 
ers would migrate. However, while this is certainly plausible, the ulti 
mate impact of growth in real per capita GDP depends on how relative 
wages within the source country are affected. If the relative employ 
ment and wage opportunities of high-skilled workers improve with 
short-term expansion, then the average skill composition of migrants 
would be inversely related to the rate of economic expansion. Since 
little evidence exists concerning the relationship between short-term 
growth and relative employment or wage opportunities, we do not pre 
dict the sign concerning the relationship between economic growth and 
the skill composition of migrants.
The marginal migrant also will adjust to differences in the direct 
costs of migration. For example, greater distance from the United 
States would impose higher direct entry costs on all migrants, so 
migrants from more distant countries should have relatively higher 
average skill levels. Less-than-perfect international transferability of 
skills also imposes costs, and greater expected skill losses should cause 
the marginal migrant to adjust by migrating at a higher skill level. 
However, others (e.g., McManus, Gould, and Welch 1983) assert that 
whereas direct migration costs (e.g., distance) do not vary with skill 
level, the negative effects of losses associated with less-than-perfect 
international skill transferability should be proportionately greater in 
the more skilled occupations. Therefore, other things being equal, 
migrants from English-speaking nations should be relatively more 
skilled than migrants from non-English speaking nations.
We expect migrants to be relatively more skilled if they come from 
source countries that have more highly educated indigenous popula 
tions. Furthermore, given per capita income, an increase in the relative 
number of highly educated individuals should decrease the wages of 
high-skilled relative to low-skilled occupations in country /, thereby 
affecting the relative propensities of high- versus low-skilled individu 
als to migrate. Acquiring an education at a U.S. university should 
reduce skill losses for those who immigrate to the United States, by 
increasing the probability that their knowledge will be easily trans-
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ferred to U.S. occupations and by creating a better flow of information 
back to country i concerning U.S. opportunities. Consequently, larger 
numbers of students from country / should increase the skill level of 
migrants from i.
The less politically attractive the country of origin, the lower the 
opportunity costs of departing; therefore, ceteris paribus, migrants 
from politically less attractive countries should be less skilled. How 
ever, evidence suggests that as political and civil rights are deprived, 
professionals respond vigorously by emigrating (Huang 1987).
The number of prior immigrants from country i who have become 
U.S. citizens should also be relevant in determining the skill composi 
tion of migrants. Because migration costs are lower for persons who 
have citizen relatives in the United States, the average skill composi 
tion should be higher for countries having a low number of naturalized 
citizens. In addition, to the extent that the differential treatment of 
Western Hemisphere natives during 1972-1976 represents a lower 
immigration barrier (i.e., fewer restrictions), the average skill level 
should also be lower.
The anticipated effect of social programs on skill composition is not 
straightforward, and consequently our reasoning is somewhat indi 
rect. To the extent that a social program entails a transfer from higher 
income (high-skilled) to lower income (low-skilled) individuals, we 
expect the program to increase the relative share of high-skilled 
migrants, because those bearing the greatest burden are generally the 
least likely to benefit from the program. Thus, countries with pro 
grams that provide universal coverage should have relatively more 
high-skilled migrants in their immigration flows.
Likewise, unemployment insurance constitutes a transfer from high- 
skilled workers to low-skilled workers, who typically have higher 
unemployment rates; consequently, we expect unemployment insur 
ance to discourage the migration of low-skilled workers and to encour 
age the migration of the high-skilled. Because the number of children 
in a family is likely to be inversely related to the family's income, fam 
ily allowance programs should be relatively more important in reduc 
ing the flow of lower-income (low-skilled) migrants. Fixed payments 
per child would increase the income of the low-income family rela 
tively more (as a percentage of unaugmented base income); hence, we
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expect employment-related family allowance programs to encourage 
more highly skilled migrants.
Not all social programs constitute an income transfer, however. For 
instance, employment-related old-age pension programs and cash sick 
ness programs present a complex situation in which both costs and 
benefits are most often roughly proportional to income levels. There 
fore, without additional information concerning specific programs, we 
are unable to ascertain precisely how they would affect the skill com 
position of migrants. However, some sickness-related programs may 
transfer wealth from high-skilled to low-skilled workers and therefore 
should increase the relative skill level of migrants.
ESTIMATION OF THE SKILL COMPOSITION EQUATION
The statistical methodology used to estimate the skill-composition 
relationships is essentially the same as that used for the gender and age 
composition of immigrant flows. Because our empirical analysis is 
designed to study the composition of occupational skills, we limit our 
analysis to immigrants who are aged 20-64. (Immigrants over the age 
of 64 are excluded because they are not likely to be economic migrants 
who possess skills that will be used in the U.S. labor market.) More 
over, by necessity, our empirical analysis is limited to only those immi 
grants aged 20-64 who declare an occupation upon their admittance as 
permanent resident aliens. For these immigrants, a separate analysis of 
skill shares is performed for each of three age groups: all immigrants 
aged 20-64; immigrants aged 20-34; and immigrants aged 35-64. The 
shares of migrants in two skill classes are considered: 1) high-skilled, 
which includes all individuals who declare an occupation in one of the 
professional, technical, and kindred (PTK) occupational categories, as 
well as managers, officials, and proprietors (except farm); and 2) low- 
skilled, which includes all other individuals who declare an occupa 
tion. Tables 4.13 and 4.14 provide an overall picture of these groups 
broken out by gender and entry class.
Since within each group the two skill classes together equal the sum 
of all individuals examined, the interpretation of the coefficients in the 
regressions is similar to that used with the gender regressions. Thus,
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the coefficient on the control total (e.g., total immigration of individu 
als aged 20-64) must sum to 1.0 across the two skill groups. The 
interpretation of the other independent variables is the same as in 
Chapters 6 and 7 in the sense that these coefficients are interpreted as 
a change in the absolute number of immigrants in a particular skill 
group and the coefficients sum to zero across the skill classes. Within 
all groups analyzed, the results for the high- and low-skilled classes 
are essentially mirror images, and therefore we present the results only 
for the high-skilled group. Moreover, the explanatory variables 
include a measure of the percentage of individuals who do not declare 
an occupation. This variable is measured specific to the age (and gen 
der) group under consideration and is included to partially correct for 
selectivity into the group of immigrants who declare an occupation. 
The variable is treated as endogenous, or correlated with unobserved 




For highly skilled immigrants, Table 8.1 reports coefficients and sig 
nificance levels for all immigrants aged 20-64, those aged 20-34, and 
those aged 35-64, where the totals are aggregated across gender and 
entry classes (i.e., numerically restricted and numerically exempt). 
Under the economic opportunities vector, we hypothesized that 
migrants will possess a relatively higher skill level if they come from 
higher-income source countries. Borjas (1987b), in particular, has 
argued that if income distributions are more unequal in the home coun 
try than in the United States, then individuals who migrate will be 
drawn from the lower tail of the home country's income distribution 
(i.e., lower skill levels). If the extent of source-country income ine 
quality is negatively related to the country's average income level, this 
consideration of income inequality should reinforce our expectation. 
However, contrary to expectations, source-country income levels do 
not significantly affect skill composition.
164 The Skill Composition of U.S. Immigration




Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban















































































































% No occupation 15

























a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Corre 
sponding r-statistics are reported in Appendix Table Gl.
b The control for the percentage of immigrants that does not declare an occupation is mea 
sured specific to the group examined (i.e., total, aged 20-34, and aged 35-64).
c The control total is measured specific to the group examined (i.e., total, aged 20-34, and 
aged 35-64).
The findings for the other economic opportunity variables provide 
only mixed support for our hypotheses, and these findings are sensitive 
to the actual age group considered. We hypothesized that relatively 
more high-skilled migrants would come from source countries that pro 
vide enhanced employment opportunities, which would lower the earn 
ings differential, but, to the extent that higher levels of development 
and more rapid short-term growth are associated with enhanced 
employment opportunities, the evidence suggests that the propensity of 
high-skilled workers to migrate is reduced by such opportunities. For 
level of development or degree of urbanization, this finding may not be 
surprising, but we do not understand why this would be the case only 
for those individuals aged 35-64. Apparently, more rapid short-term 
expansion of the economy also improves the wage and employment 
opportunities of high-skilled relative to low-skilled workers, especially 
among migrants aged 20-34.
The impact of the relative size of government is positive and margin 
ally significant for the high-skill share of migrants aged 20-34. The 
findings concerning the relationship between female labor force partic 
ipation and the skill level of migrants are sensitive to the age group 
considered. Among migrants aged 20-34, a higher percentage of
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females in the labor force is associated with a significantly larger num 
ber of high-skilled migrants; however, among the migrants aged 35- 
64, the opposite is found. This may reflect the fact that in countries 
where female labor force participation is relatively high, a generally 
higher skill level exists among the population, thus resulting in the 
migration of relatively more high-skilled workers. However, this argu 
ment does not explain why the high-skilled share is lower for the 
migrants aged 35-64.
The results indicate that English-speaking nations send relatively 
more high-skilled migrants to the United States: other things being 
equal, over 2,700 additional high-skilled workers annually migrate to 
the United States from these countries. This finding is expected. On 
the other hand, the findings indicating that fewer high-skilled workers 
come from nations with relatively highly educated populations is sur 
prising. This evidence may indicate that, in these countries, the labor 
market provides more favorable returns to human capital.
Because greater distance from the United States imposes higher 
direct entry costs on all migrants, we anticipated that, in order to over 
come these higher costs, migrants would tend to be relatively more 
skilled. The findings strongly suggest the opposite. Greater distance 
from the United States could entail more potential intervening opportu 
nities that serve to attract the relatively skilled migrants to locations 
other than the United States, but the exact reason for this finding is not 
clear.
Our findings indicate that high birth rates differentially affect mem 
bers of the indigenous population, depending on their skill (income) 
level. If births within families are inversely related to family incomes, 
then higher migration costs would be particularly imposing on the 
migration decisions of lower income (low-skilled) individuals and their 
families. The evidence suggests that these higher costs do fall dispro 
portionately on the low-skilled workers, especially among the group 
aged 20-34 where young children are most likely to be present.
We did not attach a prior to the religion variables. Our results indi 
cate that a particularly large number of skilled migrants come from 
nations where Catholicism is the primary religion. For reasons that are 
not altogether clear, Catholicism increases the high-skilled component 
of U.S. immigration for both age groups, and it is especially important
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for the group aged 20-34. The Muslim variable is positive and margin 
ally significant for this same age group.
The family reunification provisions of U.S. immigration law have 
long been suspected as one cause of declining skill composition of 
U.S. immigration. The results shown in Table 8.1 fail to support this 
position. Although the signs on the naturalization variable are negative, 
as anticipated, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Given 
the level of skill aggregation used in this study and given these find 
ings, we must look elsewhere for the cause of declining immigrant 
quality.
The differential treatment of Western Hemisphere natives during the 
1972-1976 period resulted in significantly fewer high-skilled workers 
among the total migrants and particularly among those aged 20-34. 
Thus, lower immigration barriers appear to decrease the relative skill 
level of migrants. Although we did not attach a prior to either lottery 
or Silva programs, both programs resulted in significant changes in the 
number of high-skilled migrants: the Silva program resulted in fewer 
high-skilled migrants, and the lottery visas in more. These lottery find 
ings are similar to those of Barrett (1996), who observed that lottery 
winners were more highly skilled than family immigrants. Thus, these 
results illustrate that, whether intentional or not, U.S. policy does influ 
ence the skill composition of U.S. immigrants.
In terms of magnitude, the control for Asian nations indicates a par 
ticularly large effect, with approximately 2,500 additional high-skilled 
migrants coming from Asian nations, ceteris paribus. The earnings 
differential between high- and low-skilled workers may be relatively 
low in Asian nations, thus inducing relatively more high-skilled work 
ers to migrate. Alternatively, potential migrants from Asia may 
encounter intervening opportunities that provide relatively better alter 
natives for the low-skilled. However, we noted above that intervening 
opportunities may provide the opposite set of incentives for potential 
migrants from more distant non-Asian nations.
Of the social programs considered, those that appear to have the 
greatest influence on the skill composition of migrants involve univer 
sal coverage and generally are related to old-age pension programs. As 
expected, the presence of universal old-age programs provides a signif 
icant incentive for an increased flow of younger (aged 20-34) high- 
skilled workers. Employment-related pension programs also signifi-
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cantly influence the skill composition of migrants. Whereas the pres 
ence of old-age social insurance programs reduces the number of high- 
skilled migrants, provident funds programs tend to increase their num 
ber. Moreover, if the pensions are not internationally transferable, the 
number of high-skilled migrants is reduced. These results are not 
unexpected. Employment-related pension programs that are of the 
social insurance variety often entail a cost to the insured individual that 
is equal to some fixed percentage of his or her earnings and, in turn, the 
benefits derived from such programs generally take the form of pay 
ments that equal some percentage of the average or highest earnings 
during some specified period. Apparently, where social programs pro 
vide benefits that are positively related to income levels, the higher- 
income, high-skilled workers find such programs to be relatively 
attractive inducements to stay at home. High-skilled workers also are 
less likely to migrate and leave their pensions behind, which would be 
necessary under situations where the pensions are not transferable. On 
the other hand, provident funds programs provide the opportunity for 
individuals to save an amount that would be sufficient to cover reloca 
tion expenses. Therefore, such programs may be positively associated 
with the skill level of migrants because the high-skilled (higher- 
income) individuals would be able to accumulate these savings more 
quickly. Thus, within a given age group of potential migrants, the 
highly skilled are more likely to migrate than less-skilled individuals if 
provident funds are available.
Universal family allowance programs also provide a significant 
incentive for an increased number of high-skilled migrants aged 20- 
34. However, our more direct measure of coverage within health- 
related programs does not provide evidence of the anticipated effect 
that universally provided sickness programs increase the flow of high- 
skilled migrants. The findings concerning certain features of sickness 
programs provide some support for the expected relationships, how 
ever. For instance, among the group of migrants aged 20-34, the avail 
ability of maternity and medical benefits positively influence the 
number of high-skilled migrants, though the level of significance is not 
high. We would expect these programs to generally increase the skill 
level of migrants, since the primary beneficiaries (women) tend to have 
lower skills. Among migrants aged 35-64, programs that provide cash 
sickness benefits also increase the relative share of the highly skilled,
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perhaps again reflecting that the availability of such programs is partic 
ularly important to women.
Immigrants By Gender
Table 8.2 presents the findings for total male and total female immi 
grants classified as highly skilled, as well as for the gender-specific 
subgroups aged 20-34 and 35-64, where within each of these groups 
the immigrants are aggregated across entry classes.
In general, most factors have similar effects on the skill composition 
of both males and females. The similarities are most apparent in the 
pair-wise comparisons of the factors included in the economic opportu 
nity and migration costs vectors. For educational attainment and dis 
tance from the United States, the only substantive differences across 
gender are for the subgroup aged 35-64, where (as expected) countries 
with higher education levels send more high-skilled (female but not 
male) migrants, and nations more distant from the United States send 
fewer high-skilled (male but not female) migrants. Concerning relative 
economic growth and English-language skills, the findings concerning 
the effects on skill composition are essentially the same in both the 
male and female regressions. Thus, the incentives created by eco 
nomic expansion and language skills do not appear to entail any gender 
tilting. The relationship between female labor force participation rates 
and the skill composition of migrants also is essentially identical 
across genders.
Certain factors in these vectors have a different effect on females 
than males, but the most notable differences are expected. For exam 
ple, high birth rates should impose a relatively higher migration cost on 
potential low-skilled migrants; the fact that the evidence supports this 
hypothesis for females but not males is consistent with the notion that 
child rearing costs fall more heavily on the female marriage partner. 
The finding that the presence of U.S. military personnel has a signifi 
cant influence on the composition of female but not male migrants is 
also not surprising, since this variable should reflect the operation of a 
marriage market that focuses on the wives of U.S. servicemen. 4 Con 
trary to the evidence, however, we expected U.S. military personnel to 
represent lower cost of entry and therefore to have a negative effect on 
the skill level of female migrants. The observed effect could be due to
Table 8.2 Highly Skilled Immigrants by Gender: Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable Estimates3
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a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Corresponding t-statistics are reported in Appendix
Table G2.
b In the gender-specific regressions, the education control is measured specific to the respective gender. 
c The control for the percentage of immigrants that does not declare an occupation is measured specific to the group examined (i.e., male
total, aged 20-34, aged 35-64; female total, aged 20-34, and aged 35-64). 
d The control total is measured specific to the group examined (i.e., see note c).
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marriage sorting that pairs better-educated females in source countries 
with U.S. military personnel.
Like the findings presented earlier concerning all immigrants, sig 
nificantly more of both male and female high-skilled migrants come 
from nations where Catholicism is the primary religion, but gender- 
specific differences are evident in the other factors of this vector. For 
example, significantly more high-skilled male migrants aged 20-34 
come from Muslim nations. Apparently, high-skilled males are able to 
exercise their choice to migrate, but the same may not be true of poten 
tial female migrants for whom social customs inhibit movement (Tyree 
and Donato 1985). Unattractive political environments have very dif 
ferent impacts on the skill composition of male and female migrants: a 
larger share of male migrants from politically less attractive nations is 
highly skilled, but a smaller share of female migrants is, perhaps 
reflecting different emigration restrictions. For males, this evidence 
also may suggest that general economic opportunities for high-skilled 
workers are relatively less desirable in countries that are politically less 
attractive. For female workers, either the supply of potential high- 
skilled migrants is low (e.g., suppressed opportunities to acquire the 
skills necessary to become a high-skilled migrant) or, compared to 
their low-skilled counterparts, the economic opportunities are rela 
tively good.
For many of the factors in the U.S. immigration policy vector, the 
findings are similar for both males and females and are essentially the 
same as the findings discussed earlier in the context of all immigrants 
(i.e., males and females aggregated). However, whereas the findings 
for all immigrants do not support our hypotheses concerning natural 
ized U.S. citizens, among females aged 20-34, significantly fewer high- 
skilled migrants come from nations with a relatively high number of 
natives who have become U.S. citizens, which is as anticipated. The 
effect of the lottery program also suggests a very different impact on 
males than females. The lottery visas are associated with a significantly 
larger number of high-skilled male migrants, but this program had little 
effect on the skill composition of female migrants. Apparently (per 
haps because their numbers were relatively large among the nonimmi 
grants already present in the United States at the time the lottery 
program was initiated), high-skilled male workers were in a better posi 
tion than other potential migrants to take advantage of the lottery visas.
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In the social programs vector, we hypothesized that universal bene 
fits would provide incentives for relatively more high-skilled workers 
to migrate, which is supported by evidence for both males and females 
for universal old-age and family allowance programs. The effects on 
skill composition of various other features of old-age pension pro 
grams do not appear to generally differ by gender, though the signifi 
cance of the findings is higher in the male regressions. However, 
certain social programs exert a different influence on males than on 
females. For instance, the availability of unemployment insurance 
increases the number of high-skilled female migrants aged 35-64, 
which is expected, but the same is not true for males.
Other notable differences in the findings for male versus female 
migrants relate to variables associated with sickness programs. Poten 
tial female migrants appear to be more sensitive than males to the 
availability of sickness-related programs; in particular, maternity and 
medical benefits primarily affect the skill composition of female 
migrants, which is not surprising. Concerning medical programs, 
apparently the higher income (high-skilled) workers bear a dispropor 
tionate share of the costs for such programs, thus inducing an increase 
in the skill level of female migrants. Moreover, if birth rates are 
inversely related to income levels, then maternity programs should 
increase the skill level of female migrants, since the low-skilled (low- 
income) female workers benefit most from the provision of such bene 
fits. Programs providing cash sickness benefits, which are generally 
tied to some percentage of the insured workers earnings, increase the 
high-skilled share of both male and female migrants aged 35-64; such 
benefits appear to be viewed by both genders as lowering the perceived 
earnings differential between the country of origin and the United 
States, thus inducing relatively more high-skilled workers to migrate.
Male and Female Immigrants By Entry Class
Table 8.3 presents the findings for both male and female numeri 
cally restricted and exempt immigrants classified as highly skilled and 
aged 20-64. In large part, the findings for the numerically restricted 
class of immigrants are similar to those found when the data were not 
disaggregated by entry class. However, some differences are apparent,
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particularly within many of the vectors when pair-wise comparisons 
are made between numerically restricted and exempt immigrants.
Earlier, within the context of gender and age composition, we found 
that economic incentives served better in forming the composition of 
numerically exempt immigrants. With respect to skill composition, 
this does not appear to be the case; at least in terms of the number of 
significant relationships, the skill composition of numerically restricted 
immigrants seems to be more influenced by economic opportunities. 
Moreover, in terms of directional influence, the differences across 
entry class are readily apparent. For instance, whereas the extent of 
female labor force participation and the relative size of government 
both positively influence the number of high-skilled migrants within 
the numerically restricted class, these same factors negatively influence 
the number of high-skilled migrants in the exempt class. Our hypothe 
ses are more generally supported by the evidence relating to restricted 
immigrants.
In terms of migration costs, whereas similarities are apparent con 
cerning the effects of distance and English-language skills, differences 
across entry classes are again noteworthy. On the one hand, we are not 
surprised that the presence of U.S. military personnel affects the com 
position of exempt but not restricted immigrants. On the other hand, 
we do not understand why (as expected) relatively more high-skilled 
female numerically restricted workers migrate from countries with 
high birth rates, but the same relationship is not found among exempt 
migrants. Perhaps numerically restricted female immigrants more fre 
quently move within the context of a family unit, where family size and 
its associated costs would be particularly relevant to migration deci 
sions.
The difference across entry class in terms of the effect of education 
also is quite striking. For exempt migrants, as expected, more high- 
skilled migrants come from nations where the level of educational 
attainment is relatively high. However, the evidence points more 
toward a brain-drain phenomenon for the numerically restricted immi 
grants. Apparently, within this class, the heavy orientation toward fam 
ily maintenance considerations serves to retard the entry of potential 
high-skilled migrants from nations with high levels of education, per 
haps because these nations have fewer recently formed family linkages 
with the United States.
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a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Corre 
sponding f-statistics are reported in Appendix Table G3.
b ln the gender-specific regressions, the education control is measured specific to the respec 
tive gender.
c The control for the percentage of immigrants that do not declare an occupation is measured 
specific to the group examined (i.e., male numerically restricted, numerically exempt; 
female numerically restricted, numerically exempt).
d The control total is measured specific to the group examined (i.e., see note c).
Within the numerically exempt class, the influence of foreign stu 
dents should exert itself through the operation of a marriage market, in 
which we anticipated that the composition of males would be more 
influenced than that of females. The evidence is consistent with this 
interpretation. However, for restricted migrants, the marriage market 
would not appear relevant for explaining why significantly more high- 
skilled female (but not more male) migrants come from nations where 
relatively large numbers of the population attend a U.S. college or uni 
versity. Rather, the explanation may be that acquiring a U.S. education 
provides potential independent migrants with an opportunity to take an 
initial first step toward an ultimate goal of more permanent immigra 
tion to the United States. Various potential cultural and social con 
straints may make this alternative relatively more attractive to females 
than males.
The findings concerning political and religious considerations are 
much the same as found previously when the data were disaggregated
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by entry class. However, whereas source-country political conditions 
appear to be more likely to affect the composition of exempt migrants, 
the effects of religious considerations are more pronounced for 
restricted migrants. This difference is not unexpected, since within 
families religious considerations are a matter of importance, and for 
the potential numerically restricted migrants a heavy emphasis is 
placed on family reunification. On the other hand, individuals seeking 
freedom from political repression are not necessarily linked so closely 
to religious considerations.
As found earlier, significantly more high-skilled migrants come 
from Asian nations, regardless of gender or entry class. The potential 
exists for naturalized U.S. citizens to affect the composition of both 
numerically restricted and exempt immigrants, but an effect is found 
only for restricted female migrants, where (as expected) fewer high- 
skilled migrants are associated with lower entry costs. With the other 
U.S. policy controls, the effects were expected to be more pronounced 
for numerically restricted than exempt migrants, which is the case with 
lottery visas, where significantly more of both male and female high- 
skilled migrants are found to enter under this program. Moreover, the 
findings relating to the Silva program and the Western Hemisphere 
treatment (1972-1976) indicate, as expected, that fewer high-skilled 
numerically restricted migrants are associated with lower immigration 
barriers. However, that these factors have such a strong association 
with the skill composition of exempt migrants is somewhat surprising. 
Opening the door to allow relatively more low-skilled migrants to enter 
through the numerically restricted class has apparently caused high- 
skilled migrants to turn to other avenues of entry which, in this case, is 
manifested in the exempt class of migrants.
The factors included in the vector of social programs appear to have 
more influence in shaping the skill composition of restricted than 
exempt migrants. The skill composition of restricted female migrants 
appears to be particularly sensitive to the provision of programs relat 
ing to sickness and family allowances, as well as program coverage. 
For instance, the evidence relating to female migrants supports our 
expectation that universal old-age, sickness, and family allowance pro 
grams all provide incentives that increase the number of high-skilled 
migrants. Moreover, as expected, programs providing health-care or 
medical benefits increase the number of high-skilled female migrants,
Legal U.S. Immigration 179
and (to a lesser extent) cash sickness benefits tend to decrease that 
number. Whereas the skill composition of male restricted migrants is 
also influenced by the availability of these programs, old-age pension 
programs have a greater influence on the composition of male than 
female migrants. For countries with employment-related social insur 
ance old-age pension programs, the flow of migrants includes signifi 
cantly fewer high-skilled male migrants.
The social programs that influence the composition of exempt 
migrants also do so in a manner that appears quite different from that 
found for restricted migrants. For instance, the evidence indicates that 
unemployment insurance increases the number of high-skilled exempt 
migrants, but no such evidence is found for restricted migrants. Fur 
ther, the availability of cash sickness benefits is negatively related to 
the skill level of restricted migrants but is positively related to skill 
level of the exempt. The impact of provident funds old-age programs 
also differs across entry class, suggesting that the opportunity to save 
resources necessary to cover relocation costs may be less critical in the 
decisions of exempt migrants. The reasons for differential impact of 
the sickness-related programs are not immediately obvious.
SUMMARY
Economic opportunities are more influential in determining the skill 
composition of numerically restricted migrants relative to those 
exempt, The evidence relating to exempt migrants is, in large part, 
contrary to our expectations. On the other hand, the findings for 
numerically restricted migrants, as well as the evidence from data that 
are not disaggregated by entry class, are generally as expected. These 
findings have several implications. For example, as the level of devel 
opment increases around the world, source countries will increasingly 
provide employment and earnings opportunities that are particularly 
attractive tp high-skilled workers. Economic expansion also appears to 
improve the job-related opportunities of high-skilled workers. Thus, 
from countries experiencing increasing development and economic 
expansion, the skill composition of migrants to the United States will 
be relatively lower. On the other hand, as the relative extent of female
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participation in formal labor markets increases, the skill level of U.S. 
migrants may increase because the relative number of potential high- 
skilled migrants is increasing. Moreover, to the extent that government 
sectors around the world become larger in terms of their share of gross 
domestic product, the number of high-skilled workers moving to the 
United States should increase.
Migration costs also significantly influence skill composition; in 
particular, English-language familiarity is of considerable importance, 
regardless of gender or entry class. Certain other cost factors have 
effects that are gender-specific, but these differences are generally 
quite understandable.
Like our findings relating to the other composition models, political 
and religious considerations and U.S. immigration policy play major 
roles in forming skill composition. The findings relating to the social 
program variables also provide support for many of our hypotheses 
and, as with economic opportunities, these influences are more appar 
ent with numerically restricted than numerically exempt migrants. 
Moreover, interesting differences exist across males and females for 
certain types of programs. The skill composition of female migrants is 
particularly sensitive to program coverage and the availability of sick 
ness and family allowance programs.
Notes
1. Given that vv(- and w/ measure the wage rate per unit of occupational skill, a level 
of skills that is higher than K** would imply a larger discounted value of benefits 
(Eq.8.1).
2. Of course, this presumes that the differentials in return are not skill specific. If the 
earnings differentials between country i and the United States are larger for low- 
than high-skilled workers, this expectation may be reversed.
3. Moreover, if government revenues provide some measure of the extent of transfer 
activity in country i, such transfers are likely to benefit most the low-income (low- 
skilled) individuals, thus further increasing the relative incentive for high-income 
(high-skilled) workers to migrate.
4. In Chapter 7, we also found that certain factors associated with migration costs 
(i.e., birth rate, U.S. military, education, and distance) have gender-specific differ 
ences: these factors appeared to be much stronger in shaping the age composition 
of female migrants than of male migrants.
9 Summary and Conclusions
In this study, we attempt to model the gender, age, and skill compo 
sition of legal U.S. immigration. Our empirical work is based on fairly 
simple and intuitive human capital models relating to the rate of legal 
immigration from various countries to the United States, as well as to 
the gender, age, and skill composition of the immigrants. The models 
emphasize the differential economic advantages and costs of migrat 
ing, including the costs of transferring accumulated occupational 
skills. We hypothesized'that the gender composition of immigrant 
flows should vary across source countries depending upon source- 
country characteristics that serve to place females in the pool of poten 
tial economic migrants. The proportion of immigrants that is female 
also should be determined by factors that influence the ratio of eco 
nomic to non-economic/tied migrants. To study age and skill composi 
tion, we introduce the concept of the marginal migrant, a hypothetical 
individual for whom the costs and benefits of migrating just balance. 
Conceptually, the marginal migrant is able to adjust to changes in any 
benefit or cost associated with migration, so that for a given skill level, 
he or she would become younger or older and for a given age would 
become more skilled or less skilled. The concept of the marginal 
migrant yields testable hypotheses concerning the age and skill compo 
sition of U.S. immigration.
Legal U.S. immigration is emphasized in this study for both sub 
stantive and practical reasons. The substantive reason is that U.S. 
authorities have control over legal immigration and can influence 
immigrant composition in terms of gender, age, and skills (though they 
have rarely exercised this ability). Moreover, the composition of 
migration has not been widely modeled, so this study has some interest 
and policy relevance of its own, particularly in terms of the influence of 
social programs in source countries. The practical reason is that the 
data used in the study refer only to legal immigrants. The annual data 
were drawn from the Immigration and Naturalization Service Public 
Use Tapes, which provide a record on every legal resident alien admit 
ted into the United States beginning in 1972. Our focus is on the
181
182 Summary and Conclusions
period 1972-1991, because a new immigration policy regime began in 
Fiscal Year 1992.
The empirical results of the study, which were obtained by the 
demanding Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable approach, yield two 
broad conclusions.
• Source-country characteristics significantly shape the rate and 
composition of U.S. immigration. The importance of these char 
acteristics holds across the board in the sense that, for the rate of 
immigration and/or for some components of migrant composi 
tion, each variable proves to be significant (although very few 
variables are significant for every feature of immigration studied 
here). To the extent that source-country characteristics help 
shape the rate and/or composition of migration to the United 
States, the U.S. government at best has only limited control.
• U.S. immigration policy also importantly shapes the rate of 
immigration, as well as the immigrants' characteristics. Many 
effects of U.S. policy, especially regarding immigrant composi 
tion, are probably unintended. The importance of policy is 
reflected directly by various policy variables in the models and by 
the distinction between numerically restricted and numerically 
exempt immigrants.
This chapter consists of two major sections. The first recaps the 
importance of the various variables in explaining the rate and composi 
tion of migration to the United States. The second is oriented toward 
the implications of this research for U.S. immigration policy.
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE U.S. IMMIGRATION— 
SOURCE-COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS
Differential Economic Opportunities
From the economist's perspective, differential economic opportuni 
ties are expected to play a key role, if not the key role, among the deter 
minants of U.S. immigration and its composition. Differential 
economic opportunities in large part explain migration from various
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European countries to the United States during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Such opportunities also explain more recent 
migration to the United States (Greenwood and McDowell 1991). 
However, in the modern era, emigration restrictions and immigration 
barriers impede the free international flow of labor and blunt the force 
of economic incentives. Such constraints present investigators with 
difficulties and probably conceal the true effects of variables that 
reflect economic opportunities and significance.
In this study, we have attempted to account for institutional impedi 
ments to U.S. immigration in two ways. First, our models include a 
vector of variables whose presence is intended to control for different 
treatment by U.S. authorities of countries or regions at different times. 
Second, we distinguish between immigrants who are numerically 
restricted versus those who are numerically exempt under U.S. law. 
Restricted immigrants clearly confront entry barriers, whereas exempt 
immigrants possess the required family ties to enter the United States if 
and when they wish. Consequently, economic incentives ought to be 
more clearly reflected by exempt immigrants.
As noted in Chapter 5, per capita GDP in source countries relative to 
that of the United States is not statistically significant as a determinant 
of the overall rate of U.S. immigration. This result is somewhat sur 
prising given that similar measures were important explanatory vari 
ables in roughly comparable studies, including our own earlier work 
(Greenwood and McDowell 1991). The current result is clearly due in 
part to the econometric technique adopted for this study, the Hausman- 
Taylor instrumental variable approach. We stand by our current find 
ings: in the aggregate, per capita GDP in source countries relative to 
that of the United States does not appear to influence the rate of migra 
tion to the United States. However, for those persons for whom U.S. 
immigration is an institutionally unconstrained option, the force of dif 
ferential earnings opportunities is more apparent: the rate of such 
migration is higher if the source country has lower per capita GDP. 
This finding emphasizes the importance of accounting for institutional 
restrictions and specifically distinguishing numerically exempt immi 
grants.
Relative per capita GDP does not perform well in the gender equa 
tions, where its t-value never exceeds 1.67. We anticipated that by 
especially discouraging potential economic migrants (and therefore
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males), higher values of this variable would be negative in the regres 
sion for males and correspondingly positive in that for females. One 
possible explanation for its lack of significance is that the variable fails 
to appropriately distinguish gender-specific returns. A better variable 
would be the ratio of female to male earnings in source countries ver 
sus the same measure for the United States, which would better reflect 
the relative position of females in the source country. Unfortunately, 
data on female wages or earnings are nonexistent for most countries in 
our sample, but the available data for the manufacturing sectors of a 
few advanced, industrial nations are illustrative (Table 9.1).
The data in Table 9.1 have been calculated from information pre 
sented in Blau and Ferber (1992, Table 10.4). The evidence is clear 
that, relative to the United States, the remuneration of females com 
pared to males in various countries around the world varies greatly. 
Females do relatively better in most European countries than in the 
United States, but if Japan is a reasonable proxy for other Asian 
nations, they do relatively worse in Asia. Although this richness of 
information is missing from our models, the strong positive influence 
of the Asia dummy variable on female immigrants (especially those 
who are exempt from numerical restrictions; see Table 6.2) is precisely 
what would be expected from the information provided in Table 9.1.
In our model of age composition, we argue that the age of the mar 
ginal migrant ought to increase (decrease) as relative per capita GDP 
decreases (increases), because for source countries with smaller wage 
differentials relative to the United States, the marginal migrant must be 
younger in order to enjoy the smaller differential return over a longer 
period of time to just cover the cost of migrating. In the age composi 
tion equations, relative income plays the expected role: a one-percent 
age-point increase in relative per capita GDP causes about 365 more 
immigrants aged 20-34 and about 227 fewer immigrants aged 55 and 
over to annually enter the United States from country / (see Table 7.1). 
Moreover, the magnitude of the effects is larger and generally more 
significant for males than for females, which also is anticipated, 
because relatively more males are likely to be economic migrants.
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Table 9.1 The Ratio of Female to Male Hourly
Earnings in Manufacturing Relative to 




















































SOURCE: Calculated from Blau and Ferber (1992), Table 10.4. 
a See Blau and Ferber for details concerning the measures for 
specific countries.
Short-term growth of job opportunities, as reflected in country /'s 
rate of growth of GDP relative to that of the United States, encourages 
higher rates of migration to the United States (see Table 5.1). On the 
surface, this finding may be surprising, but other considerations per 
haps soften this surprise. First, more rapid growth may allow potential 
migrants in country i to accumulate the assets needed to cover the costs 
of an international move. Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
short-term growth is likely to be of most benefit to young persons who
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have recently entered the labor force or are about to enter it (see Table 
7.1), particularly females (see Table 7.2). Thus, higher values of the 
relative growth variable ought to discourage the emigration of the 
young while at the same time encouraging that of older potential 
migrants. The empirical results indicate that the effects of this variable 
are as anticipated, but the effect appears to have a more significant 
influence on older persons than on younger persons, which in itself 
could increase migration rather than decrease it.
The effect of relative growth of GDP is strongest for exempt 
females, for whom the variable has a particularly sizable influence on 
the oldest age group (see Table 7.4). Because the exempt group in gen 
eral consists mostly of spouses and parents of U.S. citizens, the financ 
ing argument takes on added relevance. Older exempt females are 
likely to consist mainly of mothers of U.S. citizens. By affecting the 
assets of older females or those of their children in source countries, 
migration to the United States becomes a viable option for reuniting 
with other children who moved there previously.
With respect to skill composition, considerable differences are evi 
dent between the empirical results for restricted and exempt immi 
grants (see Table 8.3). Short-term growth in source countries relative 
to the United States strongly discourages the migration of numerically 
restricted persons with the highest skills. On the other hand, the skill 
composition of numerically exempt immigrants is unaffected. This 
result suggests that economic growth in source countries differentially 
benefits those with better skills and higher incomes, thus tilting skill 
composition of U.S. immigrants toward the less skilled, especially 
those who are younger (see Table 8.2). (If migration from Mexico to 
the United States follows the same pattern, any growth induced by the 
North American Free Trade Agreement could have the result of 
increasing the rate of movement to the United States while at the same 
time decreasing the skill composition.) 1
High government revenues as a percentage of GDP (and hence pre 
sumably high taxes in source countries) boost the rate of migration to 
the United States, as well as influencing age and skill composition. 
The effects on age composition tend to operate almost exclusively 
through the numerically exempt class (young spouses and older parents 
of U.S. citizens). These results make sense: high government revenues 
(high taxes on workers) encourage the migration of more young per-
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sons (especially females) and discourage the migration of older per 
sons, both males and females (see Table 7.4). The effect is that when 
the appropriate family ties to parents exist, the parents move to the 
United States only when their expected receipt of transfers in the 
source country is low.
Generally, the urbanization variable works as anticipated. The rate 
of immigration to the United States from more highly urbanized societ 
ies is clearly lower (see Table 5.1). Moreover, relatively more females 
come from such societies, presumably because urban employment 
opportunities for women attract them into the labor force, where they 
expand the pool of potential economic migrants (see Table 6.1). The 
positive effect of percent urban is particularly important for numeri 
cally exempt females (see Table 6.2), and especially for older exempt 
females (see Table 7.4), although the effect is also of some importance 
for older exempt males. Urban job opportunities are likely to be of 
most importance to young persons, and the empirical results bear this 
out for young females, especially those who are exempt (see Table 7.4). 
Historically, urban areas have provided opportunities for the most 
highly skilled workers; thus, that relatively few highly skilled persons, 
especially older male workers, migrate from more highly urbanized 
countries is not surprising (see Table 8.2). Indirectly, this finding also 
may suggest a "brain drain" from less-developed, less-urbanized coun 
tries to the United States.
Female labor force participation in source countries reduces female 
migration and tilts the gender composition toward males (see Table 6.1), 
particularly for the exempt class (see Table 6.2). Our theory of the mar 
ginal migrant suggests that both lower differential returns and higher 
costs will cause an increase in the skill composition of U.S. immigrants. 
Since greater female labor force participation presumably reflects better 
earnings opportunities and generally higher skill levels, females from 
countries with high levels of female participation ought to be more 
skilled. Moreover, the costs of migrating are higher for numerically 
restricted immigrants, which should reinforce the higher expected skill 
level for this group. Female labor force participation behaves in the 
expected fashion for restricted immigrants, but it does not for the exempt 
group (see Table 8.3). Although the lower migration costs for exempt 
migrants may result in quantitative differences for the two groups, the
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qualitative differences are difficult to understand. The results are con 
sistent for both males and females.
Migration Costs
Distance proxies both the monetary and nonmonetary costs of 
migration, each of which should rise with greater distance from the 
United States. On average, per 1000-mile increase in distance from the 
United States, immigration falls by 300 persons per million population 
of the origin country, other things being equal (see Table 5.1). This 
drop off with distance is about twice as sharp for numerically restricted 
as for numerically exempt immigrants, whose transportation expenses 
in many cases may be subsidized by their citizen relatives. Moreover, 
distance plays a role in shaping the composition of immigration to the 
United States: in other words, the costs represented by distance help 
determine who migrates. Writing during the last century, Ravenstein 
(1885) observed that females were overrepresented in short-distance 
moves. This observation is reinforced by our findings, which suggest 
that contemporary movement to the United States consists of signifi 
cantly more males if the migration originates in more distant countries 
(see Table 6.1).
Our theory of the marginal migrant predicts that immigrants from 
more distant countries will consist of relatively more young persons, 
because to offset the higher costs of moving requires that the marginal 
migrant move at an earlier age. The empirical results reject this 
hypothesis. Relatively few young persons (20 to 34 years of age), 
especially young females, move to the United States from more distant 
countries (see Table 7.2); relatively more older persons (55 years old 
and over), especially numerically restricted males (see Table 7.3), 
move from more distant countries.
U.S. military presence clearly influences the composition of U.S. 
immigration, especially gender composition. Female migration is 
boosted, specifically for the numerically exempt (see Table 6.2), and 
especially for young exempt females (see Table 7.4), reflecting the 
working of the marriage market. Although the evidence is not strong, it 
does point toward more highly skilled exempt young women (and men) 
from source countries with U.S. military presence (see Table 8.3).
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As female educational opportunities (relative to male opportunities) 
rise in potential source countries, the female share of U.S. immigrants 
increases as anticipated, especially for the exempt class (see Table 6.2). 
Our theory of the marginal migrant predicts that older persons will 
move from countries with higher levels of education. The empirical 
results are consistent with this prediction and are due mainly to fewer 
young exempt females and more older exempt females coming from 
such countries (see Table 7.4). Contrary to the predicted direction of 
the effect, fewer highly skilled immigrants, especially young males and 
females, originate in countries with high general levels of educational 
attainment (see Table 8.2). This finding is consistent with a drain of 
talent from countries with generally lower levels of education.
Familiarity with the English language should facilitate the transfer 
of occupational skills and education to the United States, as well as 
facilitate social and cultural assimilation. However, the rate of immi 
gration from English-speaking countries is not significantly higher 
than from other countries; yet, the English variable is an important 
determinant of the composition of the flows. 2 The share of female 
immigrants, especially numerically exempt females, is significantly 
higher from English-speaking countries (see Table 6.2), which sug 
gests that social and cultural assimilation are particularly important in 
female migration.
Our theory of the marginal migrant predicts that older migrants will 
originate in English-speaking countries because they will experience 
lower skill losses than migrants from other countries. Moreover, 
because their returns to learning English are generally lower, older per 
sons have a lesser incentive to migrate from non-English-speaking 
countries because they will find social and cultural assimilation harder. 
The empirical results indicate that higher shares of older immigrants, 
both female and male, come from English-speaking countries (see 
Table 7.2), and this observation is particularly true for the numerically 
exempt class (see Table 7.4). Immigrant workers from English-speak 
ing nations also are more highly skilled.
Political Attractiveness and Religion
Political conditions in source countries importantly influence U.S. 
immigration. The rate of migration to the United States is signifi-
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cantly higher from countries with less competitive political systems 
(see Table 5.1). This effect is especially strong for older, numerically 
exempt females (see Table 7.4). Moreover, countries with such politi 
cal systems provide the United States with significantly more highly 
skilled males but significantly fewer highly skilled females (see Table 
8.2); this may be due to more limited opportunities for females in 
these countries to attain high levels of education and generally to 
access highly skilled occupations.
Religions in source countries affect the composition of immigration 
to the United States. More numerically exempt females originate in 
countries that are heavily Catholic (see Table 6.2). Countries that are 
predominantly Catholic also are the sources of more highly skilled 
immigrants, particularly young males and females, as well as older 
females (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). Countries that are predominantly 
Muslim are the source of more highly skilled young males who enter 
the United States as numerically restricted (see Table 8.3).
Source-Country Social Programs
To determine the impact of various social programs on the volume 
and composition of immigration, it is necessary to ascertain the pro 
gram's net cost-benefit impact on the indigenous population. In terms 
of volume, the primary concern is with social program impacts on the 
young workers, who are otherwise more likely to migrate than other 
individuals. Thus, other things being equal, to the extent that young 
workers receive net benefits from a program, their propensity to migrate 
should be reduced, and the overall rate of migration should be lower. 
Unemployment insurance is an example of a program from which 
young workers are most likely to benefit and, as shown in Table 5.1, the 
existence of unemployment insurance systems in source countries sig 
nificantly reduces the rate of migration to the United States.
Compositional effects also should be determined by the extent to 
which a wealth transfer occurs as a result of a program's presence. The 
members of the indigenous population who receive net gains (losses) 
should be less (more) likely to migrate. For example, unemployment 
insurance affects primarily the economically active. Because men are 
more likely to be economically active than women, unemployment 
insurance should more directly reduce male migration, and shift immi-
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gration flows toward a relatively higher share of female migrants (see 
Table 6.1). Unemployment insurance also generally constitutes a 
transfer from individuals typically having lower unemployment rates to 
those having higher unemployment rates. Therefore, countries with 
unemployment insurance should show an effect of encouraging the 
flow of older individuals; the evidence concerning the effects of unem 
ployment insurance on age composition is particularly strong in the 
findings for female migrants (see Table 7.3). This result may suggest 
that the variation in unemployment rates across age classes is more 
pronounced for females than males.
Provident funds may affect migration by providing old-age benefits 
that are portable (often immediately available to those who perma 
nently emigrate). Thus, our finding that fewer older individuals migrate 
from countries having provident funds (see Table 7.2) may indicate that 
if potential migrants can take their pension benefits, they are more 
likely to migrate and reunite with their families at an earlier age. An 
added incentive may be that, if they did not emigrate, these individuals 
would have to wait longer before they receive their benefits at retire 
ment. The evidence also indicates that more numerically exempt 
females aged 20-34 migrate from these countries (see Table 7.4). Since 
these young females are most likely spouses of U.S. citizens, provident 
funds appear to facilitate their flow by providing relatively liquid assets 
that can be transferred internationally.
The availability of provident funds also tends to stimulate the flow 
of young male and female high-skilled workers (see Table 8.2), espe 
cially in the numerically restricted class (see Table 8.3). Here, provi 
dent funds may provide an opportunity to accumulate the assets 
necessary to cover the costs of relocation. Given the general nature of 
such funds (i.e., fixed percentage of earnings going into compulsory 
savings that is matched by employers), these savings will more quickly 
accumulate for the young high-skilled workers, who are more likely to 
migrate than low-skilled workers.
Employment-related old-age programs have the potential to result in 
a transfer of wealth from younger workers to older retired individuals, 
but the rate of migration does not appear to be affected by such pro 
grams (see Table 5.1), and therefore such transfers may not exist to the 
extent that is commonly believed. Employment-related old-age pro 
grams do affect the composition of immigrants, however, increasing
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the female share of restricted migrants (see Table 6.2). Moreover, these 
programs discourage (encourage) the flow of younger (older) male and 
female restricted migrants (see Table 7.3). These effects on composi 
tion are very similar to those found for programs that provide cash- 
sickness benefits to individuals unable to work. This similarity is per 
haps linked to the fact that, in these employment-related programs, the 
costs imposed on workers and the benefits received both tend to rise or 
fall in accordance with an individual's income level.
The empirical results support our view: whereas cash-sickness bene 
fits increase the flow of older high-skilled workers, employment- 
related old-age programs discourage the migration of younger high- 
skilled workers (see Table 8.2). With numerically exempt migrants, 
employment-related old-age programs have little effect on gender, age, 
or skill composition, but cash-sickness benefits affect the composi 
tional aspects of these migrants.
Universal old-age pension and universal sickness benefit programs 
are expected to transfer wealth from the younger, economically active 
population to the older inactive population. While neither of these 
programs significantly influences the overall immigration rate (see 
Table 5.1), each program is critical in terms of composition. Both 
programs increase the number of young, numerically restricted male 
and female migrants (see Table 7.3). Moreover, universal old-age pro 
grams increase the number of young male and female high-skilled 
migrants (see Table 8.2), and universal sickness programs increase the 
flow of highly skilled, numerically restricted female migrants (see 
Table 8.3). This impact on skill share is expected, since universal pro 
grams supported by taxes would be expected to fall disproportion 
ately on the high-skilled (high-income) workers.
Universal programs of family allowances for families with children 
are expected to transfer benefits to younger families, particularly those 
that have low-skilled (low-income) family heads or heads who are not 
economically active. The evidence provides support for our hypothesis 
in the sense that such programs encourage the migration of young 
high-skilled workers (see Table 8.1). Moreover, the age of female 
numerically restricted migrants is relatively older for migrants from 
countries with these programs (see Table 7.3). That the age effect is 
apparent primarily for females is probably because the program's ben 
efits are primarily family-related rather than employment-related.
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Other programs providing family-related benefits include maternity 
benefits, employment-related family allowances, and possibly pro 
grams providing medical benefits. In general, employment-related 
family allowance programs have little effect on either the volume or 
composition of immigrants, but maternity and medical programs 
increase the number of high-skilled female migrants (see Table 8.2). 
Given the nature of these benefits, we expected that the composition of 
females would be more influenced than that of males. While the evi 
dence concerning skill composition supports our hypotheses, the find 
ings relating to age composition do not. For instance, the reason or 
reasons that more young individuals, particularly young females (see 
Table 7.2), come from countries providing maternity benefits is not 
immediately clear.
General Comments
In general, the empirical results of this study are quite strong in 
terms of anticipated signs and significant coefficients, but in many 
equations specific variables do not perform as anticipated. Because 
much of the original research described above is new in terms of mod 
els and econometric procedures, we are not overly concerned with the 
surprises we have received. We hope that many of these issues will be 
addressed in future research and that concepts such as that of the mar 
ginal migrant will be further refined.
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE U.S. IMMIGRATION— 
U.S. POLICY
The importance of U.S. immigration policy is certainly reflected in 
our results. After the 1965 changes in U.S. immigration law were fully 
implemented, family reunification became the primary policy focus. 
One major aspect of family reunification is that immediate relatives 
(spouses, children, and parents) of U.S. citizens 21 years of age and 
older are exempt from numerical limits, but other relatives enter as 
restricted. Through 1991, at least 80 percent of the numerically 
restricted visas went to relatives. Of the remaining 20 percent, spouses
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and children of individuals who qualified under the occupational pref 
erences also counted against these preferences.
With all of the potential for family ties to play a role in admittances, 
we are not surprised to find that the more (naturalized) U.S. citizens 
who were born in country i, the greater the rate of migration from / to 
the United States (see Table 5.1). 3 Although the naturalization variable 
has a very strong influence in the immigration-rate equation, it plays 
only a limited role in shaping immigrant composition. Among the 
numerically restricted immigrants, the family ties proxied by the natu 
ralization variable increase young females and decrease older females 
(see Table 7.3). This is the expected pattern, because the restricted cat 
egory is inherently oriented toward younger persons more than the 
exempt category, which includes parents of U.S. citizens. Most effects 
of naturalization work through skill composition, but these effects are 
not dominant. Family connections to U.S. citizens reduce the skill 
level of young females (see Table 8.2). However, in general, while 
increasing the number of immigrants in any given year, the family-ties 
variable does not appear to greatly influence the composition of those 
entering. This is an important finding for policy purposes.
Between 1946 and 1994, programs such as the NP-5 program (for 
countries adversely affected by the 1965 immigration program) and the 
OP-1 program (for natives of underrepresented countries) added 
"irregular" immigrants to those admitted through the normal system. 
The NP-5 and OP-1 admittances are included in our lottery variable. 
The lottery program not only increased the rate of immigration, specif 
ically of numerically restricted immigrants (see Table 5.1), but it also 
skewed immigration toward males (see Table 6.1). Even after control 
ling for numerous forces that influence migration to the United States, 
the model reflects the favoring of males during episodes of irregular 
immigration. The lottery program increased the number of young 
migrants (but especially males), while decreasing the share of older 
migrants (see Table 7.2). This program also increased the skill compo 
sition of young male immigration (see Table 8.2). In general, then, the 
NP-5 and OP-1 programs reflected in the lottery variable favored 
young, highly skilled males.
Our model results indicate that Asia is the source of relatively many 
female immigrants to the United States, other factors held constant (see 
Table 6.1). This observation is especially true for exempt females (see
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Table 6.2) and for young females (see Table 7.2). It is also true for 
older exempt males. Moreover, relatively many highly skilled males 
and females, both young and old (but especially young males), origi 
nate in Asian countries. We have argued that with respect to females, 
the Asian dummy variable may reflect lower wage rates (relative to 
males) in Asian countries. Although we have no data reflecting wage 
differences by skill level, this variable could also reflect a lower wage 
gap between more and less highly skilled workers in Asian countries.
POLICY OPTIONS
To this point, we have discussed actual U.S. policy regarding immi 
grant admittances. However, many other policy options are open to 
U.S. lawmakers that, if implemented, would almost certainly influence 
the source-country, gender, age, and skill composition of U.S. immi 
gration. In this section, we discuss certain of these options and their 
implications.
Legal Immigration
The extreme positions with respect to legal immigration are to bar it 
altogether or to place no (or few) restrictions on it. The United States 
never has barred immigration completely, not even for a short period, 
and thus the first position does not appear to be likely. On the other 
hand, the United States has had periods during which few restrictions 
were imposed. Until 1882 (when the Chinese were barred), most indi 
viduals were free to enter the United States; until 1921, all were basi 
cally free to enter with the exception of the Chinese and persons from 
the Asian "barred zone." Although this open policy has proponents 
today, it too is unrealistic.
Some have proposed taxing immigrants, especially highly skilled 
and educated individuals who were trained at public expense in poor 
countries (and therefore presumably had their education expenses sub 
sidized), but such a policy would be seen as discriminatory in the 
United States. U.S. immigrants pay certain processing fees that are 
somewhat controversial in their own right. The idea of taxing immi-
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grants in general has not been well received in the United States, 
because many of the immigrants are poor and such taxes could be con 
siderable burdens. The U.S. Congress recently considered taxing the 
employers of certain highly trained and educated immigrants, but 
employer groups vehemently protested such a policy and its consider 
ation quickly ceased. Taxing employers would have the effect of 
reducing job opportunities for highly educated immigrants.
Most countries have settled on quotas as a means of controlling 
legal entry for permanent residence. The quotas may be fixed or flexi 
ble, and they frequently involve selection criteria, as with the U.S. pref 
erence categories, or the points systems used in Canada and Australia. 
Binding quotas also clearly impose costs on potential immigrants, who 
must wait for their number to come up, and thus quotas discourage 
migration or deflect it to other alternative destinations. Many countries 
have humanitarian concerns and establish separate quotas to accommo 
date refugees. Auctioning a fixed number of immigration permits to 
the highest bidders also has been proposed as a means of allocating 
U.S. entry visas, but such a policy option is highly unlikely to be 
adopted. However, visa allocations set aside for entrepreneurs and 
investors in countries like the United States and Canada provide a 
means of entry for those who possess considerable wealth.
Illegal Migration
The United States clearly has a problem with illegal immigration, 
but it is not the only country with such a problem. However, what sets 
the United States somewhat apart is that it is a high-income country 
with an extensive land border with Mexico, a relatively poor country 
where job prospects have not been good.
Guestworker programs are one option for dealing with illegal migra 
tion, but such programs in Western Europe and the United States 
(Bracero program) have proven to be as much a cause as a solution. 
After the programs are discontinued, employment demand remains, 
along with a plentiful supply of potential migrants, and the guestwork- 
ers have various ties to the host country that give them access to the 
employment opportunities. Currently, the United States maintains var 
ious nonimmigrant temporary worker programs to satisfy seasonal 
employment needs.
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For many years, the United States practiced a policy of benign 
neglect along its border with Mexico. Although many illegal aliens 
were apprehended for entering without documents, many made it 
through the border area where U.S. Border Patrol resources were con 
centrated. Significantly tightening the border required far more expen 
ditures than Congress was prepared to provide. U.S. employers and 
landowners were clear beneficiaries of the flow of illegal migrants, so 
their lobbies worked against the imposition of tighter controls. The 
consequence of the policy of benign neglect was that the estimated 
number of individuals residing illegally more or less permanently in 
the United States grew into the millions.
Congress responded with the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986 (IRCA), which provided for the eventual legalization of about 
2.7 million persons. IRCA also provided for fines against employers 
who knowingly hired illegal migrants, but employer fines were not dif 
ficult to avoid and were not sufficiently high to be effective. Presently, 
an estimated 5.0 million illegal aliens reside in the United States, 
approximately 2.0 percent of the nation's population.
The United States currently is pursuing two types of policies that 
may affect the flows of both legal and illegal migrants. In the short 
run, welfare reform legislation that bars illegal aliens (as well as cer 
tain legal aliens) from using various federal public service programs 
may affect the flows. However, Mexicans appear to enter the United 
States for jobs and higher wages, and they do not appear to be particu 
larly heavy users of welfare programs when they enter or for some 
years thereafter. Thus, this legislation may not be especially helpful in 
discouraging illegal migration from Mexico.
Although the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was 
not passed to discourage illegal migration, in the long run it could have 
such an effect. In the short run, it may cause even more illegal migra 
tion from Mexico (Martin 1993), because much illegal migration origi 
nates in rural Mexico, where agricultural practices are frequently 
primitive. The agricultural sector of Mexico will be hard-hit by com 
petition engendered by NAFTA, which will release even more labor 
from rural Mexico. Several years may be required for the Mexican 
economy to feel the positive impacts of NAFTA and thus for NAFTA 
to discourage migration to the United States.
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Finally, individuals born in the United States, even to illegal alien 
mothers, are U.S. citizens. This fact may provide an incentive for mi 
gration to the United States. Congress is considering various changes 
in citizenship requirements.
Compositional Consequences of U.S. and Canadian Policies
The United States and Canada are two of the world's major immi 
grant-receiving nations. Their immigration histories are similar: each 
experienced "mass" immigration during the laissez-faire period of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; each was populated 
mainly by persons of European ancestry; and, until the 1960s, each had 
exclusionary policies against persons of Asian ancestry. When they 
opened their doors to Asian immigrants at about the same time, migra 
tion from Asia soon displaced that from Europe as a major source for 
each country. However, while the United States maintained a policy 
oriented toward family reunification, Canada adopted a policy that 
stressed domestic economic conditions and the likelihood that the 
immigrant would assimilate into the Canadian economy and society.
Historically, immigration has played a relatively far more important 
role in Canada than in the United States. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
when legal U.S. immigration was attracting little attention from policy- 
makers or the public, Canadian immigration accounted for 9.8 and 7.1 
persons per 100 population, respectively; corresponding figures for the 
United States are 1.5 and 1.7. During the 1970s and 1980s, when the 
Canadian figures were 6.3 and 5.2, U.S. immigration amounted to 2.1 
and 3.1 persons per 100, respectively.
Although the Immigration Act of 1990 has moved the United States 
toward slightly more emphasis on employment considerations, U.S. 
entry requirements remain strongly oriented toward family ties. In 
1993, 63.9 percent of the legal immigrants who entered the United 
States did so based on family relationships, and only 5.9 percent (of 
nonlegalizations) entered as a result of the skills or education they pos 
sessed. However, in spite of its points program and the selective nature 
of its admittance system, in 1993 Canada accepted 62.4 percent of its 
immigrants based on family ties, almost the same percentage as the 
United States.
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Tables 9.2 and 9.3 provide comparative details on U.S. and Cana 
dian immigrants. The Canadian system recognizes the importance of 
age and gives points to prospective immigrants based on age. In spite 
of its preferences, Canada attracts only a slightly higher percentage of 
persons 20 to 39 years old (48.9 percent of all immigrants during 
1981-1993) than the United States (47.0 percent) (Table 9.2). 
Although the percentage of immigrants of age 50 and over has been 
trending up for the United States and down for Canada, for the entire 
period the percentages are similar (13.0 percent for the United States, 
14.1 percent for Canada).
Because human capital accumulates with increased age (i.e., experi 
ence), age and skills are somewhat correlated. The Canadian admit 
tance system appears to allow for more selectivity on account of skills 
than does the U.S. system. However, over the 1982-1993 period (and 
excluding IRCA legalizations from the U.S. data) the percentage of 
each country's immigrants who were presumably highly skilled (pro 
fessional, technical, and kindred workers, as well as managers and pro 
prietors) differed very little (11.2 percent for the United States and 10.4 
percent for Canada). With the new U.S. law in effect during 1992 and 
1993, the U.S. data show a slight upward break in the series (Table 9.3).
Thus, in spite of having admittance programs that on their surface 
appear considerably different, and in spite of having a somewhat dif 
ferent source-country composition of their immigrants, the United 
States and Canada have remarkably similar immigrant composition in 
broad terms.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
Aspects of the New Law
Effective October 1, 1991, U.S. immigration law changed consider 
ably. These changes were the result of the Immigration Act of 1990 
which, while retaining the basic principles of earlier legislation, pro 
vided the most comprehensive change in legal immigration since 1965. 
Our data relate to the old law, but this change does not negate nor 
reduce in any important way the relevance of the U.S. data we have
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1 Does not include legalizations under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.
Table 9.3 Percentage of U.S. and Canadian Immigrants 











































1 Refers to professional, technical, and kindred workers and managers 
and proprietors. U.S. figures exclude IRCA legalizations.
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analyzed, because the new law has so many similarities to the earlier 
law.
Several changes made by the 1990 act are of particular relevance. 
Under the previous law, the annual allocation of numerically restricted 
visas was only 270,000. The 1990 act established a "flexible" world 
wide cap on family-based, employment-based, and diversity immigrant 
visas. Beginning in fiscal year 1995 (after a "transition" period during 
which the annual quota was set at 700,000), the worldwide limit is 
675,000. Separate ceilings are set for each of the immigrant catego 
ries: for diversity visas, 55,000; for employment-based visas, 140,000; 
and for family-sponsored visas, 480,000. While immediate relatives of 
U.S. citizens remain exempt from numerical limitations, the number of 
spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens are subtracted 
from the overall numbers available for family sponsorship. However, 
under no circumstances can the number of numerically restricted fam 
ily-sponsored visas be less than 226,000. Therefore, if the number of 
immediate relatives of U.S. citizens exceeds 254,000 (i.e , 480,000- 
226,000), the flexible worldwide cap of 675,000 may be pierced.
In addition to setting a higher overall limit on admissions, the 1990 
act altered per-country limitations; previously, the per-country quota 
was 20,000 visas per year. The 1990 act provides that family-based 
and employment-based visas made available to citizens of a single 
independent foreign state may not exceed 7 percent of the total avail 
able. Given the minimum of 226,000 family-sponsored and 140,000 
employment-based allocations, the per-country ceiling for an indepen 
dent country is thus raised to 25,620. Additional flexibility is provided 
by the fact that the 7 percent limit is not subdivided between family- 
sponsored and employment-based allocations.
In many respects the new law concerning family-based immigrants 
is similar to the previous law. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens 
remain exempt from numerical limitation. Moreover, the annual floor 
of 226,000 numerically restricted family-sponsored visas is a relatively 
small increase over the 216,000 available under the previous law's 
family-related preference categories. However, the new law's provi 
sions should alter the mix of immigrants within the family-sponsored 
categories. The major change involves spouses, minor children, and 
unmarried adult children of permanent resident aliens (i.e., second 
preference). For these immigrants, the new law increases the allotment
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from 70,200 to at least 114,200. Moreover, at least 77 percent of these 
visas are designated for spouses and minor children of permanent resi 
dent aliens, and three-quarters of these are not subject to per-country 
limits. The other family-based categories (i.e., first, fourth, and fifth 
preference) either had their allocation remain essentially unchanged 
(i.e., fifth) or reduced by the new law.
The new law also accommodates more skill-based immigrants, and 
it provides for more source-country diversity. Prior to the 1990 act, 
54,000 visas were available for occupation-based immigrants. The 
new law allows up to 140,000 employment-based visas and also places 
more emphasis on skilled migrants within this category. The so-called 
"diversity" immigration allocations, made available for the first time 
by the 1990 act, are designed to facilitate the entry of potential 
migrants from countries adversely affected by the 1965 law. Effective 
in 1995, the diversity quota is 55,000 visas to be allocated to natives of 
countries that have sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the United 
States over the previous five years. No single country may receive 
more than 7 percent (3,850) of the total. To be eligible for a diversity 
visa, a prospective immigrant must have at least a high school educa 
tion or its equivalent and at least two years of work experience in an 
occupation that requires at least two years of training or experience. 
Diversity immigrants are therefore a kind of occupational immigrant.
Immigration under the New Law
The present study relies on data that relate to immigration under the 
1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Data relat 
ing to present legislation are now available for five years (FY 1992, FY 
1993, FY 1994, FY 1995, FY 1996), and the recent data are informative.
Table 9.4 bridges immigration under the old law and immigration 
under the Immigration Act of 1990. Data in this table are averages for 
1990 and 1991 (the last years of the old law), 1992-1994 (the three 
transition years of the new law), and 1995 and 1996 (the first two years 
during which the more or less permanent cap and quota numbers were 
in effect). Between 1990-1991 and 1995-1996, family-based immi 
gration increased by 16.9 percent to 528,551 and employment-based 
immigration increased by 72.3 percent to 101,418. Immigration not 
subject to the numerical cap fell by 7.7 percent, and in 1995-1996
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accounted for 16.3 percent of total immigration, compared with 21.1 
percent in 1990-1991.
Between 1990-1991 and 1995-1996, immigration subject to the 
numerical cap increased 27.0 percent and 29.4 percent of this increase 
was due to employment-based immigrants. Between 1992 and 1996, 
employment-based immigration accounted for 17.3 percent of total 
immigration under the cap. During 1990-1991, employment-based 
immigration accounted for only 11.0 percent of the cap total; thus the 
Immigration Act of 1990 clearly has had the effect of boosting employ 
ment-related immigration, which was one of its major objectives. 
However, professionals with an advanced degree or with advanced 
ability declined steadily after the first year that the new law was in 
effect: 58,401 in 1992, 29,468 in 1993, 14,432 in 1994, and 10,475 in 
1995 (an exception was in 1996, at 18,462). This pattern suggests a 
pent-up demand for entry by such individuals that was relieved by the 
Immigration Act of 1990.
Sorensen et al. (1992) point out that the percentage of employment- 
based visas received by professionals declined from 50 percent in 1976 
to 30 percent in 1988. Moreover, during the same period, the percent 
age of sixth-preference principals who were certified to work in service 
jobs increased from 20 to 45. These authors argue that these trends 
were important factors in the decision of Congress to cap unskilled 
workers at 10,000 in the Immigration Act of 1990. In turn, this cap has 
the potential to shift the composition of employment-related visas 
toward more highly skilled occupations.
Table 9.5 also bridges the old and new laws, but it provides occupa 
tional detail for persons 16 to 64 years of age. Consistent with Table 
9.4, Table 9.5 shows that executive (and especially professional) 
immigration increased. However, Table 9.5 shows not only that blue- 
collar workers increased, but also that they increased as a percentage 
of the total (from 14.3 percent during 1990-1991 to 15.4 percent dur 
ing 1994). Professional and executive white-collar workers as a per 
centage of the total increased only slightly during this period (from 
15.0 percent to 16.0 percent).
Table 9.4 Average Immigrant Admissions by Major Category, FYs 1990-19963
Category of Admission
Total
Not subject to the numerical cap (NX)b
Refugees and those seeking asylum
Other
Subject to the numerical cap
Family-based immigrants
Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (NX)
Spouses and children
Parents
Children born abroad to alien residents (NX)
Family-sponsored immigrants
Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens
Spouses and children of LPRsc
Married sons/daughters of U.S. citizens





























































Professionals w/ adv. deg. or of adv. ability
Skilled, professionals, other workers (CSPA)
Special immigrants
Investors
Professionals or highly skilled (old 3rd)
Needed skilled or unskilled workers (old 6th)
Diversity programs
Diversity transition (NR)
Nationals of adversely affected countries (NR)































SOURCE: For 1990-1994, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1995), Chart 1; for 1995-1996, U.S. Immigration and Naturaliz
tion Service (1997), Tables 4 and 5.
a Excludes persons granted legal permanent resident status under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. 
b NX = numerically exempt. 
c LPR = legal permanent resident. 
d X = not applicable. 
e NR = numerically restricted. 
f CSPA = Chinese Student Protection Act.
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SOURCE: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (1995), Chart 4. 
Implications for Immigration under the Act of 1990
Several factors should be kept in mind when applying our data and 
findings to the situation under the new law. First, immediate relatives 
of U.S. citizens remain exempt from numerical restriction, and thus our 
findings concerning numerically exempt immigrants should remain rel 
evant. For instance, relative differential economic opportunities will 
be particularly important in shaping the age composition of exempt 
migrants. On the other hand, the new law does have an immediate 
impact on the number of numerically restricted immigrants. Given the 
new "flexible" cap, the number of restricted immigrants has risen. 
Therefore, at least in the near term, the share of total U.S. immigrants 
who are subject to numerical restriction will be relatively larger than in 
our sample. Because our findings suggest that the composition of
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numerically restricted immigrants is more sensitive to the availability 
of social programs than is true of exempt migrants, one implication is 
that such programs will play more prominent roles in determining the 
overall composition of U.S. immigrants under the new law. For 
instance, trends toward universal program coverage will tend to reduce 
the age and increase the skill level of U.S. immigrants. 4 Moreover, as 
employment-related programs such as unemployment insurance and 
cash-sickness benefits become more available worldwide and as old- 
age pension programs become more of the social insurance variety and 
less in the form of provident funds, U.S. immigrants will tend to 
become older. 5 Another implication is that, if source-country social 
program availability is more crucial in determining migration deci 
sions, the use of U.S. social programs by those who come to the United 
States also may be affected. In other words, immigrants under the new 
law may be more inclined to use U.S. benefits such as unemployment 
insurance and sickness benefits.
Certain other features of the new law also may have a more direct 
influence on the composition of immigrants. For instance, increasing 
the allocation of numerically restricted visas should lower the wait 
time in the backlog of immigrant visa applications; consequently, the 
average age of migrants may be lowered. This effect may be only short 
term, however, as the shorter wait time may have the unintended effect 
of increasing the number of visa applications.
In addition to increasing the number of numerically restricted visas, 
the new law alters the mix of visas allocated to specific subgroups 
within the numerically restricted class. The subgroups most positively 
affected will be employment-based immigrants and the spouses and 
minor children of permanent resident aliens. Additional provisions 
relating to employment-based visas should increase the relative skill 
level of these employment-based immigrants. Using our data, the 
understanding of the various forces that will influence the composition 
of employment-based immigrants under the new law would require a 
close examination of those immigrants who enter the United States 
under the previous law's third and sixth preference categories (with, 
perhaps, the third preference entrants receiving a larger weight than 
those who enter under the sixth preference). For numerically restricted 
family-sponsored immigrants, the application of our data to the new 
law also requires a more detailed examination of the individual prefer-
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ence categories (where, for instance, the second preference category 
should be separated out for analysis that is distinct from the first, 
fourth, and fifth preference categories).
Given our analysis, the incorporation of diversity visas should be 
fairly easy, in the sense that the analysis could be refocused to provide 
a separate study of a sample that includes only those nations that would 
qualify for the diversity visas. A comparison of our findings with the 
findings for this group easily could be made, thus revealing any change 
in importance of the factors that influence the composition of U.S. 
immigration. However, for understanding the composition of total 
immigrants under the new law, the comparison to the old law is more 
complicated than simply accounting for the additional 55,000 diversity 
visas. While certain countries will likely benefit from the availability 
of diversity visas, this benefit is somewhat limited because any single 
nation is restricted to 3,850 of these visas.
Certain features of the new law will provide potentially even more 
benefit to previously oversubscribed nations. For instance, the new law 
provides for a larger per-country quota of 25,620, or an increase of 
5,620 over the previous law's quota. Moreover, the number of visas 
made available for spouses and minor children of permanent resident 
aliens is substantially increased, and three-quarters of these are not 
subject to the per-country limits. The removal of the per-country limit 
was intended to address the increasing backlog of visa applications. 
Thus, countries that sent large numbers of immigrants under the old 
law should substantially benefit from these relaxations, and, to the 
extent that they do, the attempt to diversify the source-country mix of 
U.S. immigrants will be mitigated.
Rolph (1992, p.32) noted that the legalization program, as well as 
the lotteries of the late 1980s, "established a strong precedent for pro 
grams that provide for entry outside of the worldwide ceiling." She 
also argues that political forces, including immigrant advocacy groups, 
the business community, and even states themselves (to gain additional 
revenue-sharing funds), tend to work in favor of expanding immigra 
tion. Although Congress stressed that the legalization program was a 
one-time occurrence, Rolph's arguments suggest that other such pro 
grams indeed may occur again. We noted above that "irregular" immi 
gration tends to be strongly male-dominated. If future special
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opportunities were to operate like those of the late 1980s, we anticipate 
that they too would be gender-biased in favor of males.
The empirical results of this study indicate that social programs in 
source countries influence decisions regarding immigration to the 
United States. Even if immigrants do not use U.S. social programs in 
greater proportion than native-born persons, they still use social pro 
grams such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI). In August 1996, 
President Clinton signed a welfare reform bill that restricts the welfare 
usage of legal immigrants in the-United States. Such a program could 
influence not only the volume of U.S. immigration, but also its compo 
sition (especially the age composition).
The Immigration Act of 1990 provided for somewhat higher annual 
levels of legal immigration, but due to the substantial backlog of immi 
grant visa requests, the quota ceilings of the 1990 act have been met 
(except in 1995) and promise to continue to be met. As has occurred 
previously in world and U.S. history, immigrants have been singled out 
by many native residents (whether in part rightly or, more frequently, 
wrongly) as an important source of domestic "problems" such as high 
crime rates, high unemployment rates (for some), increased welfare 
utilization, an increased gap between the wages of the most highly edu 
cated and the least highly educated, and many more. Whatever the 
economic and social effects of immigration, they are closely tied to the 
demographic and economic composition of the immigrants them 
selves. As a consequence of substantial levels of annual immigration 
that promise to continue well into the future, many of the issues con 
cerning immigrant composition raised in this monograph will remain 
before the American people for years to come.
Notes
1. Since much of the migration from Mexico consists of persons in the "other" skill 
category, this conclusion may be somewhat questionable without further disaggre- 
gation of the "other" group.
2. In the immigration-rate regressions, the coefficient most affected by the inclusion 
of the social program variables is that on the English-language variable, which 
loses significance in their presence. This result suggests that systematic differ 
ences exist in social program availability in English and in non-English speaking 
countries.
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3. Not only are the legal ties themselves improtant, but religious, social, and infor 
mational ties also play a role in the naturalization variable. U.S. immigration 
grew dramatically, from 384,685 in 1972 to 704,005 in 1991, not counting
I,123,162 persons legalized under IRCA. Different immigrant groups have dif 
ferent propensities to naturalize. For example, of the 1982 immigrant cohort, only
II.9 percent of those from Mexico had naturalized through fiscal year 1993 (U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 1996', p. 133). On the other hand, by 
1993, 68.3 percent of the 1982 cohort from Taiwan and 60.2 percent of that from 
the Philippines had naturalized. Overall, 37.6 percent of the 1982 cohort had nat 
uralized by 1992. For those countries of birth like Mexico for which naturaliza 
tion propensities are low, the potential exists for naturalizations to occur, thus 
forming additional qualifying relationships with U.S. citizens and opening the 
door to more exempt and restricted immigration in the future. Thus, in the wake 
of California's Proposition 187, which denied access of illegal aliens and their 
children to certain social services and public education, an increase occurred in 
naturalizations of persons born in Mexico. Thus, the link to U.S. citizens provides 
an on-going and perhaps cumulative effect of migration that certain scholars refer 
to as the "immigration multiplier." Indeed, various scholars argue that the exempt 
category of immigration has resulted in a lower skill level of U.S. immigrants.
Sorensen et al. (1992) examined immigrant categories and occupational out 
comes of U.S. immigrants. Their main finding was that immigrants who enter 
under an employment preference earn more than those who enter under a fmaily 
preference and are also more likely to be employed as PTK workers and managers 
than their family-presence counterparts. Their work bears only indirectly on the 
exempt versus restricted debate, but is relevant nonetheless.
4. Each univeral program studied here became more common over the 1972-1991 
period: 1) for old-age programs, an increase from 13 to 15 countries; 2) for sick 
ness programs, an increase from 10 to 14; and 3) for family allowance programs, 
an increase from 11 to 15.
5. Between 1972 and 1991, unemployment insurance became slightly more common 
in our 60-country sample (from 26 to 28 countries), cash sickness benefits 
remained the same (44 countries), and provident fund old-age programs became 
more common (from 7 to 9).
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Table Al Coefficients of Multiple Determination (R2) in Gender
































































































































































































































































































































a A dash indicates too few observations to estimate. Observations with missing data
were dropped for these countries/years, 





Rate of migration from 
country / to U.S.A.
Definition
The rate of U.S. immigration from country i 
during year t, where the rate is defined as 
the ratio of total immigration from i during 
t to the population of i during t; in econo 
metric discussions, this variable is referred 
to as mit.
Independent variables
1. Differential economic opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
% Female in labor force
Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 
country i during year t relative to a compa 
rable measure for the U.S.A. during t, mea 
sured in U.S. dollars (IMF, International 
Financial Statistics: Yearbook).
The rate of growth of GDP in / measured in 
constant prices and averaged over the previ 
ous three years relative to a comparable 
measure for the U.S.A. (IMF, International 
Financial Statistics: Yearbook).
Country f s central government revenues in 
year t, expressed as a percentage of GDP 
during t (IMF, International Financial Sta 
tistics: Yearbook).
The percentage of country fs population 
that resides in an urban area (UN, Demo 
graphic Yearbook).
Female labor force as a percentage of coun 











Estimated airline mileage from the principal 
city of country / to the nearest major U.S. 
city (John S. Swift Co., Inc., no date).
Country f s crude birth rate in year t (UN, 
Demographic Yearbook).
The number of U.S. military personnel and 
civilian military employees in country / dur 
ing f, expressed relative to f s total popula 
tion in t (U.S. Department of Defense, 
Selected Manpower Statistics).
The number of students at the third level of 
education in / expressed as a fraction of f s 
total population (UNESCO, Statistical 
Yearbook}.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i's 
official United Nations language is English, 
and otherwise equal to zero (Greenfield 
1992).
The number of persons born in country i who 
attended a U.S. university during t as a pro 
portion of /'s total population (UNESCO, 
Statistical Yearbook).




An index of political rights ranging from 1.0 
for countries with a fully competitive elec 
toral process to 7.0, indicating least free 
(Gastil 1987).
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country f s 
primary religion is Catholic (i.e., at least 50 
percent of population is Catholic) and other 
wise equal to zero (World Almanac).
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country z's 
primary religion is Muslim (i.e., at least 50
217









percent of population is Muslim) and other 
wise equal to zero (World Almanac).
The number of naturalizations to U.S. citi 
zenship of persons born in country i, 
summed over year t and the prior four years, 
and expressed relative to the population of i 
during t (U.S. INS, Annual Reports and Sta 
tistical Yearbooks).
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country fs 
number of NP-5 (OP-1) admittances is 
greater than 5 percent of the number of nu 
merically restricted (numerically exempt 
for OP-1) immigrants for year t who were 
born in /, and otherwise equal to zero (INS 
files).
A dummy variable that reflects significant 
admissions from country i (Mexico) in year 
t under the Silva program; equal to 1 for 
Mexico for 1978 and 1981, and otherwise 
equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i is 
in the Western Hemisphere and t is 1972, 
1973, 1974, 1975, or 1976, and otherwise 
equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i is 
in Asia (except Israel), and otherwise equal 
to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in 
year t had an old-age pension program that 
was universally available for all residents or 
resident citizens, and otherwise equal to ze 
ro.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in 
year t had an old-age social insurance pro-
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Provident fund old-age








gram available for wage earners, salaried 
employees, and/or employed persons, and 
otherwise equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in 
year t had an old-age provident fund system, 
and otherwise equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country / in 
year t had an old-age program and the old- 
age pension was not payable abroad or was 
payable abroad only under "limited condi 
tions."
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in 
year t had a universal medical benefits pro 
gram, and otherwise equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country / in 
year t paid cash sickness benefits when 
short-term illnesses prevented the insured 
from going to work, and otherwise equal to 
zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if for country 
i in year t provided maternity benefits, and 
otherwise equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in 
year t provided health care, hospital, and 
pharmaceutical benefits, and otherwise 
equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in 
year t had an unemployment insurance pro 
gram, and otherwise equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country / in 
year t had a family allowance program that 
provided universal benefits to residents 
with children, and otherwise equal to zero.
A dummy variable equal to 1 if country i in 
year t had an employment-related family al 





Sex ratio in i's population
Median age in i 
% No occupation
Total U.S. immigration from /
A total population of country / during year t.
A ratio of males to females in the population 
of i during year t.
A median age of the population of i during t.
A percentage of a given gender, age, and en 
try class of immigrants from / that reported 
no occupation when entering the United 
States in year t.
Control total for a given model, or the num 





The use of panel data presents many potential econometric problems, but it 
also provides valuable econometric opportunities. Here we discuss a number 
of issues pertinent to the estimation of models based on panel data. 1 As de 
scribed in Chapter 4, the panels used in this study are immigrant countries of 
birth, which are followed annually through time from 1972 to 1991. We have 
full information on the independent variables in our models for 60 countries. 
The appendix concludes with tables comparing various estimators that are de 
scribed below. We settled on the use of Hausman-Taylor estimators; these es 
timators were employed in all regressions that appear in Chapters 5,6,7, and 8.
We retain in this section the notation m,,, representing the migration from 
the Ith country during period t, but we partition the set of explanatory variables 
into two groups that cut across the various vectors. In the discussion below, we 
pay particular attention to the econometric treatment of the time-invariant vari 
ables of the model (distance from country i to the United States, whether coun 
try i is English speaking or not [a dummy variable], and three additional 
dummy variables that indicate whether country i is in Asia, is predominately 
Catholic, or is predominately Muslim). Let Vit = [Jt'.Jz1 .] where xit is a 
K x 1 vector of variables that measures characteristics of country i in period t, 
and z, is a G x 1 vector of time-invariant variables. The model of migration, 
then, is
Eq. Cl mit = cc. + 8, + $xit + yz,- + £,-,, /=!,... ,60;r = 1,... ,20,
where the f3 and y are vectors of unknown parameters, eit is a random distur 
bance, and the a, and 5, are unobserved country-specific and time-specific vari 
ables, respectively.
The eit are assumed to have zero mean and to be independent across coun 
tries. They may be correlated over time according to a first-order autoregres- 
sive process (Berndt and Savin 1975). Note that the model allows different 
cross-sectional and time-specific intercepts. Various assumptions about these 
are dealt with in the estimation procedures discussed below.
Equation Cl is a straightforward example of a cross section-time series data 
model (Kmenta 1986), apart from the additional consideration that some exog 
enous variables do not vary in the time dimension. In the ideal case, Eq. Cl is
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true for all / and t, that part of migration unaffected by measured covariates 
does not vary over time or country, and the eit are white noise. That is, no mis- 
specification of the form of the migration equation exists, either with respect to 
functional form of the variables or the choice of factors that are thought to in 
fluence migration. Migration corrected for the influence of the covariates is the 
same in each country and for each period (i.e., only one constant is in the mod 
el), and the errors are homoskedastic over country and time and are uncorrelat- 
ed with one another. In this case, the 20 observations for each of the 60 
countries may be "stacked" and linear regression applied to the entire 1,200 ob 
servations. Nothing is learned from the time series-cross section organization 
of the data, and nothing disrupts the optimality of linear regression.
The above case is "ideal" only in the sense that no econometric complica 
tions are evident. That such a simple representation of reality could capture the 
complex migration process is unlikely, however. For example, immigration of 
a given class of migrants could be different for different countries and for dif 
ferent time periods and variables potentially correlated with the time or country 
effects may be omitted or poorly measured. Part of the advantage of panel data 
is that it is possible to control for effects unique to time periods or to countries, 
since repeated observations over time and countries are available.
Time- and Country-Specific Effects
It would seem wise to allow for the possibility that the 8, of Eq. Cl are in 
deed different for different time periods (vary with /)• This can be done by 
specifying a model where the time-specific effects are assumed to be either ran 
dom or fixed.
If it is assumed that the individual time effects are drawings from a normal 
distribution and that they are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the 
model (i.e., they are random), the effects may be absorbed into the error term, 
leaving the deterministic part of the equation unchanged, and the random ef 
fects model fitted. The force of such an assumption is that the new vector of 
disturbances (which now includes the random time effects) no longer has a sca 
lar covariance matrix. The reason is that the random time effect does not 
change for a particular period across countries. Therefore stacking the obser 
vations and using linear regression is no longer optimal, and a generalized least 
squares estimator must be fit to the data.
It may not be reasonable to assume that the individual time effects are un 
correlated with the explanatory variables. If this is the case, fitting the random 
effects model will produce biased estimates. For example, suppose that gov 
ernment revenues as a percent of GDP have no real effect on the migration of 
a given class of immigrants. If migration of this group has increased over time
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and government revenues as a percent of GDP have similarly risen, then as 
suming a random effects model would attribute to the government revenues 
variable the effect of the drift over time in the migration of that class. An al 
ternative to the random effects model that alleviates this problem is the fixed 
effects model, where the data are augmented to include a constant for each pe 
riod. To estimate this model, Eq. Cl may be represented in group mean-devi 
ated form: Let mit = m it - mit and xit = x it - xt . The new regression is
Eq. C2 mit = a,.* + pi,., + yz t* + e it i = 1,.... 60; /= 1,.... 20,
where z* = Zi~z and a( * = a, - a have zero mean, and e- r is defined anal 
ogously to mit and xit . If desired, the time-specific means may be recovered 
after estimation.
A similar situation occurs with respect to the country-specific effects. That 
is, suppose that the migration of various immigrant groups across countries is 
different for reasons that are not attributable to measurable variables. Then the 
country-specific constants, a,*, must be considered in estimating the parame 
ters of the model. This can be done as discussed above for random time effects. 
It could be assumed that the a,* are random variables uncorrelated with the oth 
er variables in the model, and the random effects model fit. But there are sev 
eral reasons to question the assumption that the a,-* are uncorrelated with other 
variables in the model, especially the time-invariant variables. For example, 
more distant countries may have lower levels of migration in every period. In 
that case, the coefficient of the distance variable would be biased if the model 
were estimated under the random effects assumption. A second possibility in 
volves misspecification of the time-invariant variables. Exactly which vari 
ables are relevant to the migration decision? This is difficult for economic 
theory to predict. The possibility exists that some important variable will be 
omitted.. If this is the case, and these omitted variables are correlated with the 
country-specific effects, then the random effects model will again produce bi 
ased parameter estimates.
To examine the fixed country effects model, we may proceed analogously 
to the case of fixed time effects. Assuming the a,* are fixed given the values 
in the sample, Eq. C2 is averaged over time, producing
Eq. C3 m = a,-* + pi (. + YZ,* + e/ i=l, ...,60, 
and subtracted from Eq. C2 to produce
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Eq. C4 mit = mit -mi = ^xit + Eit , i = 1,. . ., 60; t = 1,..., 20,
where xit and £it are defined analogously to mit . This regression produces 
unbiased parameter estimates of p\ since the country-specific constants have 
been eliminated. These estimates, PW , are reported for a single immigrant 
class in Table Cl in the column headed "Within." Because only the within- 
time variation in the data is utilized, identification of the coefficients in the vec 
tor y is lost. Note that the term involving y and z has disappeared in Eq. C4. 
This situation did not occur when considering time-specific effects since no 
country-invariant variable is in the data.
To recapitulate, the existence of a panel of data on migration behavior al 
lows controlling for time-specific and country-specific effects. These effects 
may be treated in a parallel manner, with either the random or the fixed effects 
model. The fixed effects model requires fewer assumptions than the random 
effects model, so that it is the model of choice for the time dimension. How 
ever, when the same model is applied to the country dimension, some parame 
ter estimates are lost. Thus, the fixed effects model cannot be fit in this case. 2 
For the random effects model to produce consistent estimates requires the as 
sumption of no correlation between the random effects and the explanatory 
variables. Since it is unlikely that this condition will be true in the data, an al 
ternative technique, that of instrumental variables, is proposed.
If this white noise assumption concerning the random time effects is not 
made a priori, then the within estimates of (5 may be retained and the coeffi 
cient estimates of y recovered by an instrumental variables (IV) approach of 
Hausman and Taylor (1981). 3 Conventional IV estimation is often plagued by 
the problem of finding convincing instruments for the endogenous variables. 
This is a problem because usually no reason is evident to exclude from the 
model any variables correlated with m and jc, given the imprecise nature of 
economic models and data. This is not the case here, however, due to the 
structure of the data and the nature of the variables for which instruments are 
needed. The data have two dimensions: a cross-sectional dimension (coun 
tries) and a time dimension (years). The variables that need instruments vary 
only in the former dimension. Hence, if it can be assumed that some of the 
variables in x are uncorrelated with the a,, then they may be used in two ways 
because of their variation across both country and time: 1) using deviations 
from country means, they produce unbiased estimates of the (3's (Eq. C4), and 
2) using the country means themselves, they serve to identify the endogenous 
variables in z. Therefore, the instruments are already "in" the model, elimi 
nating the objection to IV estimation mentioned above.
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To calculate the IV estimates of 7, partition x and z so that x = (x 1 jc 2 ) and 
z = (z jIZ2 ), where it is assumed that the k } elements of *, and the g, elements 
of Zi are uncorrelated with the country effects, whereas this is not true for the 
k2 x 1 and g2 x 1 (respectively) vectors x2 and z2 - 4 First, $wxit is subtracted 
from both sides of Eq. C2 to produce
Eq. C5 mit - $wx it = a.* + yz/* + eit
where Eit is now to be interpreted as e. it + (P - Pw)*j f • Then, the left side of 
Eq. C5, is averaged over t, and the variables in z2 are regressed on z, and the 
time-averaged variables in *,. This procedure gives consistent estimates of y 
regardless of the endogeneity of the a,-.
Although these estimates are consistent, they are not fully efficient, since 
the covariance structure of the random term, ct ( * + ejr , has been ignored. This 
omission is the same as ignoring the random effects in the random effects mod 
el and simply fitting least squares to the data, as discussed at the beginning of 
this section. To produce fully efficient estimates, the components of the dis 
turbance variance must first be estimated. This is possible, since (3 is consis 
tently estimated from the within regression and y is consistently estimated from 
the IV regression. With these estimates in hand, m, or, and the instruments for 
z may be transformed and generalized least squares performed. This will pro 
duce consistent, efficient estimates of all parameters under any hypothesis re 
garding correlation. Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable estimates are 
reported in the fourth column of Table Cl; the corresponding /-statistics are in 
Table C2.
Notes
1. We are grateful to Donald Waldman for this section, which mainly is drawn from 
Greenwood, McDowell, and Waldman (1996).
2. The intercountry variation may also be utilized by noticing that Eq. C3 contains 
all the parameters of the original model. A random effects estimation of this 
equation is known as the "Between" estimator. However, as with the least squares 
and generalized least squares estimators and unlike the Within estimator, Between 
estimators are consistent only if the time effects are white noise.
3. For related work, see Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986), and Breusch, Mizon, and 
Schmidt(1989).
4. The method of partitioning variables into those potentially correlated with unob 
served country-specific effects and those that are exogenous is discussed in Chap 
ter 5 under "Empirical Findings."
Table Cl Alternative Estimates of the Rate of U.S. Immigration, 1972-199P
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income (x\)
Relative growth of GDP (xj)
Government revenues (x2)
% Urban (x{)
% Female in labor force (x2)
Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A. (zj)
Birth rate (x2)
U.S. military presence (x2)
Education (jc2)
English language (z2)
U.S. college students (x2)
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Per capita naturalizations (jc2)
Lottery visas (jq)
Silva visas (x\)
Western Hemisphere 1972-76 (jcj)
Asia(zj)
Control






























a *** indicates t > 1.96; ** indicates 1.67 < t < 1.96; * indicates 1.29 < t < 1.67. Table C2 reports the 
corresponding f-statistics.
Table C2 Alternative Estimates of the Rate of U.S. Immigration, 1972-1991: /-Statistics
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income (xj)
Relative growth of GDP (x])
Government revenues (x2)
% Urban (x,)
% Female in labor force (jc2)
Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A. (z\)
Birth rate (x2)
U.S. military presence (x2)
Education (x2)
English language (z2)
U.S. college students (jc2)







































































Per capita naturalizations (x^
Lottery visas (x^)
Silva visas (x\)
Western Hemisphere 1972-76 Oq)
Asia (z\)
Control































1. Within - between test of no endogeneity:
HO: individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors; X2(5) = 442.6 —> reject null.
2. Test of random effects:
HO: individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors; %2(5) = 56.52 —> reject null.
3. Test of exogeneity of Hausman-Taylor instruments:
HO: instruments are not endogenous; X2(5) = 0.81 —» do not reject null.
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Table Dl Means and Standard Deviations of Econometric Variables
Variable3
Rate of migration from / to U.S.A. (10~3)
Population in /(105)
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues (102)
% Urban
% Female in labor force

























































































Male education per capita (10"')
Female education per capita (10" 1 )
Relative female education
Median age in i

















a For variables carrying exponents, the reported data should be multiplied by the expo 
nent to give the actual coefficient.
b ln the regressions of Chapter 5, this variable has been multiplied by 102 . All other 
variables are defined as reported in this table.




Relative per capita income (x^
Relative growth of GDP (jq)
Government revenues (x2)
% Urban (jq)
% Female in labor force (x2)
Migration costs
Distance to U.S.A. (z\)
Birth rate (x2)
U.S. military presence (;c2)
Education (x2)
English language (z2)
U.S. college students (x2)





































































Per capita naturalizations (^2) 
Lottery visas Oq) 
Silva visas (x\)
Western Hemisphere 1972-76 (x{) 
Asia (z\) 
Social programs
Universal old-age (x^) 
Employment-related old-age (x2) 
Provident fund old-age (x^) 
Old-age pension not portable (x2) 
Universal sickness (^2) 
Cash sickness benefits (jc2) 
Maternity benefits (x^) 
Medical benefits (*2) 
Unemployment insurance (A^) 
Universal family allowance (jc2) 

































































No social All Numerically Numerically 
____________Variable_____________program variable___immigrants restricted exempt
Control
Population of i'<jes ) -2,418 -0.878 -0.175 -1.364 
Testofex«jgeneity<ofH-TiBSdmments 0.81 1.60 1.62 2.73
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Table El Gender Composition of Total U.S. Immigrants: /-Statistics
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban





















































































Sex ratio in i
Total U.S. immigration from /



















a Refers to the ratio of the female to the male education variables.
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Table E2 Female U.S. Immigrants By Entry Class: '-Statistics
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban























































































Sex ratio in /
Total U.S. immigration from i





















a Refers to the ratio of the female to the male education variables.
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Table Fl Age Composition of Immigrants: /-Statistics
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban





















































































Median age in i
Total migration from i aged 20 and over
























Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban







































































































































Median age in i
Total sex-specific immigration 
aged 20 and over from i











































a In the gender-specific regressions, the education variable is measured specific to the 
respective gender.
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Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban







































































































































Median age in i
Total aged 20 and over 
numerically restricted from ib











































a In the gender-specific regressions, the education variable is measured specific to the
respective gender. 
b ln the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to
the respective gender.
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Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban







































































































































Median age in i
Total exempt aged 20 and over 
from ib











































a In the gender-specific regressions,
respective gender. 
b ln the gender-specific regressions,
the respective gender.
the education variable is measured specific to the 
the control total variable is measured specific to
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Table Gl Highly Skilled Immigrants by Age: ^-Statistics
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban
















































































































Total U.S. immigration from ib





























a The control for the percentage of immigrants that does not declare an occupation is mea 
sured specific to the group examined (i.e., total, aged 20-34, and aged 35-64).
b The control total is measured specific to the group examined (i.e., total, aged 20-34, and 
aged 35-64).
Table G2 Highly Skilled Immigrants by Gender: ^-Statistics
Variable
Diff. econ. opportunity
Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban























































































































Silva visas -0.802 -1.726 -2.280 -4.489 -8.960 -2.799 
Western Hemisphere 1972-76 -4.595 -4.073 -0.909 -3.421 -2.173 0.252 
Asia 5.134 4.725 4.767 4.473 4.057 4.294
Social programs
Universal old-age 0.786 1.918 -0.623 1.659 1.953 1.039 
Employment-related old-age -2.394 -2.326 -1.275 -1.556 -1.524 -0.468 
Provident fund old-age 1.417 2.424 -1.248 1.595 2.477 -0.306 
Old-age pension not portable -1.589 -2.053 0.439 -1.487 -1.493 -0.014 
Universal sickness -1.460 -0.629 -0.835 0.126 0.119 0.779 
Cash sickness benefits 0.280 -1.188 3.314 0.373 -0.007 2.464 
Maternity benefits -0.112 1.072 -1.506 1.836 1.333 1.319 
Medical benefits 1.124 1.262 1448 1.151 2.245 0.608 
Unemployment insurance -0.678 -0.278 0.339 0.805 1.061 1.620 
Universal family allowance 1.269 1.897 0.656 1.425 2.499 0.739 
Employment family allowance 0.158 0.642 0.384 0.422 1.244 0.437
Control
% No occupation" -2.682 -1.950 0.070 -1.416 -0.351 0.224 
Total U.S. immigration from ic 13.477 13.761 19.195 18.036 22.387 22.560 
Test of exogeneity of H-T instruments____3.35_____3.04_____4.85______5.85______5.83_____4.25
a In the gender-specific regressions, the education variable is measured specific to the respective gender.
b In the gender-specific regressions, this control is measured specific to the respective gender, as well as to the specific age group. 
c In the gender-specific regressions, the control total variable is measured specific to the respective gender, as well as to the specific age 
group.
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Relative per capita income
Relative growth of GDP
Government revenues
% Urban








































































































































Total U.S. immigration from ic











































a In the gender-specific regressions, the education variable is measured specific to the 
respective gender.
b ln the gender-specific regressions, the percent no-occupation variable is specific to 
the respective gender, as well as immigrant class.
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established in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn, 
founder of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of 
employment income during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn 
Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of 
publications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a 
research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social 
scientists; 2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements 
the internal research program by providing financial support to researchers 
outside the Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major 
vehicle for disseminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other 
selected works in the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services 
division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment and 
training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute's research, grant, and publication 
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public and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make 
knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit 
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consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and 
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